Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ticonderoga Farms is a family-owned farming and agritourism business in Northern Virginia, managed by Peter J. Knop, who holds a majority interest. Over the years, Peter gifted shares to his children, resulting in Alexandra B. Knop and William J.W. Knop, along with the Evergreen Trust, holding minority interests. Persistent disputes arose among the family members regarding ownership percentages, management decisions, and financial transparency. In 2015, Peter converted the corporation into a limited liability company, assigning membership interests based on his own calculations, which the minority members contested. The parties engaged in extensive litigation over ownership, property, and company management, culminating in Peter issuing a capital call for substantial contributions from all members, which the minority members refused, citing lack of authority and transparency.The Loudoun County Circuit Court held a bench trial to resolve the disputes. It found that the purported operating agreement drafted by Peter was invalid, so the company was governed by the default provisions of the Virginia Limited Liability Company Act. The court ruled that Peter lacked authority to make the capital call and that the minority members were entitled to access company records. Regarding Peter’s request for judicial expulsion of the minority members under Code § 13.1-1040.1(5), the court found no material breach or wrongful conduct by the minority members and concluded their actions did not directly cause the company’s dysfunction. The court denied expulsion and, finding it not reasonably practicable for the company to continue business, ordered judicial dissolution of Ticonderoga Farms under Code § 13.1-1047.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s rulings, deferring to its factual findings. The Supreme Court of Virginia now reviews the case and holds that judicial expulsion under Code § 13.1-1040.1(5)(c) requires a direct causal link between a member’s conduct and the impracticability of business, which was not established here. Judicial dissolution under Code § 13.1-1047 is appropriate when it is not reasonably practicable to continue business, regardless of fault. The Supreme Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Ticonderoga Farms, LLC v. Knop" on Justia Law

A former school administrator, who frequently attended and commented at public school board meetings, was removed from a meeting by police after refusing to leave. She later sued the school board and officials for violations of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) and prevailed. Subsequently, a school board member filed an internal disciplinary complaint against another board member, attaching a narrative that included statements accusing the former administrator of perjury in the prior VFOIA litigation. Another board member, then chairperson, circulated this narrative and a related notice to the school board and superintendent. The former administrator obtained these documents and filed a civil complaint for defamation and defamation per se against the two board members.The Circuit Court of the City of Suffolk overruled the board members’ demurrers, which argued that they were immune from the defamation claims based on legislative, sovereign, and statutory immunity. The court found that the allegations in the amended complaint did not establish immunity at this stage. The board members sought interlocutory review of this decision.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo. It held that while disciplining a fellow board member is a legislative act protected by common law legislative immunity, the immunity does not necessarily extend to allegedly defamatory statements about a third party, such as the plaintiff, when those statements may not be integral to the legislative process. The Court also held that the board members, sued in their individual capacities, were not entitled to sovereign immunity for intentional torts like defamation. Finally, the Court found that statutory immunity under Code § 8.01-223.2 did not apply because the complaint sufficiently alleged that the statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brooks-Buck v. Wahlstrom" on Justia Law

Katie Orndoff appeared as a witness for the prosecution in a felony domestic assault jury trial in the Circuit Court for Loudoun County. During her testimony, she repeatedly referenced the defendant’s prior arrests and incarceration, despite admonitions from the court and objections from defense counsel. The circuit court observed that Orndoff’s demeanor was unusual, including rocking in her chair and nearly falling over, and questioned her about possible substance use. Orndoff admitted to smoking marijuana earlier that day. The circuit court found her in summary contempt for “misbehavior in the presence of the court” due to voluntary intoxication, sentenced her to ten days in jail, and declared a mistrial.Orndoff appealed her contempt conviction to the Court of Appeals of Virginia. A three-judge panel reversed the circuit court’s finding, holding that the trial judge did not personally observe all essential elements of the alleged contempt and improperly relied on Orndoff’s admission rather than direct observation. The panel found that summary contempt was inappropriate and that Orndoff’s due process rights were violated. Upon rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals was evenly divided, resulting in an affirmance of the circuit court’s judgment without opinion.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and applied an abuse of discretion standard. It held that summary contempt requires the judge to personally observe all essential elements of the misconduct in open court. The Supreme Court found that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Orndoff was voluntarily intoxicated while testifying, as the circuit court’s findings were contradicted by the record and relied on unreliable admissions. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reversed the circuit court’s contempt finding, and vacated Orndoff’s conviction. View "Orndoff v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped a rental pickup truck driven by the defendant after observing a traffic violation and noticing the vehicle’s dark window tint. Upon approaching, the officer detected the odor of marijuana and learned that the defendant had previously waived his Fourth Amendment rights as part of a plea agreement. After both occupants exited the vehicle, a search revealed marijuana shake and bags containing suspected narcotics. The officer then searched the defendant’s person, finding large amounts of cash and, during a pat-down over the defendant’s underwear, felt a hard object between the defendant’s buttocks and underwear. The defendant resisted as the officer attempted to retrieve the item, which was ultimately removed and found to contain cocaine and crack cocaine. At no point were the defendant’s genitals or buttocks exposed to the public.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was an impermissible, warrantless body cavity search under the Fourth Amendment. The Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk denied the motion, finding probable cause and exigent circumstances due to the potential danger of fentanyl and risk of evidence destruction. The defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The Court of Appeals of Virginia vacated the conviction, holding that the search was unreasonably intrusive and not justified by exigent circumstances, and that the evidence should have been suppressed.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, given the probable cause for arrest, the manner and location of the search, the risks posed by possible fentanyl exposure, and the need to prevent destruction of evidence. The Court found the search did not constitute a manual body cavity search and was justified as a search incident to arrest. The defendant’s conviction was reinstated. View "Commonwealth v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

A toll road operator in Loudoun County, Virginia, sought to increase toll rates, arguing that the State Corporation Commission (the Commission) misapplied statutory criteria and that denying the increase would constitute an uncompensated taking under the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions. The toll road, known as the Dulles Greenway, was built with private funds and has faced financial difficulties due to lower-than-expected traffic volumes. The operator, Toll Road Investors Partnership II, L.P. (TRIP II), has refinanced its debt multiple times and has previously received approval for toll increases.The Commission had previously approved several toll increases but denied TRIP II's latest application. The Commission's decision was based on the statutory criteria that toll rates must be reasonable to the user in relation to the benefit obtained, must not materially discourage use of the roadway, and must provide the operator no more than a reasonable return. The Commission found that TRIP II's proposed toll increase did not meet the "reasonable benefit to the user" or "material discouragement" criteria. The Commission also noted that TRIP II had significant cash reserves and had not made equity distributions since 2006 due to indenture restrictions.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Court held that the Commission's findings were supported by credible evidence and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The Court also rejected TRIP II's argument that the denial of the toll increase constituted an unconstitutional taking, noting that the Commission had acted within its authority and had considered the overall circumstances, including the public's interest and the financial condition of TRIP II. The Court concluded that the Commission's decision did not violate the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. View "Toll Road Investors Partnership II v. SCC" on Justia Law

In June 2016, Terae Harris, driving an Enterprise rental car, backed out of a parking space and struck James Joplin on his motorcycle. Enterprise offered Joplin a $25,000 settlement in exchange for releasing all claims against both Enterprise and Harris. Joplin did not respond, and in May 2018, he sued Harris for $300,000. In May 2020, Joplin’s new attorney found the signed release and sent it to Enterprise, but it was illegible. Harris filed a plea of accord and satisfaction, claiming the release barred Joplin’s suit.The Circuit Court of Henrico County admitted an unsigned copy of the release as evidence, ruling that the parol evidence rule did not apply because the unsigned release was used to confirm the terms of the illegible signed release. The court granted Harris’ plea of accord and satisfaction, barring Joplin’s suit. Joplin appealed, arguing the unsigned release was improper parol evidence, his attorneys lacked authority to settle, and there was no mutual assent.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court, holding that the unsigned release was improper parol evidence and that Harris had not met the burden of proof for its admissibility. The court did not address Joplin’s other arguments.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the unsigned release. The court held that the parol evidence rule did not apply because the unsigned release was used to verify the terms of the illegible signed release, not to alter them. The court also found that the circuit court’s factual finding linking the two releases was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment for Harris. View "Harris v. Joplin" on Justia Law

Luka Kartozia was observed by a security guard at Turnberry Tower, a condominium high rise, acting erratically and using an outside power outlet to charge his phone. When approached by security, Kartozia claimed to know a resident, Phil Yang, but refused offers to contact him. After repeated requests to leave by security and police, Kartozia was arrested for trespassing.Kartozia was found guilty of trespassing in the Arlington County General District Court and appealed to the Arlington County Circuit Court. At the circuit court trial, Kartozia proposed a jury instruction on a good-faith claim-of-right defense, which the court denied, finding insufficient evidence to support it. The jury convicted Kartozia, and he was fined $1,000.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court’s judgment, vacated the conviction, and remanded the case for retrial, ruling that the circuit court abused its discretion by not giving the proposed jury instruction. The Court of Appeals found that there was more than a scintilla of evidence supporting Kartozia’s claim that he believed he had a right to be on the property.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the jury instruction. The court found no credible evidence that Kartozia had a reasonable, good-faith belief that he was authorized to remain on the property after being asked to leave multiple times. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated the circuit court’s judgment, affirming Kartozia’s conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Kartozia" on Justia Law

Under Wild Skies, Inc. (UWS) owned a television show called Under Wild Skies, which was sponsored by the National Rifle Association (NRA). In January 2018, UWS and the NRA entered into agreements for the production and sponsorship of the show, effective through 2025. The NRA was required to make quarterly payments. In July 2019, the NRA requested information about the show as part of an internal review. UWS initially resisted but eventually provided the information. The NRA did not respond and failed to make the September 1, 2019 payment. UWS then sued the NRA for breach of contract and anticipatory breach.The trial court rejected UWS's proposed Jury Instruction 21 on the doctrine of adequate assurance, stating it would cause the court to comment on the evidence. The jury found in favor of UWS on the breach of contract claims but in favor of the NRA on the anticipatory breach claims. UWS's motion to set aside the verdict was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the doctrine of adequate assurance is not recognized in Virginia law.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the doctrine of adequate assurance, as outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251, is not part of Virginia's common law. The court emphasized that the doctrine is a modern innovation and has not been adopted by Virginia appellate courts or the General Assembly, except in limited circumstances. Consequently, the trial court did not err in refusing Jury Instruction 21, as it was not an accurate statement of Virginia law. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Under Wild Skies v. NRA" on Justia Law

Jamar Paxton was arrested in May 2020 for robbery and use of a firearm following the death of his girlfriend, Dominique Danzy. During interrogation, Paxton initially denied killing Danzy but later made incriminating statements after invoking his right to remain silent. The trial court found that Paxton had unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent but denied his motion to suppress the statements, ruling that Paxton voluntarily reinitiated the interrogation. Evidence presented at trial included Paxton's purchase of a rifle, forensic evidence linking the rifle to Danzy's murder, and Paxton's possession of Danzy's car keys and a cartridge casing.The jury found Paxton guilty of second-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of murder, and he was sentenced to 33 years in prison with 16 years suspended. Paxton appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which ruled that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statements. The Court of Appeals held that the error was not harmless because Paxton's incriminating statements were powerful evidence in a case with circumstantial evidence. The court also ruled that Paxton did not waive his challenge by testifying.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and determined that any error in admitting Paxton's statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that the Commonwealth downplayed the importance of Paxton's statements during closing arguments and focused on the physical evidence linking Paxton to the murder. The court concluded that the overall strength of the Commonwealth's case, including forensic evidence and Paxton's possession of Danzy's car keys, established that a rational jury would have found Paxton guilty even without the statements. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed Paxton's convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Paxton" on Justia Law

Norfolk Southern Railway Company challenged the constitutionality of Code § 56-16.3, which allows broadband service providers to install fiber optic cables across railroad property. The statute, enacted in 2023, aims to promote broadband expansion in Virginia. Cox Communications filed applications to install fiber optic cables under Norfolk Southern’s tracks, which Norfolk Southern did not initially oppose. However, a dispute arose over the license fees, leading Cox to proceed without a licensing agreement, prompting Norfolk Southern to seek relief from the State Corporation Commission (the “Commission”).The Commission rejected Norfolk Southern’s arguments without a hearing, finding the claims insufficient to establish undue hardship. Norfolk Southern appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which stayed the Commission’s judgment during the appeal.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether Code § 56-16.3 violated Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution. The court emphasized that eminent domain statutes must be strictly construed and that the burden of proving public use lies with the condemnor. The court found that Code § 56-16.3 did not reference public use and allowed a private company to take property for financial gain, which is not a public use under the Virginia Constitution.The court held that the application of Code § 56-16.3 in this case constituted a taking of Norfolk Southern’s property for a nonpublic use, violating the Virginia Constitution. Consequently, the court reversed the Commission’s judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. SCC" on Justia Law