Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kevin Thomas King was convicted of felony unauthorized use of another’s vehicle after a bench trial. The incident occurred on December 31, 2020, when King attended a party at Isaac Robertson, Jr.'s home. King asked Robertson if he could drive Robertson’s Volkswagen Jetta, but Robertson refused. Despite this, King took the car while Robertson was asleep and was later found unconscious and inebriated near the heavily damaged vehicle. Robertson confirmed he owned the car, which his brother had given him in 2020, although he had not registered it with the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) due to a suspended driver’s license.The trial court denied King’s motion to strike the evidence, which argued that Robertson was not the legal owner since he had not registered the car with the DMV. The court found that Robertson was the owner based on his possession and control of the vehicle and his testimony that his brother had given it to him. Consequently, King was convicted of unauthorized use of a vehicle.King appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, reiterating his argument that Robertson was not the legal owner due to the lack of DMV registration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating that the definition of “owner” in Code § 18.2-102 does not require DMV registration and that Robertson’s testimony and possession of the car were sufficient to establish ownership.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Robertson’s testimony and the circumstances of his possession and control of the vehicle were sufficient to establish that he was the owner, even without DMV registration. Thus, the evidence supported King’s conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle. View "King v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Nakia Durham was stopped by Officer Labat for driving with a suspended license. During the stop, Officer Labat noticed the smell of alcohol and saw an open container in the car. A subsequent search revealed a concealed firearm, leading to Durham's convictions for possession of a firearm by a nonviolent felon, carrying a concealed weapon unlawfully, and drinking while driving.In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Durham moved to suppress the firearm evidence, arguing the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The court denied the motion, finding the search justified based on the totality of the circumstances, including the odor of alcohol and the open container. Durham was convicted and sentenced to three years for the firearm possession, with additional penalties for the other charges.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision, applying a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to uphold the search's constitutionality. The court found that the presence of the open container, the smell of alcohol, and Durham's behavior provided probable cause for the search. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Durham's firearm convictions, noting his proximity to the weapon and his actions during the stop.The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that the search was justified under the totality of the circumstances and that the evidence was sufficient to support Durham's convictions. The court emphasized that probable cause does not require meeting all statutory prongs but rather a reasonable belief based on the overall situation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Durham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Joshua Adam Eckard was convicted by a jury of 12 counts of possession of child pornography. Following the verdict, Eckard filed a motion to set aside the jury verdict, alleging juror misconduct. He claimed that one juror had intimidated another into voting guilty. The motion included an email from a sheriff’s office employee and a letter from the Sheriff, both indicating that a juror felt threatened during deliberations and had complained about the trial process. However, there was no follow-up from the juror who made the complaint.The Circuit Court denied Eckard’s motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, stating that the allegations did not justify vacating the verdict or warrant judicial intrusion into the jury’s decision-making process. Eckard appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion without a hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, noting that the record did not support Eckard’s claims and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The appellate court emphasized that the allegations were vague and amounted to internal discord rather than external threats.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and upheld the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the verdict without an evidentiary hearing. The Court noted that the allegations were insufficiently detailed and did not constitute an exceptional case warranting judicial intervention. The Court also declined to consider additional documents Eckard attempted to introduce, as they were not part of the record before the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, maintaining the jury’s verdict. View "Eckard v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between H. Cliff Page and the Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority (PRHA). Page owned a building in Portsmouth that shared a common wall with a building owned by PRHA. In 2014, PRHA demolished its building after the City of Portsmouth declared it an unlawful nuisance. Page claimed that the demolition was negligently performed and damaged his building. PRHA responded with a plea in bar, raising the defense of sovereign immunity.The circuit court held a hearing on the plea in bar and ruled in favor of PRHA, holding that sovereign immunity barred Page’s claim. The court found that the demolition of the property was implemented under the City of Portsmouth’s plan to address blight in the Downtown Portsmouth Historic District. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s ruling, stating that PRHA’s immunity should be the same as that of the City of Portsmouth.However, the Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that sovereign immunity does not shield PRHA from tort liability under the circumstances of this case. The court found that PRHA was acting in its proprietary capacity, similar to a private landowner, when it demolished the building. The court concluded that PRHA's obedience to the City’s Notice of Emergency Demolition was not an exercise of governmental discretion but a ministerial legal duty to perform a proprietary function. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Page v. Portsmouth Redevelopment & Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Michael Powell and Melanie Knoepfler-Powell over the modification of their child custody arrangement. The couple divorced in 2017 and agreed to joint legal custody of their child, with primary physical custody granted to Melanie. In 2021, Melanie intended to move to Alabama and sought to modify the custody arrangement. Michael objected and sought an injunction to prevent the relocation. He also sought primary physical custody if Melanie relocated or more time with the child if she stayed in Virginia. Both parties also requested "tie-breaking authority" regarding the child's legal custody.The Fairfax County Circuit Court denied Michael's motion to modify the custody arrangement. The court allowed their child, who was nine years old, to testify and used her notes as a guide for questioning. The court admitted the notes as a demonstrative exhibit, meaning they had no independent probative value and were meant to explain or clarify other substantive evidence. The court used uncorroborated portions of the notes in its decision not to modify the custody arrangement. Michael appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred by reviewing the child's notes while she testified, admitting the notes as a demonstrative exhibit, and relying on them in reaching its decision.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the trial court's decision. It ruled that Michael failed to sufficiently preserve for appeal any challenges to the trial court's review of the child's notes or the admission of the notes as a demonstrative exhibit. The Court of Appeals also determined that the trial court's ruling was not actually based on the child's notes, but on testimony contained in the record.The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the portion of the Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It held that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the uncorroborated portions of the child's notes in determining whether it was in the child's best interests to modify the custody arrangement. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration. View "Powell v. Knoepfler-Powell" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County and Rita M. Leach-Lewis, trustee of the Rita M. Leach-Lewis Trust, which owns several homes in Fairfax County. These homes are used by members of the New World Church of the Christ, including Leach-Lewis, for activities such as handling correspondence, preparing spiritual teachings, and storing files and boxes. The homes are located in a residential-conservation zone, which prohibits office uses. After a zoning official conducted a search of the residences, a notice of violation of the zoning ordinance was issued, stating that the homes were being used as an "office."The notice of violation was appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), which upheld the zoning administrator's decision. Leach-Lewis then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the BZA's decision, arguing that the residences were not being used as an "office" and that the notice of violation was based on an improper search under the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court upheld the BZA's decision, and Leach-Lewis appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the BZA had a duty to interpret and apply a provision of the zoning ordinance that states that no part of the ordinance may be construed to authorize an unconstitutional inspection or search. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the BZA to determine whether the zoning ordinance was violated by the search of the church's property.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the BZA was not required to examine the constitutionality of the search underlying the notice of violation. The court also concluded that the residences were being used as an "office" as defined in the zoning ordinance. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment in favor of the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County. View "Board of Supervisors v. Leach-Lewis" on Justia Law

Travis Alexander Bland-Henderson was charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a violent felony. He was to be tried by a jury and filed a “Notice of Demand for Jury Sentencing” pursuant to Code § 19.2-295. However, Bland-Henderson missed the statutory deadline to file his request for jury sentencing, filing his notice only 13 days before trial. The Commonwealth objected to Bland-Henderson’s request for jury sentencing as untimely. Bland-Henderson acknowledged that he had filed the request late, but argued that his untimeliness did not eliminate his statutory right to be sentenced by the jury. The circuit court denied Bland-Henderson’s request for jury sentencing.The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, ruling that the circuit court had “correctly concluded that Bland-Henderson waived his request for jury sentencing by failing to submit his demand at least 30 days before trial.” The Court of Appeals also held that if the jury would not be sentencing the defendant, voir dire on sentencing ranges is not permitted, since that line of questioning would be irrelevant and would only encourage jury nullification.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the “shall” command in Code § 19.2-295, that instructs a defendant to file a request for jury sentencing at least 30 days prior to trial, is mandatory. Therefore, Bland-Henderson had waived his statutory right to jury sentencing by missing the statutory deadline to file his request. The court also held that there is no absolute right to voir dire jurors regarding potential sentencing ranges, since this line of questioning remains irrelevant and improper when the jury will not be sentencing the defendant. View "Bland-Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Tony Thomas, who was indicted for aggravated malicious wounding following a physical altercation that resulted in permanent injuries to the victim. The parties initially reached a plea agreement, which was presented to the trial court but not immediately accepted. The court indicated it would review the agreement and make a decision at a later date. However, due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and changes in the circumstances of the case, the parties renegotiated and entered into a second plea agreement, which was presented to a different judge and accepted.The original judge, upon learning of the second plea agreement, insisted on enforcing the first agreement, despite the parties having withdrawn their assent to it. The defendant and the Commonwealth both objected to this decision, arguing that they were free to renegotiate the plea agreement as it had not been accepted by the court. The trial court rejected these arguments and convicted the defendant based on the first plea agreement.The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, relying on the doctrine of approbate and reprobate and the court's inherent authority to take a matter under advisement for a later decision. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant was required to either present a new plea agreement to the original judge or inform the original judge that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea.The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, reversed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that parties are free to modify or renegotiate plea agreements when a trial court has not yet accepted the agreement. The court found that the trial court's insistence upon and implementation of a plea agreement that the parties had revoked was reversible error. The court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Thomas v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Stephen Lamar Garrick was found asleep in a vehicle with the engine running. Upon waking him, officers noticed signs of intoxication and a faint smell of marijuana. This led to a search of the vehicle, where they found a bag of heroin and a loaded handgun in the glove compartment. Garrick, the sole occupant of the vehicle, stated that his mother owned the car and he drove it three days a week. The glove compartment also contained two receipts for vehicle maintenance, both listing Garrick as the customer. Garrick was convicted of possession of heroin and possession of a firearm by a violent felon.Garrick appealed his convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove possession. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, stating that Garrick's occupancy of the vehicle, his proximity to the items, and his admission of driving the vehicle were insufficient to establish constructive possession. The Court of Appeals also noted that the maintenance receipts only served as evidence that Garrick regularly used the car, not that he knew about the heroin and firearm.The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, stating that the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Garrick was aware of the presence of the heroin and firearm. The court noted that Garrick was the sole occupant of the vehicle, was in close proximity to the items, and had been in the vehicle for a significant period of time. The court also pointed out that the maintenance receipts indicated that Garrick was responsible for the vehicle's upkeep, suggesting that he used the glove compartment where the items were found. The court concluded that the combined circumstances were sufficient to support the conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Garrick" on Justia Law

The case involves Montalla, LLC ("Montalla") and the Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Transportation ("VDOT"), and the Comptroller of Virginia (collectively the "Commonwealth"). Montalla filed a five-count complaint against the Commonwealth related to several contracts VDOT had entered into for construction inspection services. The circuit court dismissed the entire complaint, ruling that sovereign immunity barred all five counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, concluding that Counts I-III of the complaint were barred by sovereign immunity and that Counts IV-V were barred by the entry of a settlement agreement entered into by the pertinent parties.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the first three counts of the complaint were barred by sovereign immunity and that the last two counts were barred by the entry of a settlement agreement. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the settlement agreement was enforceable and that Montalla had not sufficiently alleged duress or repudiation to set it aside.The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar Montalla's claims based on valid contracts. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the settlement agreement, including the release of claims contained therein, was enforceable at this stage of the proceedings. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Montalla, LLC v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law