Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was injured when her vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by Defendant. In 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint to recover damages for injuries she suffered in the collision, but the complaint contained a misnomer that misnamed Defendant. Plaintiff subsequently moved to nonsuit her claim, and the trial court granted the nonsuit. In 2012, Plaintiff refiled her complaint properly naming Defendant. Defendant filed a special plea in bar asserting that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that the 2011 complaint did not toll the statute of limitations where Plaintiff failed to correct the misnomer within the time period contemplated by Va. Code 8.01-6. The trial court sustained Plaintiff’s plea in bar. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although Plaintiff was not properly named in the 2011 complaint, there was no doubt that she was the party identified, and therefore, the tolling provisions of Va. Code 8.01-229(E) applied, and Plaintiff’s 2012 complaint was timely filed. View "Richmond v. Volk" on Justia Law

Gary Wooten purchased property before marrying Iracy Wooten. Gary subsequently executed a deed of trust to secure a loan. Thereafter, Gary conveyed the property to himself and Iracy as tenants by the entirety. Approximately two weeks later, the lender recorded the deed of trust executed solely by Gary. Five years later, the lender filed suit against Gary and Iracy seeking a judicial reformation of the deed of trust to include Iracy as grantor or to declare her interest in the property to be encumbered by the deed of trust. Iracy responded that she knew nothing of the deed of trust or the loan and first learned of them during divorce proceedings with Gary. Meanwhile, a final divorce decree was entered ordering that the property be sold and any remaining proceeds be divided equally between the parties. In the lender’s proceeding, the lender argued that Iracy was judicially estopped from denying that her interest was subject to Gary’s deed of trust and that the divorce decree justified this conclusion. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the lender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel based solely upon the divorce decree. Remanded. View "Wooten v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

Jennifer Ploutis’ home was insured under a policy issued by Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company when water pipes in the home burst, damaging the home and certain contents. When the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the cost of certain repairs, Ploutis filed a complaint for breach of contract against Allstate. Upon the request of Ploutis, the action was nonsuited. Well after two years after the damage was sustained, Ploutis filed the present action. Allstate filed a demurrer asserting that Ploutis failed to comply with the conditions precedent under the policy by bringing the action within two years “after the inception of loss or damage.” The circuit court overruled the demurrer, concluding that the limitations period was tolled pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-229(E)(3), which tolls the “statute of limitations” with respect to nonsuited actions. Judgment was entered in favor of Ploutis. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and entered final judgment for Allstate, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that section 8.01-229(E)(3) applies to the contractual period of limitations for filing an action under Allstate’s policy. View "Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ploutis" on Justia Law

In this matter concerning the care and custody of the children of Kristin Burns, the circuit court enjoined Burns from pursuing any further action until after she completed certain mental and parental fitness evaluations. On March 25, 2015, the court denied Burns’ motion for leave to file documents in this matter for the reasons stated in its previous order. On the fifteenth day after entry of the March 25, 2015, when her petition for review was due, Burns dispatched the petition to the Clerk’s Office of the Court of Appeals by pre-paid transmittal with a third-party commercial carrier for next-day delivery. The Court of Appeals denied the petition as untimely, concluding that Burns did not file the petition within fifteen days of entry of the March 25, 2015 order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) for purposes of Va. Code 8.01-626, a petition for review is deemed to have been “presented to a judge of the Court of Appeals" when it has been filed with the Clerk’s Office of the Court of Appeals; and (2) therefore, Burns’ petition was timely filed with the Court of Appeals. View "Burns v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant were involved in an automobile accident in which the vehicles being operated by each of them collided. Plaintiff filed suit and attempted to serve the complaint and summons on Defendant at a prior address despite having knowledge of Defendant’s correct address. Plaintiff subsequently used Defendant’s proper address for service of additional pleadings but did not serve the complaint and summons at his current address. Plaintiff later obtained a default judgment awarding the full amount of damages she claimed. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved to set aside the default judgment, averring that there existed some question regarding whether Defendant was validly served with process. The circuit court denied Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decision whether to grant Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the default judgment was within the circuit court’s discretion; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment. View "Sauder v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc. filed a defamation action against three John Doe defendants alleging that they falsely represented themselves as Hadeed customers and posted negative reviews about Hadeed’s services on Yelp, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California. Hadeed issued a subpoena duces tecum to Yelp seeking documents located in California revealing the identity and other information about the reviews’ authors. The circuit court entered an order enforcing the subpoena duces tecum and holding Yelp in civil contempt when it refused to comply. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that service of the subpoena on Yelp’s registered agent in Virginia provided the circuit court with jurisdiction to enforce the subpoena duces tecum. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and the contempt order of the circuit court, holding that the circuit court was not empowered to enforce the subpoena duces tecum against Yelp, as subpoena power was not conferred upon the circuit court by Yelp’s act in registering to conduct business in Virginia or designating a registered agent for service of process in Virginia. View "Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were former employees by Verizon Virginia, Inc. Plaintiffs sued Verizon and the Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO District 2 after Plaintiffs accepted an “Enhanced Income Security Plan” based on the assurances that they would not be terminated but were nonetheless terminated. Defendants filed notices of removal to the federal district court, arguing that Plaintiffs’ state-law claims were completely preempted by section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The district court concluded that Plaintiffs’ state-law claims were not completely preempted and there was no federal jurisdiction. On remand, the circuit court agreed with Defendants on the complete preemption issue and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred by dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of jurisdiction, even if they were completely preempted; and (2) Plaintiffs’ claims were not completely preempted. View "Anthony v. Verizon Va., Inc." on Justia Law

Antonio Amos was convicted of assaulting his estranged wife, Felecia Amos, and ordered not to contact or harass Felecia. Felecia subsequently alleged that Antonio had harassed her. The Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney sought and obtained a rule to show cause against Antonio. After a hearing on the show cause order, the trial court ruled that Antonio had not violated the terms and conditions of his probation, held Felecia in contempt of court, and sentenced Felecia to jail for ten days. Felecia appealed. The court of appeals reversed Felecia’s summary contempt conviction, concluding that the trial court deprived Felecia of any opportunity to object at the time of the ruling and that, pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-384(A), Felecia did not default the arguments raised on appeal by failing to object at the time the trial court held her in contempt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in holding that the contemporaneous objection exception in section 8.01-384(A) allows a litigant who was precluded by the trial court from asserting a contemporaneous objection to the court’s ruling to raise the issue on appeal, notwithstanding the provisions of Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5A:18. View "Commonwealth v. Amos" on Justia Law