Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Renee Jauregui brought a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Shannon J. Cothran, her OB/GYN, alleging that between May and October 2018 she repeatedly informed Dr. Cothran about a lump in her breast during pregnancy-related visits. Jauregui stated that Dr. Cothran dismissed her concerns, diagnosing a clogged milk duct and assuring her that the lump was normal and would resolve itself. At her postpartum visit in October 2018, Jauregui was told to monitor the lump and call if there were changes. When Jauregui noticed a change in July 2019, she returned for a follow-up in August, resulting in a diagnosis of metastatic breast cancer.The Circuit Court of Fairfax County granted Dr. Cothran’s plea in bar, finding that Jauregui’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The court determined there was neither a continuous nor substantially uninterrupted course of examination or treatment after October 2018, thus the continuing treatment rule did not apply. The court concluded that no ongoing physician-patient relationship existed regarding the breast lump after the October 2018 appointment.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the continuing treatment rule does not require specific treatment and that Jauregui’s return in August 2019, pursuant to Dr. Cothran’s prior instructions, established a continuous and substantially uninterrupted course of examination for the same condition.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court did not err in sustaining Dr. Cothran’s plea in bar. It clarified that the continuing treatment rule requires a mostly continuous physician-patient relationship regarding a specific malady, and found that the ten-month gap between appointments constituted a substantial interruption. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that Jauregui’s claim was time-barred. View "Cothran v. Jauregui" on Justia Law

Five former employees of a construction company alleged that their employer failed to pay commissions they had earned after leaving the company. Four of the plaintiffs were paid solely by commission, while one received commissions and other compensation. The employer initially lacked a written commission policy but later required employees to sign agreements stating that commissions would be paid only up to 14 days after their departure, with no further commissions paid thereafter. The plaintiffs claimed they were owed significant sums in unpaid commissions after leaving, and three argued that the agreement violated statutory prohibitions against forfeiting wages for time worked as a condition of employment.The employer responded to the complaint by filing a demurrer in the Circuit Court, arguing that Virginia’s wage theft statute, Code § 40.1-29, did not apply to commissions. The Circuit Court agreed, holding that commissions were not covered by the statute. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the term “wages” in Code § 40.1-29 encompassed commissions. The Court of Appeals relied on the statute’s remedial purpose, previous decisions interpreting “wages” broadly, and an administrative agency’s interpretation.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and held that Code § 40.1-29 does not cover commissions, either expressly or by implication. The Court determined that the statute’s language and context indicate the General Assembly did not intend for commissions to be included, noting that the legislature has elsewhere specifically distinguished wages, salaries, and commissions. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia and entered final judgment for the employer. View "Groundworks Operations, LLC v. Campbell" on Justia Law

A physician contracted with two medical staffing companies to provide emergency medicine services at certain hospitals. After raising concerns in late 2020 about allegedly fraudulent billing practices and the mismanagement of federal COVID-19 relief funds, the physician was told in early 2021 that her contracts would not be renewed unless she accepted a significant pay cut. In March 2021, she discovered that she was no longer scheduled for work. Attempts to seek clarification were unsuccessful, and in June 2021, she received a letter confirming her employment was considered terminated as of March 3, 2021.She filed suit in the Henrico County Circuit Court on April 1, 2022, alleging, among other claims, a violation of the Virginia Whistleblower Protection Act (VWPA) for retaliatory termination. The staffing companies demurred and then filed a plea in bar, arguing that her claim was time barred because the alleged retaliatory act occurred more than one year before she filed suit. The circuit court denied the plea in bar, and on interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed. The Court of Appeals distinguished the case from Rivera v. Mantech International Corporation, reasoning that the physician was not given explicit notice of a definitive adverse employment action, and thus the statute of limitations did not begin to run in March 2021.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and held that under the VWPA, the statute of limitations begins to run when the employer commits a prohibited retaliatory action—not when the employee feels its full impact or receives definitive notice. The Court found that removal from the work schedule in March 2021 constituted the prohibited action. As a result, the physician’s claim, filed more than one year later, was time barred. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case. View "Ingleside v. Hollis" on Justia Law

In 1991, a jury convicted an individual of rape, sexual abuse, and abduction based on the testimony of the victim, who identified her attacker after encountering him twice following the assault. The incident occurred outdoors, and the victim described being attacked by a teenager whom she did not know. Physical evidence was collected at the hospital, but initial forensic testing at the time found no semen or foreign hairs linking the defendant to the crime. Despite the lack of biological evidence, the victim’s identification was central to the prosecution’s case, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.After exhausting direct appeals, the convicted individual sought post-conviction DNA testing decades later, alleging that advances in technology could yield exculpatory results. DNA testing was conducted on the biological evidence collected from the victim, including her underwear and swabs. The new tests found no male DNA on most items and excluded the defendant as a contributor to a partial DNA mixture found on the underwear. The individual then petitioned the Supreme Court of Virginia for a writ of actual innocence, arguing both the absence of his DNA and new non-biological evidence, including a declaration about the victim’s cognitive health and research on eyewitness identification.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the petition under the statutory standard requiring the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that no rational factfinder would have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the new evidence. The Court held that the new DNA results did not definitively link or exclude the defendant from the crime and that the non-biological evidence was speculative and collateral. The Court concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the statutory burden and dismissed the petition for a writ of actual innocence. View "In Re: Hargrove" on Justia Law

A city employee was driving a city-owned trash truck as part of his regular route, which required operating a specialized vehicle and collecting trash from hundreds of homes. On the day in question, while the employee was driving in a “normal” fashion and not actively conducting trash collection maneuvers, he failed to stop at a stop sign, resulting in a collision with another vehicle. The driver of the other vehicle, Taylor B. Jolley, sustained injuries and filed a lawsuit against both the city and the employee, alleging negligence.The case was first heard by the Circuit Court for the City of Chesapeake. That court sustained the city’s plea in bar, finding that both the city and its employee were protected by sovereign immunity and dismissing the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that neither the city nor the employee was entitled to sovereign immunity, reasoning that the employee was engaged in ordinary driving rather than discretionary or judgment-driven actions tied to the governmental function of trash collection.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case. It determined that the city itself was protected by sovereign immunity because trash collection is a governmental function, not a proprietary one. However, the court held that the employee was not entitled to sovereign immunity for his actions at the time of the collision, since he was engaged in ordinary driving, not exercising special discretion or judgment beyond typical driving tasks. The court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling as to the employee’s lack of immunity, reversed as to the city’s immunity, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision. View "Ellis v. Jolley" on Justia Law

The case involves a woman who, as a minor, engaged in a sexual relationship with an adult more than twice her age. After the relationship ended, she experienced significant psychological distress, including anxiety and difficulty with personal relationships, and was later diagnosed with PTSD by a psychologist. Years after the relationship, she reported the events to the police, resulting in criminal charges against the adult, who was ultimately acquitted. Over a decade after the relationship ended, she brought civil claims for negligence per se, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The Circuit Court of Fairfax County sustained the defendant’s plea in bar, finding that the statute of limitations had run. The court determined that the version of the Virginia accrual statute in effect when the plaintiff reached the age of majority governed the action. The court found no legislative intent to apply later, more favorable statutes retroactively and ruled that the limitations period began when the plaintiff turned 18. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, concluding that the relevant accrual statute did not apply retroactively and that the plaintiff’s own complaint demonstrated awareness of her injuries and their connection to the relationship before reaching adulthood.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed whether the lower courts erred in refusing to apply the more recent accrual statute retroactively and in finding that the plaintiff was aware of her injuries and their causal connection before the age of majority. The Supreme Court held that arguments for retroactive application of the statute were waived because they were not properly raised below, and that the record supported the finding that the plaintiff knew of her injury and its connection to the relationship as a minor. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the claims were time barred. View "Doe v. Green" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after pleading guilty in 2018 to felony larceny with intent to sell and driving with a revoked license, received suspended sentences conditioned on supervised probation. After completing his active sentences in 2021, he began probation but soon failed multiple urine screens, tested positive for cocaine, missed treatment appointments, failed to report to his probation officer, and was arrested for new crimes. His probation officer filed several reports alleging violations of various probation conditions, including failing to report, absconding, and committing new offenses. At his probation revocation hearing, he pleaded guilty to violations based on new convictions but not guilty to technical violations related to reporting and compliance.The Circuit Court of Loudoun County found him guilty of all alleged violations. During sentencing, the court remarked on the defendant’s failure to accept responsibility, among other factors, when determining the sentence. The court ultimately revoked a portion of the suspended sentence, resulting in an active term of incarceration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the circuit court improperly considered the defendant’s not-guilty pleas to the technical violations as an aggravating factor at sentencing and reversed for resentencing.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not enhance the sentence as punishment for the defendant’s exercise of his right to plead not guilty. Instead, the comments about the failure to accept responsibility were permissible considerations of rehabilitation potential and not explicitly linked to the plea. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Ticonderoga Farms is a family-owned farming and agritourism business in Northern Virginia, managed by Peter J. Knop, who holds a majority interest. Over the years, Peter gifted shares to his children, resulting in Alexandra B. Knop and William J.W. Knop, along with the Evergreen Trust, holding minority interests. Persistent disputes arose among the family members regarding ownership percentages, management decisions, and financial transparency. In 2015, Peter converted the corporation into a limited liability company, assigning membership interests based on his own calculations, which the minority members contested. The parties engaged in extensive litigation over ownership, property, and company management, culminating in Peter issuing a capital call for substantial contributions from all members, which the minority members refused, citing lack of authority and transparency.The Loudoun County Circuit Court held a bench trial to resolve the disputes. It found that the purported operating agreement drafted by Peter was invalid, so the company was governed by the default provisions of the Virginia Limited Liability Company Act. The court ruled that Peter lacked authority to make the capital call and that the minority members were entitled to access company records. Regarding Peter’s request for judicial expulsion of the minority members under Code § 13.1-1040.1(5), the court found no material breach or wrongful conduct by the minority members and concluded their actions did not directly cause the company’s dysfunction. The court denied expulsion and, finding it not reasonably practicable for the company to continue business, ordered judicial dissolution of Ticonderoga Farms under Code § 13.1-1047.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s rulings, deferring to its factual findings. The Supreme Court of Virginia now reviews the case and holds that judicial expulsion under Code § 13.1-1040.1(5)(c) requires a direct causal link between a member’s conduct and the impracticability of business, which was not established here. Judicial dissolution under Code § 13.1-1047 is appropriate when it is not reasonably practicable to continue business, regardless of fault. The Supreme Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Ticonderoga Farms, LLC v. Knop" on Justia Law

A former school administrator, who frequently attended and commented at public school board meetings, was removed from a meeting by police after refusing to leave. She later sued the school board and officials for violations of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) and prevailed. Subsequently, a school board member filed an internal disciplinary complaint against another board member, attaching a narrative that included statements accusing the former administrator of perjury in the prior VFOIA litigation. Another board member, then chairperson, circulated this narrative and a related notice to the school board and superintendent. The former administrator obtained these documents and filed a civil complaint for defamation and defamation per se against the two board members.The Circuit Court of the City of Suffolk overruled the board members’ demurrers, which argued that they were immune from the defamation claims based on legislative, sovereign, and statutory immunity. The court found that the allegations in the amended complaint did not establish immunity at this stage. The board members sought interlocutory review of this decision.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo. It held that while disciplining a fellow board member is a legislative act protected by common law legislative immunity, the immunity does not necessarily extend to allegedly defamatory statements about a third party, such as the plaintiff, when those statements may not be integral to the legislative process. The Court also held that the board members, sued in their individual capacities, were not entitled to sovereign immunity for intentional torts like defamation. Finally, the Court found that statutory immunity under Code § 8.01-223.2 did not apply because the complaint sufficiently alleged that the statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brooks-Buck v. Wahlstrom" on Justia Law

Katie Orndoff appeared as a witness for the prosecution in a felony domestic assault jury trial in the Circuit Court for Loudoun County. During her testimony, she repeatedly referenced the defendant’s prior arrests and incarceration, despite admonitions from the court and objections from defense counsel. The circuit court observed that Orndoff’s demeanor was unusual, including rocking in her chair and nearly falling over, and questioned her about possible substance use. Orndoff admitted to smoking marijuana earlier that day. The circuit court found her in summary contempt for “misbehavior in the presence of the court” due to voluntary intoxication, sentenced her to ten days in jail, and declared a mistrial.Orndoff appealed her contempt conviction to the Court of Appeals of Virginia. A three-judge panel reversed the circuit court’s finding, holding that the trial judge did not personally observe all essential elements of the alleged contempt and improperly relied on Orndoff’s admission rather than direct observation. The panel found that summary contempt was inappropriate and that Orndoff’s due process rights were violated. Upon rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals was evenly divided, resulting in an affirmance of the circuit court’s judgment without opinion.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and applied an abuse of discretion standard. It held that summary contempt requires the judge to personally observe all essential elements of the misconduct in open court. The Supreme Court found that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Orndoff was voluntarily intoxicated while testifying, as the circuit court’s findings were contradicted by the record and relied on unreliable admissions. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reversed the circuit court’s contempt finding, and vacated Orndoff’s conviction. View "Orndoff v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law