Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Katie Orndoff appeared as a witness for the prosecution in a felony domestic assault jury trial in the Circuit Court for Loudoun County. During her testimony, she repeatedly referenced the defendant’s prior arrests and incarceration, despite admonitions from the court and objections from defense counsel. The circuit court observed that Orndoff’s demeanor was unusual, including rocking in her chair and nearly falling over, and questioned her about possible substance use. Orndoff admitted to smoking marijuana earlier that day. The circuit court found her in summary contempt for “misbehavior in the presence of the court” due to voluntary intoxication, sentenced her to ten days in jail, and declared a mistrial.Orndoff appealed her contempt conviction to the Court of Appeals of Virginia. A three-judge panel reversed the circuit court’s finding, holding that the trial judge did not personally observe all essential elements of the alleged contempt and improperly relied on Orndoff’s admission rather than direct observation. The panel found that summary contempt was inappropriate and that Orndoff’s due process rights were violated. Upon rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals was evenly divided, resulting in an affirmance of the circuit court’s judgment without opinion.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and applied an abuse of discretion standard. It held that summary contempt requires the judge to personally observe all essential elements of the misconduct in open court. The Supreme Court found that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Orndoff was voluntarily intoxicated while testifying, as the circuit court’s findings were contradicted by the record and relied on unreliable admissions. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reversed the circuit court’s contempt finding, and vacated Orndoff’s conviction. View "Orndoff v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped a rental pickup truck driven by the defendant after observing a traffic violation and noticing the vehicle’s dark window tint. Upon approaching, the officer detected the odor of marijuana and learned that the defendant had previously waived his Fourth Amendment rights as part of a plea agreement. After both occupants exited the vehicle, a search revealed marijuana shake and bags containing suspected narcotics. The officer then searched the defendant’s person, finding large amounts of cash and, during a pat-down over the defendant’s underwear, felt a hard object between the defendant’s buttocks and underwear. The defendant resisted as the officer attempted to retrieve the item, which was ultimately removed and found to contain cocaine and crack cocaine. At no point were the defendant’s genitals or buttocks exposed to the public.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was an impermissible, warrantless body cavity search under the Fourth Amendment. The Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk denied the motion, finding probable cause and exigent circumstances due to the potential danger of fentanyl and risk of evidence destruction. The defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The Court of Appeals of Virginia vacated the conviction, holding that the search was unreasonably intrusive and not justified by exigent circumstances, and that the evidence should have been suppressed.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, given the probable cause for arrest, the manner and location of the search, the risks posed by possible fentanyl exposure, and the need to prevent destruction of evidence. The Court found the search did not constitute a manual body cavity search and was justified as a search incident to arrest. The defendant’s conviction was reinstated. View "Commonwealth v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

A toll road operator in Loudoun County, Virginia, sought to increase toll rates, arguing that the State Corporation Commission (the Commission) misapplied statutory criteria and that denying the increase would constitute an uncompensated taking under the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions. The toll road, known as the Dulles Greenway, was built with private funds and has faced financial difficulties due to lower-than-expected traffic volumes. The operator, Toll Road Investors Partnership II, L.P. (TRIP II), has refinanced its debt multiple times and has previously received approval for toll increases.The Commission had previously approved several toll increases but denied TRIP II's latest application. The Commission's decision was based on the statutory criteria that toll rates must be reasonable to the user in relation to the benefit obtained, must not materially discourage use of the roadway, and must provide the operator no more than a reasonable return. The Commission found that TRIP II's proposed toll increase did not meet the "reasonable benefit to the user" or "material discouragement" criteria. The Commission also noted that TRIP II had significant cash reserves and had not made equity distributions since 2006 due to indenture restrictions.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Court held that the Commission's findings were supported by credible evidence and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The Court also rejected TRIP II's argument that the denial of the toll increase constituted an unconstitutional taking, noting that the Commission had acted within its authority and had considered the overall circumstances, including the public's interest and the financial condition of TRIP II. The Court concluded that the Commission's decision did not violate the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. View "Toll Road Investors Partnership II v. SCC" on Justia Law

Norfolk Southern Railway Company challenged the constitutionality of Code § 56-16.3, which allows broadband service providers to install fiber optic cables across railroad property. The statute, enacted in 2023, aims to promote broadband expansion in Virginia. Cox Communications filed applications to install fiber optic cables under Norfolk Southern’s tracks, which Norfolk Southern did not initially oppose. However, a dispute arose over the license fees, leading Cox to proceed without a licensing agreement, prompting Norfolk Southern to seek relief from the State Corporation Commission (the “Commission”).The Commission rejected Norfolk Southern’s arguments without a hearing, finding the claims insufficient to establish undue hardship. Norfolk Southern appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which stayed the Commission’s judgment during the appeal.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether Code § 56-16.3 violated Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution. The court emphasized that eminent domain statutes must be strictly construed and that the burden of proving public use lies with the condemnor. The court found that Code § 56-16.3 did not reference public use and allowed a private company to take property for financial gain, which is not a public use under the Virginia Constitution.The court held that the application of Code § 56-16.3 in this case constituted a taking of Norfolk Southern’s property for a nonpublic use, violating the Virginia Constitution. Consequently, the court reversed the Commission’s judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. SCC" on Justia Law

Nakia Durham was stopped by Officer Labat for driving with a suspended license. During the stop, Officer Labat noticed the smell of alcohol and saw an open container in the car. A subsequent search revealed a concealed firearm, leading to Durham's convictions for possession of a firearm by a nonviolent felon, carrying a concealed weapon unlawfully, and drinking while driving.In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Durham moved to suppress the firearm evidence, arguing the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The court denied the motion, finding the search justified based on the totality of the circumstances, including the odor of alcohol and the open container. Durham was convicted and sentenced to three years for the firearm possession, with additional penalties for the other charges.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision, applying a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to uphold the search's constitutionality. The court found that the presence of the open container, the smell of alcohol, and Durham's behavior provided probable cause for the search. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Durham's firearm convictions, noting his proximity to the weapon and his actions during the stop.The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that the search was justified under the totality of the circumstances and that the evidence was sufficient to support Durham's convictions. The court emphasized that probable cause does not require meeting all statutory prongs but rather a reasonable belief based on the overall situation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Durham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County and Rita M. Leach-Lewis, trustee of the Rita M. Leach-Lewis Trust, which owns several homes in Fairfax County. These homes are used by members of the New World Church of the Christ, including Leach-Lewis, for activities such as handling correspondence, preparing spiritual teachings, and storing files and boxes. The homes are located in a residential-conservation zone, which prohibits office uses. After a zoning official conducted a search of the residences, a notice of violation of the zoning ordinance was issued, stating that the homes were being used as an "office."The notice of violation was appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), which upheld the zoning administrator's decision. Leach-Lewis then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the BZA's decision, arguing that the residences were not being used as an "office" and that the notice of violation was based on an improper search under the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court upheld the BZA's decision, and Leach-Lewis appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the BZA had a duty to interpret and apply a provision of the zoning ordinance that states that no part of the ordinance may be construed to authorize an unconstitutional inspection or search. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the BZA to determine whether the zoning ordinance was violated by the search of the church's property.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the BZA was not required to examine the constitutionality of the search underlying the notice of violation. The court also concluded that the residences were being used as an "office" as defined in the zoning ordinance. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment in favor of the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County. View "Board of Supervisors v. Leach-Lewis" on Justia Law

In this case, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled in favor of Peter Vlaming, a high school French teacher who was terminated by the West Point School Board for refusing to use a transgender student's preferred pronouns. Vlaming had chosen to use the student's preferred name but avoided using any third-person pronouns to refer to the student as it conflicted with his religious beliefs. The School Board fired Vlaming for not complying with its policy to use government-mandated pronouns.Vlaming sued the School Board, alleging that his termination violated his constitutional, statutory, and breach-of-contract rights. The Circuit Court dismissed Vlaming's claims, holding that they failed to state legally viable causes of action. The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, reversed the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court concluded that Vlaming's complaint sufficiently alleged that the School Board substantially burdened his right to free exercise of religion under the Virginia Constitution and that his claims under the Virginia Religious Freedom Restoration Act should not have been dismissed. Moreover, the Court held that Vlaming has alleged a viable compelled speech claim under the free speech provision of the Virginia Constitution. The Court rejected the School Board's argument that it could compel Vlaming's speech as part of his official duties as a teacher. The Court concluded that Vlaming's refusal to use certain pronouns did not interfere with his duties as a French teacher or disrupt the school's operations.The Court's decision reaffirmed the fundamental right to free speech and the free exercise of religion under the Virginia Constitution, emphasizing that these rights extend to public school teachers in their interactions with students. It clarified that although the government has a legitimate interest in ensuring non-discrimination and respect for all students, this interest must be balanced against individual rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion. The Court also clarified that a public school teacher's speech in the classroom is not entirely within the control of the school board and that teachers cannot be compelled to express views that conflict with their sincerely held religious beliefs. View "Vlaming v. West Point School Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in this real property dispute, holding that the escheat provision of Va. Code 58.1-3967, as applied to the factual circumstances of this case, violated Va. Const. art. I, 11.The City of Richmond obtained a judicial sale of a parcel of property that was subject to a statutory lien for delinquent taxes. The circuit court confirmed the sale and directed that the City's lien for delinquent taxes, along with its costs and legal fees, be fully paid by the purchase proceeds. Although the sale proceeds satisfied the tax lien, the circuit court concluded that section 58.1-3967 required it to award a portion of the surplus sale proceeds to the City instead of an unsatisfied junior lienor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as applied to this particular case, section 58.1-3967 unconstitutionally authorized the City to take the proceeds and keep them for itself. View "McKeithen v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not require a court to pre-screen eyewitness identification testimony before the eyewitness can be permitted to make an identification of the defendant for the first time in open court.Defendant was indicted on four counts of robbery and four counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony for robbing a bank. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to forty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) due process did not compel the circuit court to pre-screen the identification at issue when that identification was made for the first time in court; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Defendant's identification was more probative than prejudicial; and (3) Defendant was properly convicted of a second or subsequent offense of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. View "Walker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that International Paper Co. had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the County of Isle of Wight's tax scheme violated the requirement of the Virginia Constitution that taxation be uniform, holding that the circuit court did not err.In 2017, the County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution authorizing an "economic development retention grant program" that would benefit certain taxpayers. International Paper filed a refund action alleging that the County's tax and retention grant scheme violated the uniformity requirement of the Virginia Constitution. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of International Paper, concluding that the County's tax scheme created an unconstitutional non-uniform tax. View "County of Isle of Wight v. International Paper Co." on Justia Law