Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Geoff Livingston and 134 other homeonwers or renters (collectively Plaintiffs) in a Fairfax County subdivision brought an inverse condemnation suit against the County and the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) after their homes were flooded during a severe storm. The circuit court dismissed the suit on demurrer, holding that a single occurrence of flooding could not support an inverse condemnation claim under Va. Const. art. I, 11. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint, if taken as true, established that their homes and personal property were damaged by VDOT's operation of, and failure to maintain, the relocation of a tributary stream, the circuit court erred in dismissing their inverse condemnation suit on VDOT's demurrer. Remanded. View "Livingston v. Va. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

On his wife's complaint, Defendant was arrested and tried on a misdemeanor warrant for sending emails to his wife accusing his wife of engaging in sexual acts with other men and soliciting sex on Craigslist. Defendant was convicted of harassment by a computer. A panel of the court of appeals reversed on the ground that Defendant's emails were not obscene under the definition of obscenity the court of appeals adopted in Allman v. Commonwealth. However, in its decision en banc, the court of appeals overruled its decision in Allman and adopted a newly broadened definition of obscenity, holding that Defendant's emails were obscene within that definition. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and vacated Barson's conviction, holding (1) the definition of "obscene" provided by the General Assembly in Va. Code Ann. 18.2-372 controlled this case, and accordingly, the court of appeals erred in substituting a dictionary definition for that provided by the General Assembly; and (2) Defendant's emails to his wife did not meet the standard of obscenity provided by section 18.2-372. View "Barson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Violet Seabolt filed a complaint against Albermarle County alleging that she was injured as a result of the County's gross negligence in maintaining a public park. The County filed a demurrer to gross negligence and a special plea of sovereign immunity. The circuit court sustained the demurrer as to gross negligence but declined to rule on the County's special plea of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Seabolt's complaint but on different grounds, holding that the circuit court erred by not granting the County's special plea of sovereign immunity because, in the absence of a legislative waiver of immunity, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate Seabolt's tort claim against the County, and therefore, the court had no jurisdiction to decide the case on any other basis. View "Seabolt v. County of Albemarle" on Justia Law

These companion appeals arose out of a personal-injury suit brought by a former high school student who was injured in a fight with another student on school grounds. On the morning of the fight, an assistant principal received a report that the fight would occur sometime that day, but he did not act on the report before the fight. The injured student sued two students and the assistant principal, asserting claims for simple and gross negligence, assault, and battery. The circuit court entered judgment against all three defendants, awarding the injured student a total of $5 million in damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred by (1) holding that the assistant principal was not entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity from Plaintiff's simple negligence claim under the common law; and (2) refusing Plaintiff's proffered jury instruction on gross negligence. Remanded for a new trial limited to Plaintiff's gross negligence claim against the assistant principal. View "Burns v. Gagnon" on Justia Law

Mary Arnold, who was injured in an automobile collision, brought a negligence action against the other driver, Jonathan Wallace, who was uninsured. Travelers Insurance Company, Arnold's carrier, defended the suit pursuant to its uninsured motorist coverage. The jury awarded a verdict for Arnold in the amount of $9,134. Arnold appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in admitting medical records under the business records exception, as there was established a sufficient foundation for the admission of the evidence; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in finding an expert physician qualified to testify when her partner previously had been retained by the opposing counsel. View "Arnold v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Thomas Porter was convicted in the circuit court of the capital murder of a law enforcement officer, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and grand larceny. The trial court sentenced Porter to death plus twenty-two years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court subsequently dismissed Porter's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding (1) Porter was not denied the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because a juror failed to disclose during voir dire that his brother was employed as a deputy sheriff, as Porter failed to demonstrate that the juror failed to answer honestly a material question during voir dire; (2) the Commonwealth did not fail to disclose exculpatory information as required by Brady v. Maryland; and (3) Porter failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient for failing to investigate Porter's childhood and educational history. View "Porter v. Warden" on Justia Law

Patricia LaCava was convicted in the circuit court of two counts of embezzlement. LaCava commenced her appeal pro se. LaCava filed a timely notice of appeal and asked the court reporter to order transcripts of the trial proceedings. LaCava subsequently secured representation by appellate counsel, who discovered that the transcripts had not been filed within the sixty-day period required by Va. R. Crim. App. 5A:8(a). After filing the transcripts by hand, counsel filed a motion to extend the deadline for filing transcripts. The court of appeals denied the motion and thereafter denied LaCava's petition for appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the court of appeals abused its discretion in denying LaCava's motion to extend the deadline for filing her transcript, as LaCava showed good cause to extend the period for filing transcripts; and (2) the court of appeals erred in denying LaCava's petition for appeal because the order was predicated solely on the absence of a transcript or statement of facts. View "LaCava v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant Jean Enriquez was found in a drunken condition in a parked motor vehicle with the keys in the ignition switch. Defendant was subsequently convicted of driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Defendant appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to convict him as a matter of law of the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when an intoxicated person is seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle on a public highway and the key is in the ignition switch, he is in actual physical control of the vehicle and, therefore, is guilty of operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol within the meaning of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-266; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle and to support his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. View "Enriquez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

When he was fifteen years old, E.C. pled guilty to breaking and entering and rape. After E.C. was released from custody and placed under parole supervision, a team of attorneys filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on E.C.'s behalf alleging that E.C.'s guilty plea was neither knowing nor voluntary and was unconstitutionally invalid because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Six days after his petition was filed, E.C. was released from parole supervision. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that it had no jurisdiction to consider the petition and that the habeas corpus proceeding was moot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court had active jurisdiction over the proceeding because E.C. was detained for purposes of habeas corpus when the petition was filed; and (2) E.C.'s release from probation during the pendency of the habeas corpus proceeding did not automatically render the proceeding moot, as the collateral consequences imposed on E.C. by the convictions he challenged were sufficient to sustain a continued controversy. View "E.C. v. Va. Dep't of Juvenile Justice" on Justia Law

James Blaxton was convicted in 1989 of rape, forcible sodomy and attempted sodomy. In 2008, the Commonwealth filed a petition seeking Blaxton's civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. The trial court found that Blaxton was a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). The circuit court subsequently entered an order granting Blaxton conditional release and transferred supervision of Blaxton to the state of Illinois after finding that the SVPA does not prohibit interstate transfers of sexually violent predators. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court's judgment was error pursuant to Commonwealth v. Amerson, in which the Court held that the SVPA does not authorize the conditional release of a sexually violent predator outside the Commonwealth. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Blaxton" on Justia Law