Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Leslie Todd gave birth to a female child while incarcerated. Lucretia Copeland eventually became the baby's primary physical custodian. Approximately two years later, Copeland filed a petition to adopt the child without the consent of Todd pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 63.2-1202(H). The circuit court granted Copeland's petition, holding that Todd failed to maintain contact with the child for a period of six months prior to the filing of the petition as required by section 63.2-1202(H), and, in the alternative, that Todd had withheld her consent contrary to the child's best interests under Va. Code Ann. 63.2-1203 and -1205. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reinstated the final decree of adoption, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in reversing the circuit court's holding that Todd's consent to the adoption was not necessary under section 36.2-1202(H), but (2) the court of appeals erred in its judgment that the circuit court violated Todd's constitutional rights under sections 63.2-1203 and -1205 as the circuit court gave adequate consideration to Todd's due process rights and Todd's equal protection rights were not violated. View "Copeland v. Todd" on Justia Law

Geoffrey Sanders was convicted by a jury of forcible sodomy, rape, object sexual penetration, and taking indecent liberties with a child. During the trial, the circuit court allowed the commonwealth's medical expert, a doctor, to rely on the results of a laboratory report as the basis of her opinion that the victim had a sexually transmitted infection. Sanders appealed, arguing that this portion of the expert's testimony violated his right to confront witnesses against him as guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The court of appeals found the laboratory report in this instance was not testimonial for purposes of Sixth Amendment confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the laboratory report was for medical treatment purposes as it was created to permit the doctor to medically diagnose and treat the victim for sexually transmitted infections and was thus non-testimonial; and (2) a laboratory technician under these circumstances would not have reason to believe the results of his or her testing would be used in later trial and thus the report and the expert's testimony as to its content were not subject to exclusion under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. View "Sanders v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Police officers asked D'Angelo Brooks for permission to search his house for a weapon after someone reported shots fired. Brooks consented. During the search an officer opened a bag, in which he found cash and cocaine. The officer then asked Brooks if this was his cash and drugs, to which Brooks responded affirmatively. Prior to trial Brooks moved to suppress the cocaine as being beyond the scope of his consent to search and his statement as being fruit of the poisonous tree. The court denied the motion to suppress and found Brooks guilty of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals denied Brooks' petition for appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) the appellate court did not err when it upheld the denial of the motion to suppress the cocaine and Brooks' statement to the officer afterwards because the search of the bag was objectively reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) Brooks' statement was not obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because a reasonable person in Brooks situation would not have believed he was in custody, and therefore no Miranda warning was needed. View "Brooks v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Petitioner Marquis Byrd was indicted for first-degree murder, aggravated malicious wounding of another, and for the use of a firearm in both offenses. At a jury trial, he was convicted of second-degree murder and the unlawful wounding of another and use of a firearm in the murder; Petitioner was acquitted of the firearm charge in the wounding case. At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, defense counsel made a motion to strike, which the court denied. At the close of all evidence, defense counsel failed to renew the motion. Petitioner's trial counsel was given leave to withdraw from the case with respect to sentencing; substitute counsel filed a motion to set aside the verdict, but did not argue it and therefore never obtained a ruling. Petitioner was sentenced to 33 years' imprisonment for the three offenses. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal on grounds that the sufficiency of evidence had not been preserved by either a renewal of the motion to strike or the motion to set aside the verdict. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court, alleging he had been denied his right to effective assistance of counsel at both trial and sentencing. The Supreme Court, in applying Strickland, found that if counsel had performed without any professional errors and petitioner's direct appeal had been available for review, there would be "no reasonable probability that a different result would have been reached." The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

Petitioner Corey Smith was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by Richmond police officers for a broken tail light. The officers asked the driver and Petitioner for identification, and processed that information using the police database known as "PISTOL" (Police Information System Totally On Line), which was accessed through a computer in the police patrol car. PISTOL returned an "alert" stating that Petitioner was "probably armed and a narcotics seller/user." On receiving the alert, the officers asked Petitioner out of the car and conducted a pat down search of his person. The officer detected a gun in Petitioner's pocket. Petitioner was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of state law. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the pat down, arguing that the search, based solely on the information in PISTOL was unreasonable and a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion; Petitioner entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Petitioner asserted that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The appellate court concluded that "in the absence of some contemporaneous indication that the individual might be carrying a weapon, the facts do not provide reasonable suspicion to believe he may presently be armed and dangerous" and overturned the lower court's conviction. On review, the Supreme Court holds that the record supports the conclusion of the trial court, that the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk, and affirmed the conviction.