Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Nakia Durham was stopped by Officer Labat for driving with a suspended license. During the stop, Officer Labat noticed the smell of alcohol and saw an open container in the car. A subsequent search revealed a concealed firearm, leading to Durham's convictions for possession of a firearm by a nonviolent felon, carrying a concealed weapon unlawfully, and drinking while driving.In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Durham moved to suppress the firearm evidence, arguing the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The court denied the motion, finding the search justified based on the totality of the circumstances, including the odor of alcohol and the open container. Durham was convicted and sentenced to three years for the firearm possession, with additional penalties for the other charges.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision, applying a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to uphold the search's constitutionality. The court found that the presence of the open container, the smell of alcohol, and Durham's behavior provided probable cause for the search. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Durham's firearm convictions, noting his proximity to the weapon and his actions during the stop.The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that the search was justified under the totality of the circumstances and that the evidence was sufficient to support Durham's convictions. The court emphasized that probable cause does not require meeting all statutory prongs but rather a reasonable belief based on the overall situation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Durham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County and Rita M. Leach-Lewis, trustee of the Rita M. Leach-Lewis Trust, which owns several homes in Fairfax County. These homes are used by members of the New World Church of the Christ, including Leach-Lewis, for activities such as handling correspondence, preparing spiritual teachings, and storing files and boxes. The homes are located in a residential-conservation zone, which prohibits office uses. After a zoning official conducted a search of the residences, a notice of violation of the zoning ordinance was issued, stating that the homes were being used as an "office."The notice of violation was appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), which upheld the zoning administrator's decision. Leach-Lewis then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the BZA's decision, arguing that the residences were not being used as an "office" and that the notice of violation was based on an improper search under the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court upheld the BZA's decision, and Leach-Lewis appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the BZA had a duty to interpret and apply a provision of the zoning ordinance that states that no part of the ordinance may be construed to authorize an unconstitutional inspection or search. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the BZA to determine whether the zoning ordinance was violated by the search of the church's property.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the BZA was not required to examine the constitutionality of the search underlying the notice of violation. The court also concluded that the residences were being used as an "office" as defined in the zoning ordinance. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment in favor of the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County. View "Board of Supervisors v. Leach-Lewis" on Justia Law

In this case, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled in favor of Peter Vlaming, a high school French teacher who was terminated by the West Point School Board for refusing to use a transgender student's preferred pronouns. Vlaming had chosen to use the student's preferred name but avoided using any third-person pronouns to refer to the student as it conflicted with his religious beliefs. The School Board fired Vlaming for not complying with its policy to use government-mandated pronouns.Vlaming sued the School Board, alleging that his termination violated his constitutional, statutory, and breach-of-contract rights. The Circuit Court dismissed Vlaming's claims, holding that they failed to state legally viable causes of action. The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, reversed the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court concluded that Vlaming's complaint sufficiently alleged that the School Board substantially burdened his right to free exercise of religion under the Virginia Constitution and that his claims under the Virginia Religious Freedom Restoration Act should not have been dismissed. Moreover, the Court held that Vlaming has alleged a viable compelled speech claim under the free speech provision of the Virginia Constitution. The Court rejected the School Board's argument that it could compel Vlaming's speech as part of his official duties as a teacher. The Court concluded that Vlaming's refusal to use certain pronouns did not interfere with his duties as a French teacher or disrupt the school's operations.The Court's decision reaffirmed the fundamental right to free speech and the free exercise of religion under the Virginia Constitution, emphasizing that these rights extend to public school teachers in their interactions with students. It clarified that although the government has a legitimate interest in ensuring non-discrimination and respect for all students, this interest must be balanced against individual rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion. The Court also clarified that a public school teacher's speech in the classroom is not entirely within the control of the school board and that teachers cannot be compelled to express views that conflict with their sincerely held religious beliefs. View "Vlaming v. West Point School Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in this real property dispute, holding that the escheat provision of Va. Code 58.1-3967, as applied to the factual circumstances of this case, violated Va. Const. art. I, 11.The City of Richmond obtained a judicial sale of a parcel of property that was subject to a statutory lien for delinquent taxes. The circuit court confirmed the sale and directed that the City's lien for delinquent taxes, along with its costs and legal fees, be fully paid by the purchase proceeds. Although the sale proceeds satisfied the tax lien, the circuit court concluded that section 58.1-3967 required it to award a portion of the surplus sale proceeds to the City instead of an unsatisfied junior lienor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as applied to this particular case, section 58.1-3967 unconstitutionally authorized the City to take the proceeds and keep them for itself. View "McKeithen v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

In this criminal case, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not require a court to pre-screen eyewitness identification testimony before the eyewitness can be permitted to make an identification of the defendant for the first time in open court.Defendant was indicted on four counts of robbery and four counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony for robbing a bank. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to forty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) due process did not compel the circuit court to pre-screen the identification at issue when that identification was made for the first time in court; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Defendant's identification was more probative than prejudicial; and (3) Defendant was properly convicted of a second or subsequent offense of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. View "Walker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that International Paper Co. had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the County of Isle of Wight's tax scheme violated the requirement of the Virginia Constitution that taxation be uniform, holding that the circuit court did not err.In 2017, the County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution authorizing an "economic development retention grant program" that would benefit certain taxpayers. International Paper filed a refund action alleging that the County's tax and retention grant scheme violated the uniformity requirement of the Virginia Constitution. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of International Paper, concluding that the County's tax scheme created an unconstitutional non-uniform tax. View "County of Isle of Wight v. International Paper Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for rape, holding that Defendant did not suffer any violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution.On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecution violated his right to confrontation by failing to produce as a witness a police officer who translated for a police detective at the crime scene. At trial, the Commonwealth offered the testimony of a different police officer who, separately, translated the exchange between Defendant and the detective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no constitutional requirement for the officer at issue to be confronted at trial. View "Cortez-Rivas v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's misdemeanor conviction for attempting to purchase a firearm while subject to a protective order, holding that the admission of certain evidence did not violate Defendant's confrontation right.At issue was whether a return of service on a preliminary protective order, which included the serving deputy's signature and the time and date of service, was testimonial evidence subject to exclusion under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court of appeals concluded that the signing and dating of the return of service was a ministerial duty on the part of the deputy sheriff that was functionally distinct from the delivery of live testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the return of service was intended to serve a primarily administrative purpose, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, and therefore, the admission of the evidence did not violate Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. View "Logan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding Defendant's convictions for conspiracy to distribute oxycodone and distribution of oxycodone, third or subsequent offense, holding that Defendant was not deprived of his right to counsel during a critical stage of a criminal prosecution.On appeal, Defendant alleged that at a hearing, at which Defendant appeared without counsel, he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The reason for the hearing was to advise Defendant as to the status of his case and to ascertain what his wishes were with respect to having counsel of his choice after his attorney was suspended. Defendant argued that he should have been afforded the assistance of counsel before being required to make a decision about whether to proceed with the scheduled trial without the assistance of his then-suspended counsel. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing did not require Defendant to have the assistance of counsel to formulate his response, and thus, this was not a critical stage of the criminal proceedings that would give rise to a presumption of prejudice as a result of Defendant not having counsel at that time. View "Weatherholt v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting the motion to strike the evidence of Monica Cromartie's claims against Brian Billings, a former police officer, for an unlawful search based on Va. Code 19.2-59, for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and for false arrest under section 1983, holding that the circuit court erred by granting Billings' motion to strike the three claims based on sovereign immunity and qualified immunity.At the close of Cromartie's case-in-chief the circuit court granted Billings' motion to strike the section 1983 and section 19.2-59 claims on the grounds of qualified immunity and sovereign immunity, respectively. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Billings' search was performed contrary to well-established law and violated Cromartie's Fourth Amendment rights, and therefore, the circuit court erred by granting the motion to strike based on sovereign immunity for the section 19.2-59 claim for unlawful search; (2) the circuit court erred by striking the section 1983 claim for false arrest based upon qualified immunity; and (3) Billings' use of force was unreasonable under the circumstances, and therefore, the section 1983 excessive force claim failed both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis at the motion to strike stage. View "Cromartie v. Billings" on Justia Law