Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mark Lahey was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder. The court of appeals and Supreme Court refused Lahey's petitions for appeal. Lahey subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Lahey submitted his habeas petition for filing on the last day of the limitations period but did not complete payment of the filing fee until days later. The circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely under Va. Code Ann. 8.01-654(A)(2) upon determining that, under the express requirements of Va. Code Ann. 8.01-655, the petition could not be filed, or deemed filed, without proper payment of the filing fee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Lahey's habeas petition was time-barred under section 8.01-654(A)(2). View "Lahey v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Jean Moreau & Associates brought this suit against the Health Center Commission for the County of Chesterfield (HCC), a municipal corporation, seeking a declaratory judgment and alleging claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit. The circuit court dismissed Jean Moreau's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Jean Moreau did not comply with the mandatory procedural requirements of the Virginia Public Procurement Act in bringing its breach of contract claim against HCC, the circuit court did not err in concluding that the claim was barred; and (2) the circuit court did not err in concluding that Jean Moreau's quantum meruit claim was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity for HCC's development and operation of Springdale, an independent living facility, because (i) municipal corporations performing governmental functions are immune from quantum meruit claims, (ii) HCC was not entitled to absolute immunity simply because it was created by a county and not a municipality, but (iii) Springdale served a governmental function. View "Jean Moreau & Assocs., Inc. v. Health Ctr. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 1994, Michael Haas was convicted at a bench trial in the circuit court of sodomy committed upon his two sons in 1992 and 1993, when they were eleven and nine years of age, respectively. After Haas' petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied, Hass filed a petition for a writ of actual innocence based on non-biological evidence, including recantation evidence. The court of appeals denied Haas' request to refer the case to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in (1) declining to refer the case back to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing, and (2) finding that Haas failed to carry his burden of proof and, accordingly, granting the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss his petition. View "Haas v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a guilty plea, Steven DeMille was convicted of rape. Before DeMille's release from incarceration, the attorney general filed a petition seeking the civil commitment of DeMille as a sexually violent predator. After a bench trial, the circuit court entered an order declaring DeMille to be a sexually violent predator. At issue on appeal was whether in a proceeding under the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, the determination that the respondent is likely to engage in sexually violent acts must be based solely on expert testimony that states an opinion to that effect in express terms. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the factual determination of whether a respondent is a sexually violent predator likely to engage in sexually violent acts is to be based on the totality of the record, including but not limited to expert testimony. View "DeMille v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial, the circuit court found Jerrod Quarles guilty of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Quarles' motion to suppress where the police impermissibly reinitiated communication with Quarles after he invoked his right to counsel in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, and therefore, Quarles' subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights was not voluntary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Quarles' motion to suppress where the police officer would not have known that Quarles was likely to respond to his statement and Quarles was not particularly susceptible to exposure to such statements. View "Commonwealth v. Quarles" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a bail bondsman licensed in another state but not in Virginia had the authority to enter Virginia and apprehend a fugitive bailee. In a bench trial, Defendant, an out-of-state bail bondsman, was convicted of attempted abduction and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the General Assembly plainly manifested its intent to abrogate the common law rule allowing out-of-state bail bondsmen and bounty hunters to enter Virginia to apprehend fugitive bailees; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to establish the specific intent necessary to support a conviction of attempted abduction. View "Collins v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this action, the trial court granted summary judgment against a locality, holding it liable to landowners under the State Water Control Law, Va. Code Ann. 62.1-44.2 through -44.34:28, in particular Code 62.1-44.34:18(C) of the Oil Discharge Law, for the contamination of groundwater by leachate and landfill gas. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to the landowners and finding the locality liable under the Oil Discharge Law, as the Oil Discharge Law does not apply to the passive, gradual seepage of leachate and landfill gas into groundwater. View "Campbell County v. Royal" on Justia Law

At a bench trial, the circuit court found Curtis Branham guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The court of appeals affirmed. Branham appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress the Commonwealth's evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Branham's motion to suppress where the arresting officer's search of Branham's person and vehicle and the results of those searches were not fruits of an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the circuit court did not err in admitting the certificate of analysis of the cocaine into evidence where the chain of custody evidence was sufficient. View "Branham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Smith for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Two days later, Smith applied for the purchase of a semi-automatic pistol. Smith answered that he was not under indictment for a felony on the form prepared by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives of the United States Department of Justice (the ATF form). The record contained no evidence that Smith, when executing the ATF form, was aware that the grand jury had returned an indictment against him. Smith was indicted for making a false statement on a firearm purchase form, and the circuit court ultimately found Smith guilty. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, vacated the conviction, and dismissed the indictment, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of "willfully and intentionally making a materially false statement" on a form executed in connection with the purchase of a firearm because there was no evidence to support a finding that Smith knew that he had been indicted when he signed the ATF form. View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation (DRPT) entered into an agreement, pursuant to the Rail Enhancement Fund created by Va. Code Ann. 33.1-221.1:1.1, to grant funds to Norfolk Southern Railway Company (Norfolk Southern) for the development of an intermodal terminal in Montgomery County. Appellant, Montgomery County, instituted on action against DRPT, DRPT's director, and the Commonwealth Transportation Board, claiming that section 33.1-221.1:1.1 and the agreement were unconstitutional pursuant to the state Constitution's internal improvements clause and credit clause, and sought to enjoin their administration. Norfolk Southern subsequently intervened as a defendant. The circuit court ruled in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 33.1-221.1:1.1, as applied in this case, did not violate either the internal improvements clause or the credit clause of the Constitution of Virginia. View "Montgomery County v. Va. Dep't of Rail & Pub. Transp." on Justia Law