Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a trial, the circuit court found Defendant guilty of possessing heroin with the intent to distribute. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated Sixth Amendment rights by denying him a continuance on the day of trial for the purported purpose of substituting court appointed counsel with retained counsel of his choice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s continuance request was deficient as a matter of law because Defendant established no factual predicate for seeking substitution of other counsel in place of his court appointed counsel under the authority of the Sixth Amendment; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a continuance and in proceeding to trial with Defendant being represented by his court appointed attorney. View "Brown v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of rape, four counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of aggravated sexual battery for offenses committed against his stepdaughter. As a condition of Defendant’s probation, the court ordered that Defendant submit to warrantless, suspicionless searches of his person, property, residence, and vehicle at any time by any probation or law enforcement officer. Defendant challenged this probation condition on appeal. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the condition was reasonable under the facts of this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the probation condition at issue was not reasonable in light of the offenses for which Defendant was convicted, his background, and the surrounding circumstances. View "Murry v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suits against Defendants, alleging that she was injured by Defendants’ course of conduct while she was incarcerated in the Richmond City Jail. Plaintiff was not incarcerated when she filed her lawsuits. Plaintiff asserted state law claims and later amended her complaint to assert federal claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The circuit court (1) sustained Defendants’ pleas in bar to Plaintiff’s state law causes of action based on the statute of limitations in Va. Code Ann. 8.01-243.2, and (2) sustained Defendants’ special pleas and affirmative defense of the statute of limitations to the amended complaint, concluding that the section 1983 claims did not relate back to the original filings of the state law claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute of limitations in section 8.01-243.2 applies when the plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the time she files her action relating to the conditions of her confinement, and thus, the circuit court did not err in finding that Plaintiff’s state law claims were time barred; and (2) the circuit court did not err in not granting leave for Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint. View "Lucas v. Woody" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the City of Alexandria from 2008 until 2011, when the City terminated his employment. Plaintiff sued the City, alleging that the City unlawfully retaliated and discriminated against him by terminating his employment in response to complaints he made about a director of the department in which Plaintiff worked. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages of $104,096 in back pay. The circuit court subsequently granted Plaintiff’s motion to include liquidated damages to the back pay award, which doubled the award. Plaintiff then filed a motion for additional relief, including reinstatement or, in the alternative, an award of front-pay, and an award for his loss of pension benefits. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of an award of reinstatement, front pay, or pension compensation, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Plaintiff was made whole through his other awards against the City and that Plaintiff’s claim for pension compensation was “subject to too much speculation.” View "Lewis v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of malicious wounding and robbery. Petitioner was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for malicious wounding and five years’ imprisonment for robbery, to be served concurrently. On appeal, Petitioner asserted that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the elements of malicious wounding and that insufficient evidence supported the convictions. The court of appeals denied the appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing, among other things, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the malicious wounding jury instruction. The habeas court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court improperly instructed the jury and the elements of malicious wounding; but (2) Petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object to the instruction, as the erroneous malicious wounding instruction did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. View "Dominguez v. Pruett" on Justia Law

The American Tradition Institute and Robert Marshall (collectively, “ATI”) sent a request to the University of Virginia (“UVA”), seeking all documents that Dr. Michael Mann, a climate scientist and former professor, had produced and/or received while working for UVA. When ATI failed to receive the documents, it filed a petition for mandamus and injunctive relief in the trial court. The trial court conducted an in camera review of some of the documents UVA designated as exempt from disclosure, and subsequently entered an order finding UVA carried its burden of proof that the records withheld under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act met each of the requirements for exclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by denying the request for disclosure of the documents at issue; and (2) the trial court did not err in allowing UVA to demand a reasonable fee for the cost of reviewing the documents sought under the statutory exclusions. View "American Tradition Inst. v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va." on Justia Law

Defendant, a teacher at a vocational school who also supervised students on the sidewalk outside his classroom, was indicted on three counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor by a person in a custodial or supervisory relationship. A jury convicted Defendant on all three counts. At issue on appeal was whether the evidence showed Defendant had a custodial or supervisory relationship over A.G., a student at the school, who was not one of Defendant’s students but whom Defendant saw every day when he monitored the sidewalk. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the proscribed acts occurred while Defendant maintained a custodial or supervisory relationship with A.G. View "Linnon v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to carnal knowledge of a minor. At the time of his conviction, Defendant's crime was classified as a non-violent sex offense. Defendant was required to register annually for ten years, after which he could petition for expungement. The federal government subsequently enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, which resulted in Defendant's conviction being retroactively reclassified as a sexually violent offense. Consequently, Defendant was required to register every ninety days for the rest of his life with no right to petition for expungement. Defendant filed a complaint asserting that the reclassification of his offense violated his contractual and constitutional rights. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Commonwealth. Smith appealed, arguing that his plea agreement was a contract that incorporated the sex offender registration laws in existence at the time of the agreement, and thus, the Commonwealth materially breached the plea agreement by amending the registration laws and retroactively enforcing them against him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there were no contractual or constitutional violations resulting from the reclassification of Defendant's conviction, and therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed Defendant's petition for expungement and for a permanent injunction.View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was hired by New Dimensions, Inc. (NDI) as a design and sales consultant. Plaintiff was paid a commission of 2.12 percent of her total sales, but other design and sales consultants, both male and female, previously hired by NDI were paid commissions of 2.25 percent. Plaintiff was subsequently terminated by NDI and was not paid commissions for certain sales she had secured. Plaintiff filed this amended complaint against NDI alleging breach of contract, quantum meruit, and violation of the federal Equal Pay Act (EPA). In its answer, NDI did not affirmatively plead the four defenses articulated in the statute. The circuit court determined that NDI was prohibited from presenting evidence in defense of the EPA claim and precluded the introduction of evidence related to those defenses. The circuit court ruled in favor of Plaintiff on the EPA claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the defenses set forth in the EPA are affirmative but were not waived under the facts presented in this case; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in preventing NDI from presenting evidence of its gender-neutral compensation system at trial. Remanded.View "New Dimensions, Inc. v. Tarquini" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of animate object sexual penetration. Prior to his sentencing, Defendant hired a new attorney, who discovered that the Commonwealth had made a plea offer prior to trial. The circuit court found that the plea offer was not conveyed to Defendant, declared a mistrial, and ordered a new trial. Defendant subsequently entered a plea of no contest, which the circuit court accepted. The court then sentenced Defendant to thirty years' imprisonment. Thereafter, Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for his first attorney's failure to communicate to him the plea offer from the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth dismissed the petition, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over Defendant's claim because Defendant was not being detained as a result of his first trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, holding that, assuming that Defendant may link the first and second trials and assert ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant could not prove he was prejudiced by counsel's performance pursuant to Missouri v. Frye, which provides the standard for proving prejudice in the plea context. View "Laster v. Russell" on Justia Law