Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Virginia Electric and Power Company sought certificates of public convenience and necessity to construct two high-voltage overhead transmission line projects in Loudoun County, including the Aspen-Golden and Apollo-Twin Creeks Projects. The Aspen-Golden Project involved approximately nine miles of transmission lines, some running beside Route 7 in the Lansdowne community. VEPCO evaluated several routes and preferred Route 1AA, asserting it minimized adverse impacts. The Apollo-Twin Creeks Project involved about 1.9 miles of transmission lines, some collocated with the Aspen-Golden lines, to serve data centers. VEPCO proposed overhead construction for both projects due to feasibility concerns with underground alternatives.The State Corporation Commission consolidated the applications for review. Loudoun County and Lansdowne Conservancy objected to overhead lines along Route 7, arguing for underground construction to protect scenic and historic assets, including Belmont Manor. They submitted an Updated Hybrid Proposal for partial underground construction, but VEPCO and Commission staff questioned its feasibility, cost, and engineering challenges. After public hearings and detailed testimony, the hearing examiner recommended approval of overhead construction along Route 1AA, finding underground options infeasible within required timelines and statutory criteria, and noting the proposal’s analytical deficiencies.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the Commission’s final orders, affirming the Commission’s approval of the CPCNs. The Court held that the Commission properly verified the need for the Aspen-Golden Project, reasonably rejected underground construction due to cost, engineering challenges, and timing, and gave due consideration to the local comprehensive plan and scenic easement. The Court concluded that the Commission’s decisions minimized adverse impacts to the extent reasonably practicable and found no abuse of discretion in declining to impose additional mitigation conditions or in approving the Apollo-Twin Creeks Project. The judgments were affirmed. View "Lansdowne Conservancy v. SCC" on Justia Law

An officer employed by the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office was demoted following an internal-affairs investigation into a jailhouse incident involving deputies under his supervision. After his demotion, the officer requested access to certain internal-affairs records, including documentary and video materials, under both the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) and the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act (Government Data Act). While his personnel file was provided, his requests for internal-affairs records were denied on grounds that they were exempt from disclosure under the VFOIA and that he lacked standing under the Government Data Act. The officer filed suit in the General District Court against the sheriff in his official capacity, seeking the records. After an adverse decision, he appealed to the Circuit Court, which also denied his claims. The Circuit Court concluded that the internal-affairs records were exempt from disclosure under the VFOIA and that, under the Government Data Act, the officer was not a “data subject” because the records were not indexed or searchable by his name or other identifying particulars. The court also found that these records were not part of his personnel file. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s rulings, agreeing that the officer was not a “data subject” under the Government Data Act and was not entitled to the records under either statute. The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed only the claims under the Government Data Act. The Court held that the sheriff’s office violated the Act by refusing to provide the officer access to internal-affairs records related to his actions or inactions as a supervising deputy, because the statutory definition of “data subject” is not limited to records formally indexed by name but also includes records that may be located using an individual’s name or identifying particulars. The Court affirmed the denial of relief under the VFOIA but reversed as to the Government Data Act and remanded for in camera review and redaction of non-personal information. View "Keil v. O'Sullivan" on Justia Law

An infant girl was discovered severely wounded on an Afghan battlefield by U.S. forces in 2019. With no known surviving family and urgent medical needs, she was transferred to U.S. military care. Joshua and Stephanie Mast, learning of her plight while stationed in Afghanistan, initiated legal proceedings in Virginia, ultimately receiving an adoption order in 2020. The initial court found compelling evidence that the child was stateless, her parents were deceased, and Afghan authorities were unwilling or unable to care for her. The Masts were found credible, and the adoption was supported by the Department of Social Services and a guardian ad litem. Later, A.A. and F.A. filed a petition to vacate the adoption, claiming Afghan law made them the child’s guardians and the adoption was procured by fraud. The Circuit Court of Fluvanna County, and subsequently the Court of Appeals of Virginia, found that Code § 63.2-1216—which bars collateral or direct attacks on adoption orders after six months—did not apply, relying on various legal theories including “de facto parent” status and federal preemption. On review, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Code § 63.2-1216’s plain language bars all attacks on final adoption orders after six months, including those based on alleged fraud, procedural errors, or lack of jurisdiction, unless the challenger is a legal parent with a fundamental liberty interest. The Court rejected the “de facto parent” constitutional argument, found no federal preemption, and determined that neither the factual record nor law supported exempting the challengers from the statute of repose. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and dismissed the petition to vacate the adoption order with prejudice. View "Mast v. A.A." on Justia Law

Two competing software companies specializing in business process management platforms were embroiled in a dispute after one company's employee, acting as a covert consultant, obtained confidential information about the other’s products. The employee, who had access through a third-party government contractor, provided the competitor with detailed tutorials, internal documentation, and live presentations designed to help the competitor improve its own offerings and target the rival’s weaknesses in sales efforts. The information was disseminated within the competitor’s organization and used both to inform product development and to shape competitive strategy. The aggrieved company discovered the espionage years later when the consultant’s handler joined its staff and disclosed the conduct. The company then pursued claims for trade secret misappropriation under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act, among other causes.The Circuit Court for Fairfax County oversaw a lengthy trial and issued several key evidentiary and instructional rulings: it excluded evidence about the number of users who had access to the alleged trade secrets, limited the competitor’s damages defense based on a discovery response, prohibited the competitor from authenticating certain software versions except on a specified laptop, and issued a damages instruction that shifted the burden of proof to the competitor. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded substantial damages. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the jury’s finding of misappropriation but reversed the judgment, holding that the circuit court committed multiple errors in its evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, and remanded for a new trial on the trade secret claims.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment. It held that the circuit court erred by shifting the burden of proof for damages to the defendant, by limiting the defendant’s damages evidence, by precluding authentication of software exhibits, and by instructing the jury that the number of people with access to the trade secrets was irrelevant. The Supreme Court ordered a remand for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Appian Corporation v. Pegasystems" on Justia Law

Renee Jauregui brought a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Shannon J. Cothran, her OB/GYN, alleging that between May and October 2018 she repeatedly informed Dr. Cothran about a lump in her breast during pregnancy-related visits. Jauregui stated that Dr. Cothran dismissed her concerns, diagnosing a clogged milk duct and assuring her that the lump was normal and would resolve itself. At her postpartum visit in October 2018, Jauregui was told to monitor the lump and call if there were changes. When Jauregui noticed a change in July 2019, she returned for a follow-up in August, resulting in a diagnosis of metastatic breast cancer.The Circuit Court of Fairfax County granted Dr. Cothran’s plea in bar, finding that Jauregui’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The court determined there was neither a continuous nor substantially uninterrupted course of examination or treatment after October 2018, thus the continuing treatment rule did not apply. The court concluded that no ongoing physician-patient relationship existed regarding the breast lump after the October 2018 appointment.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the continuing treatment rule does not require specific treatment and that Jauregui’s return in August 2019, pursuant to Dr. Cothran’s prior instructions, established a continuous and substantially uninterrupted course of examination for the same condition.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court did not err in sustaining Dr. Cothran’s plea in bar. It clarified that the continuing treatment rule requires a mostly continuous physician-patient relationship regarding a specific malady, and found that the ten-month gap between appointments constituted a substantial interruption. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that Jauregui’s claim was time-barred. View "Cothran v. Jauregui" on Justia Law

Five former employees of a construction company alleged that their employer failed to pay commissions they had earned after leaving the company. Four of the plaintiffs were paid solely by commission, while one received commissions and other compensation. The employer initially lacked a written commission policy but later required employees to sign agreements stating that commissions would be paid only up to 14 days after their departure, with no further commissions paid thereafter. The plaintiffs claimed they were owed significant sums in unpaid commissions after leaving, and three argued that the agreement violated statutory prohibitions against forfeiting wages for time worked as a condition of employment.The employer responded to the complaint by filing a demurrer in the Circuit Court, arguing that Virginia’s wage theft statute, Code § 40.1-29, did not apply to commissions. The Circuit Court agreed, holding that commissions were not covered by the statute. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the term “wages” in Code § 40.1-29 encompassed commissions. The Court of Appeals relied on the statute’s remedial purpose, previous decisions interpreting “wages” broadly, and an administrative agency’s interpretation.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and held that Code § 40.1-29 does not cover commissions, either expressly or by implication. The Court determined that the statute’s language and context indicate the General Assembly did not intend for commissions to be included, noting that the legislature has elsewhere specifically distinguished wages, salaries, and commissions. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia and entered final judgment for the employer. View "Groundworks Operations, LLC v. Campbell" on Justia Law

A physician contracted with two medical staffing companies to provide emergency medicine services at certain hospitals. After raising concerns in late 2020 about allegedly fraudulent billing practices and the mismanagement of federal COVID-19 relief funds, the physician was told in early 2021 that her contracts would not be renewed unless she accepted a significant pay cut. In March 2021, she discovered that she was no longer scheduled for work. Attempts to seek clarification were unsuccessful, and in June 2021, she received a letter confirming her employment was considered terminated as of March 3, 2021.She filed suit in the Henrico County Circuit Court on April 1, 2022, alleging, among other claims, a violation of the Virginia Whistleblower Protection Act (VWPA) for retaliatory termination. The staffing companies demurred and then filed a plea in bar, arguing that her claim was time barred because the alleged retaliatory act occurred more than one year before she filed suit. The circuit court denied the plea in bar, and on interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed. The Court of Appeals distinguished the case from Rivera v. Mantech International Corporation, reasoning that the physician was not given explicit notice of a definitive adverse employment action, and thus the statute of limitations did not begin to run in March 2021.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and held that under the VWPA, the statute of limitations begins to run when the employer commits a prohibited retaliatory action—not when the employee feels its full impact or receives definitive notice. The Court found that removal from the work schedule in March 2021 constituted the prohibited action. As a result, the physician’s claim, filed more than one year later, was time barred. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case. View "Ingleside v. Hollis" on Justia Law

In 1991, a jury convicted an individual of rape, sexual abuse, and abduction based on the testimony of the victim, who identified her attacker after encountering him twice following the assault. The incident occurred outdoors, and the victim described being attacked by a teenager whom she did not know. Physical evidence was collected at the hospital, but initial forensic testing at the time found no semen or foreign hairs linking the defendant to the crime. Despite the lack of biological evidence, the victim’s identification was central to the prosecution’s case, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.After exhausting direct appeals, the convicted individual sought post-conviction DNA testing decades later, alleging that advances in technology could yield exculpatory results. DNA testing was conducted on the biological evidence collected from the victim, including her underwear and swabs. The new tests found no male DNA on most items and excluded the defendant as a contributor to a partial DNA mixture found on the underwear. The individual then petitioned the Supreme Court of Virginia for a writ of actual innocence, arguing both the absence of his DNA and new non-biological evidence, including a declaration about the victim’s cognitive health and research on eyewitness identification.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the petition under the statutory standard requiring the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that no rational factfinder would have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the new evidence. The Court held that the new DNA results did not definitively link or exclude the defendant from the crime and that the non-biological evidence was speculative and collateral. The Court concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the statutory burden and dismissed the petition for a writ of actual innocence. View "In Re: Hargrove" on Justia Law

A city employee was driving a city-owned trash truck as part of his regular route, which required operating a specialized vehicle and collecting trash from hundreds of homes. On the day in question, while the employee was driving in a “normal” fashion and not actively conducting trash collection maneuvers, he failed to stop at a stop sign, resulting in a collision with another vehicle. The driver of the other vehicle, Taylor B. Jolley, sustained injuries and filed a lawsuit against both the city and the employee, alleging negligence.The case was first heard by the Circuit Court for the City of Chesapeake. That court sustained the city’s plea in bar, finding that both the city and its employee were protected by sovereign immunity and dismissing the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that neither the city nor the employee was entitled to sovereign immunity, reasoning that the employee was engaged in ordinary driving rather than discretionary or judgment-driven actions tied to the governmental function of trash collection.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case. It determined that the city itself was protected by sovereign immunity because trash collection is a governmental function, not a proprietary one. However, the court held that the employee was not entitled to sovereign immunity for his actions at the time of the collision, since he was engaged in ordinary driving, not exercising special discretion or judgment beyond typical driving tasks. The court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling as to the employee’s lack of immunity, reversed as to the city’s immunity, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision. View "Ellis v. Jolley" on Justia Law

The case involves a woman who, as a minor, engaged in a sexual relationship with an adult more than twice her age. After the relationship ended, she experienced significant psychological distress, including anxiety and difficulty with personal relationships, and was later diagnosed with PTSD by a psychologist. Years after the relationship, she reported the events to the police, resulting in criminal charges against the adult, who was ultimately acquitted. Over a decade after the relationship ended, she brought civil claims for negligence per se, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The Circuit Court of Fairfax County sustained the defendant’s plea in bar, finding that the statute of limitations had run. The court determined that the version of the Virginia accrual statute in effect when the plaintiff reached the age of majority governed the action. The court found no legislative intent to apply later, more favorable statutes retroactively and ruled that the limitations period began when the plaintiff turned 18. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, concluding that the relevant accrual statute did not apply retroactively and that the plaintiff’s own complaint demonstrated awareness of her injuries and their connection to the relationship before reaching adulthood.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed whether the lower courts erred in refusing to apply the more recent accrual statute retroactively and in finding that the plaintiff was aware of her injuries and their causal connection before the age of majority. The Supreme Court held that arguments for retroactive application of the statute were waived because they were not properly raised below, and that the record supported the finding that the plaintiff knew of her injury and its connection to the relationship as a minor. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the claims were time barred. View "Doe v. Green" on Justia Law