Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Arbitration & Mediation
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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the State Corporation Commission (SCC) that approved a petition filed by the Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) to obtain a rate-adjustment clause pursuant to Va. Code 56-585.1(A)(5)(e), holding that, contrary to the arguments brought by Applalachian Voices on appeal, the SCC applied the proper legal standard governing such requests.VEPCO made its request to recover projected costs of purchasing allowances through the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-trade market regulating carbon dioxide emissions by electric utilities. On appeal, Appalachian Voices, a nonprofit environmental organization, argued that the SCC failed to apply the law when it approved VEPCO's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the SCC did not misunderstand or fail o apply the legal standard governing petitions filed pursuant to Va. Code 56-585.1(A)(5)(e). View "Appalachian Voices v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying a refund of Business and Professional Occupational License (BPOL) taxes Coxcom, LLC paid to Fairfax County on the grounds that the Internet Tax Freedom Act's (ITFA) grandfather clause permitted the County to impose the tax, holding that the grandfather clause did not apply.Since 2000, Cox had provided internet access service to customers in the County. In 2016, Cox filed a request for a BPOL tax refund for the tax years 2013 through 2015, asserting that the federal ITFA preempted the County from imposing the BPOL tax on internet access service revenues. The circuit court concluded that the BPOL tax qualified for the grandfather clause exemption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that the ITFA applied to the County's BPOL tax; and (2) the grandfather clause did not rescue the County's imposition of a tax on internet access services. View "Coxcom, LLC v. Fairfax County" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that the Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act, Va. Code 8.01-581.01 to -.016 (VUAA), and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1-16 (FAA), do not compel enforcement of an arbitration clause in a trust.The decedent created an inter vivos irrevocable trust that was divided into three shares for his children and grandchildren. The trust contained an unambiguous arbitration clause. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, the trust's trustee, alleging breach of duty. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a trust is neither a contract nor an agreement that can be enforced against a beneficiary; and (2) therefore, neither the VUAA nor the FAA compel arbitration. View "Boyle v. Anderson" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court refusing to enforce arbitration agreements between NC Financial Solutions of Utah, LLC (NCFS-Utah) and the individual consumers who were affected by alleged violations of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA), Va. Code 59.1-196-59.1-207, holding that the circuit court did not err.The Attorney General, acting on behalf of the Commonwealth, filed this action against NCFS-Utah to enforce the provisions of the VCPA. The complaint requested injunctive relief, civil penalties, and awards of attorney's fees, costs, and reasonable expenses. NCFS-Utah filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the individual Virginia consumers had agreed to arbitrate any disputes arising from the loans at issue. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the Commonwealth was not bound by the arbitration agreements between NCFS-Utah and the Virginia consumers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that sections 59.1-203 and 59.1-205, read together, implicitly authorize the Attorney General to request a restitution award when pursuing a VCPA enforcement action on behalf of the Commonwealth. View "NC Financial Solutions of Utah, LLC v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court denying Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the circuit court erred in denying the motion for arbitration because the parties’ disagreements were controversies arising out of or relating to their contract, and therefore, pursuant to the contract, an arbitrator must resolve them.Plaintiffs sued Defendant, alleging that the home Defendant constructed for Plaintiffs suffered from defects that caused damage to the home. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration under the arbitration clause of the parties’ contract. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration clause was unenforceable. The supreme Court reversed, holding that the parties’ disagreement over the interpretation of the arbitration clause, as well as the application of the doctrine of impossibility to the arbitration clause, were “controvers[ies] arising out of or relating to the contract,” and therefore, the circuit court erred in refusing to compel arbitration. View "Brush Arbor Home Construction, LLC v. Alexander" on Justia Law

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In this appeal of a judgment confirming an arbitration award, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not err in refusing to vacate the arbitration award under Va. Code 8.01-581.010.Plaintiff filed a fourteen-count complaint against Defendants alleging liability theories for conspiracy, conversion, legal malpractice, breach of trust, and other causes of action. Defendants moved to have the dispute submitted to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration provision in an agreement between the parties. The circuit court granted the motion to compel arbitration, and the arbitrators found in favor of Defendants on all counts. The circuit court confirmed the award in its entirety and denied Plaintiff’s application to vacate the award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no basis in law or fact for reversing the circuit court’s confirmation of the arbitration award. View "Meuse v. Henry" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff worked for the Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority (ARHA) before being discharged for violating ARHA’s “absenteeism and tardiness policies.” Plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court claiming that she had been improperly discharged. The circuit court denied Plaintiff’s request for reinstatement and her claim for money damages but held that Plaintiff was entitled to have her claims arbitrated under ARHA’s grievance procedure. The Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment in favor of ARHA, holding that the circuit court misapplied Va. Code 15.2-1507(A)(7)(b) and erred in ordering ARHA to arbitrate Plaintiff’s grievance. View "Alexandria Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Walker" on Justia Law

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In 2007, Schuiling hired Harris as his full-time, live-in housecleaner. Harris signed an arbitration agreement, a one-page, pre-printed form prepared for Schuling’s auto business, stating that disputes “shall be resolved exclusively by arbitration administered by the National Arbitration Forum under its code of procedure then in effect.” In 2011, Harris sued Schuiling, alleging multiple torts, statutory violations, and breach of contract. Schuiling moved to enforce arbitration under Code § 8.01-581.02(A), stating that the National Arbitration Forum was no longer available and requesting the court to appoint a substitute arbitrator under Code § 8.01-581.03. Harris argued that unavailability of the named arbitrator, coupled with the agreement’s failure to provide for a substitute arbitrator, rendered the agreement unenforceable. The circuit court agreed with Harris and denied the motion to compel arbitration. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed. Relying on the intention of the parties as expressed in the language of the agreement, the court concluded that NAF’s designation as arbitrator was not integral and was severable in order to give effect to the arbitration requirement, the sole purpose of the agreement. View "Schuiling v. Harris" on Justia Law

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After Roger Hudspeth's employment with the Bank of the Commonwealth was terminated, Hudspeth filed a complaint against the Bank, alleging the Bank failed to pay him compensation owed for his employment. The Bank filed a motion to stay and compel arbitration before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), arguing (1) the Bank was a "customer" as defined by the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (Customer Code), (2) Hudspeth was an associated person of a "member," and (3) because the dispute was between a customer and an associated person of a member, arbitration was mandatory under the Customer Code. The circuit court denied the Bank's motion, concluding that the Bank was not a customer under the Customer Code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Customer Code was susceptible to an interpretation under which the Bank could be considered a customer, and (2) because under the Federal Arbitration Act any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, the circuit court erred when it denied the Bank's motion in this case. Remanded. View "Bank of the Commonwealth v. Hudspeth" on Justia Law