Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An undercover law enforcement officer conducted a controlled drug transaction with an individual inside a clothing store. Based on an affidavit alleging drug distribution, officers obtained both an arrest warrant for the individual and a search warrant for the store. When officers executed the search warrant, they ordered everyone to exit; the individual, who was the only occupant, was detained and handcuffed. Officers read the search warrant and affidavit to him but did not provide physical copies, reasoning that the store was not a residence and he was not its owner. The subsequent search uncovered marijuana and firearms, leading to additional charges.In the Circuit Court, the individual moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that Code § 19.2-56(B) required officers to provide a copy of the search warrant and affidavit to any occupant of a place being searched, not just for residences. The circuit court interpreted the statute as applying to all search warrants, but held that the individual was not entitled to copies because he was no longer an occupant after being arrested. The individual entered a conditional guilty plea to preserve his right to appeal. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, but on different reasoning. It concluded that the statutory requirement to provide copies applied only to search warrants for a “place of abode,” not commercial premises.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case to determine whether the statutory requirements of Code § 19.2-56(B) apply solely to search warrants for residences or to all premises. The Court held that the entirety of Code § 19.2-56(B) applies only to search warrants for a “place of abode.” Because the search occurred in a commercial establishment, the officers were not required to provide a copy of the warrant or affidavit. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Blow v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A police officer initiated a late-night traffic stop after observing a vehicle making frequent lane changes and driving well below the speed limit. The officer determined that the registered owner of the vehicle had a suspended license and that the driver, Nafeesa Rausham Knight-Walker, resembled the owner’s photo. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer confirmed that Knight-Walker was driving with a suspended license and that neither she nor her passenger could lawfully drive the car away. During the encounter, the officer asked Knight-Walker about weapons and drugs in the vehicle, questions which took approximately twelve seconds. Knight-Walker consented to a search of her person and her purse, and the officer subsequently found drug paraphernalia in the vehicle. She was later charged with possession of controlled paraphernalia.The Circuit Court for the City of Newport News denied Knight-Walker’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the officer did not unlawfully prolong the stop because the mission of the stop was not complete: Knight-Walker could not drive the car away, and it was reasonable for the officer to remain at the scene. The court also found her consent to search was voluntary. Knight-Walker entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed. The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed, holding that the officer’s questioning extended the stop beyond its permissible duration under the Fourth Amendment, citing Rodriguez v. United States, and suppressed the evidence.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer did not impermissibly extend the traffic stop. The brief questioning about weapons and drugs was deemed reasonable and related to officer safety, especially since the stop was ongoing and the officer needed to control the scene until a licensed driver arrived. The court also affirmed that Knight-Walker’s consent to search was voluntary and not tainted by an unlawful detention. Final judgment was entered for the Commonwealth. View "Commonwealth v. Knight-Walker" on Justia Law

Police officers observed the defendant engaging in behavior consistent with drug transactions in a high-crime area. After surveilling the defendant, officers detained him and found a drawstring bag in his possession containing multiple baggies of different controlled substances, including cocaine, BMDP, alprazolam, and a mixture of heroin and fentanyl. The defendant also had a large amount of cash, two cell phones, and a firearm. Laboratory testing confirmed the identity of the substances. An expert testified that the quantity, packaging, and variety of drugs, along with the cash and other items, indicated distribution rather than personal use.The defendant was tried in the Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake for several offenses, including possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute as a third or subsequent offense. At trial, the defendant moved to strike the fentanyl charge, arguing there was no evidence he knew the heroin mixture contained fentanyl. The jury convicted him on all counts, and the circuit court denied his renewed motion at sentencing. He appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which affirmed his conviction, holding that the circumstantial evidence and expert testimony supported a finding that he knowingly possessed fentanyl with intent to distribute.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case, focusing on whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant knew about the fentanyl in the mixture. The Court held that, given the defendant’s experience as a drug dealer, the market context, and the evidence presented, a rational factfinder could infer he was aware of the fentanyl’s presence. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn by the jury were sufficient. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Cuffee v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A man filed suit in 2017 against three individuals and a club, alleging that he was sexually abused as a child between 1993 and 2000. He claimed that the abuse caused him numerous injuries but asserted that he did not learn of the connection between the abuse and his injuries until 2014, after receiving psychotherapy. The defendants argued that his claims were barred by the statute of limitations, contending that he was aware of the connection between the abuse and his injuries before reaching adulthood, based on deposition testimony and documents such as statements the plaintiff made to police.The Circuit Court of Sussex County considered deposition transcripts and documentary evidence submitted by the parties, with no live testimony presented at the hearing. The circuit court found that the plaintiff knew of the causal relationship between the abuse and his injuries before he reached the age of majority in 2002. Thus, the court determined that his claims accrued when he became an adult, and were barred by the two-year statute of limitations that expired in 2004. The court granted the defendants’ pleas in bar, dismissing the claims.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed this decision, holding that, since only documentary evidence had been presented, the circuit court’s factual findings were not entitled to deference. It reviewed the matter de novo, found disputed material facts, and concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of review. The Supreme Court clarified that factual findings based on deposition evidence are entitled to substantial deference unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the claims were time-barred. View "Stevens v. Jurnigan" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a 50-foot-wide easement for ingress and egress over land owned by Thibault Enterprises, LLC, which is used by the Yosts to access their home. The easement is much wider than the gravel road the Yosts actually use, which is about 12 feet wide. Thibault has placed fences, grapevines, hay bales, and other objects within the easement's boundaries but not in the gravel road itself. These objects have not prevented or impeded the Yosts from traveling to and from their home. The Yosts requested an injunction to prohibit Thibault from placing anything within the 50-foot easement, arguing their entitlement to unrestricted use of the entire width.The Dinwiddie County Circuit Court granted an injunction, finding that although the objects did not interfere with the Yosts’ current use, their placement within the easement was improper. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, holding that any object placed within the easement’s defined width was an impermissible narrowing of the easement.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that Virginia law does not require the removal of all objects within an easement of defined width unless those objects unreasonably interfere with the easement holder’s rights. The Court held that the correct rule is one of reasonableness, which requires examining the deed and the purpose of the easement, and determining whether the servient owner’s actions unreasonably interfere with the easement. Because the objects did not impede the Yosts’ ingress or egress, Thibault was not required to remove them. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment for Thibault. View "Thibault Enterprises, LLC v. Yost" on Justia Law

A man traveling with his family, including his thirteen-year-old daughter, on Delta Air Lines was reported by a flight attendant for suspected human trafficking or sexual abuse after comforting his distressed daughter during turbulence. The flight attendant relayed her suspicions to the flight captain, who then involved the airport station manager, resulting in a call to law enforcement. Upon landing, police detained and questioned the man and his daughter but found no probable cause for arrest. The incident caused the man significant emotional distress and exacerbated his pre-existing PTSD.He subsequently filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the City of Newport News against the flight attendant, Delta, and Endeavor Air, alleging negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with parental rights, and false imprisonment. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and moved to dismiss, claiming immunity under Virginia Code § 63.2-1512. The district court agreed, holding that the defendants were immune because the report, even if made only to law enforcement and not to social services, was made in good faith and without malicious intent. The man appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was uncertain whether the immunity statute applied in this context and certified the legal question to the Supreme Court of Virginia.The Supreme Court of Virginia, upon review of the certified question, held that Virginia Code § 63.2-1512 does not provide immunity to a nonmandatory reporter who, in good faith, reports suspected child abuse to law enforcement without also contacting a Department of Social Services employee or the designated hotline. The Court reasoned that the statutory language is clear and limits immunity to specific categories, which do not include complaints made solely to law enforcement by nonmandatory reporters. The answer to the certified question was “no.” View "Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Frederick Lewis Moncrea was charged with multiple drug and firearm offenses. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was convicted of two counts of possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I or II controlled substance and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. As part of the agreement, Moncrea received a 25-year sentence with 22 years suspended, along with a period of supervised probation. The sentencing order entered by the trial court stated that Moncrea would be on supervised probation “until released by the Court or Probation Officer,” without specifying a precise duration.Moncrea did not object to the language regarding the duration of supervised probation before the trial court. He later appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing that the sentencing order was void ab initio because it imposed a period of supervised probation that could exceed the five-year maximum allowed by Code § 19.2-303. The Court of Appeals agreed with Moncrea, holding that any supervised probation beyond five years was void ab initio, as courts have no authority to impose probation conditions outside the parameters set by statute.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court’s sentencing order was not erroneous and did not violate the statutory limitation, as Code § 19.2-303 gives the court discretion to determine the conditions of probation so long as the period does not exceed five years. The Supreme Court found no evidence that Moncrea was, or would be, subject to supervised probation beyond the statutory maximum. Therefore, it did not reach the question of whether the sentencing order was void ab initio or merely voidable. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the sentence imposed by the trial court. View "Commonwealth v. Moncrea" on Justia Law

A child, J.H., was born to her biological mother and father in 2014. After the parents separated, they initially shared custody, but the mother was later awarded primary physical custody. In 2020, after allegations of the mother’s drug use and findings of abuse or neglect, the Tazewell County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court issued a protective order restricting the mother’s contact with J.H. and ultimately revoked her visitation rights due to noncompliance with court-ordered drug screenings. The mother later sought to amend the no contact order, but her efforts to do so were delayed and not diligently pursued.While the mother’s motion regarding visitation was pending, the child’s stepmother and father filed a petition in the Tazewell County Circuit Court for the stepmother to adopt J.H. without the mother’s consent, citing Virginia Code § 63.2-1202(H), which eliminates the need for a birth parent’s consent if, without just cause, the parent has neither visited nor contacted the child for six months prior to the adoption petition. The circuit court found that the mother had neither visited nor contacted J.H. during the relevant period and that this lack of contact was without just cause, as it resulted from her own conduct and insufficient efforts to modify the restrictive order. The circuit court approved the adoption.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, interpreting “just cause” under Code § 63.2-1202(H) to mean circumstances beyond the parent’s control, and agreeing that the mother’s own actions led to the no contact order. The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding the absence of just cause. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the mother’s consent was not required for the adoption to proceed. View "Perkins v. Howington" on Justia Law

A physician employed by a medical group entered into an employment agreement that included a noncompete clause prohibiting him from working for a competing healthcare organization within a specified geographic area for one year after leaving his position. After learning that the physician planned to join a competitor, the employer warned him that doing so would violate his contract. Nevertheless, after his employment ended, the physician began working for the competing medical group, which was a subsidiary of a hospital authority created by statute. The employer then sued the physician for breach of contract and the competitor for tortious interference with contract.The Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk considered only the pleadings and granted the competitor’s plea of sovereign immunity, dismissing the action against it with prejudice. The court adopted the argument that, as a subsidiary of the hospital authority, the competitor automatically shared in the authority’s sovereign immunity and was therefore immune from suit.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true. The Court held that a subsidiary or agent of an immune entity does not automatically share the principal’s sovereign immunity. Instead, whether a corporate agent shares in the principal’s immunity depends on the specific facts and circumstances, analyzed under a four-factor test articulated in prior Virginia cases. Because the record lacked sufficient facts to determine the competitor’s entitlement to immunity and because the competitor bore the burden of establishing such entitlement, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the circuit court erred by sustaining the plea of sovereign immunity. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Sentara Medical Group v. Klena" on Justia Law

A financial advisor sold her company to a buyer, with a portion of the purchase price to be paid up front and the remainder in quarterly installments. When the buyer failed to make the scheduled payments, the seller initiated arbitration through the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), as required by their agreement. The arbitration panel found the buyer in default and awarded damages to the seller. The buyer then sought to vacate the arbitration award in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond, arguing that one of the arbitrators had “evident partiality” due to undisclosed past connections with the seller and her company.The circuit court reviewed the motion to vacate and applied the “evident partiality” standard as interpreted by the Fourth Circuit in ANR Coal Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., and denied the motion, finding no clear evidence of bias. The buyer appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that the arbitrator’s prior connections with the seller and her company were too remote and insubstantial to suggest partiality, and that the undisclosed interactions did not create an appearance of bias that would require vacatur of the award.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case to clarify the standard for “evident partiality” under the Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act. The court held that, to vacate an arbitration award for evident partiality, a party must objectively show that a reasonable person, knowing all relevant facts, would perceive the arbitrator’s conduct as obvious bias against that party. Applying this standard, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that the arbitrator’s remote and inconsequential past connections did not meet this threshold. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings regarding attorney fees. View "Garofalo v. Di Vincenzo" on Justia Law