Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to thirty-three counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. Defendant later filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to “prosecute” his appeal. After a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus, ruling that counsel was not deficient for failing to file a petition for appeal on Defendant’s behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s finding was not plainly wrong or unsupported by credible evidence. View "Velasquez-Lopez v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, maliciously shooting into an occupied vehicle, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and reckless handling of a firearm, a misdemeanor. After a trial on the misdemeanor charge and a preliminary hearing on the felonies, the general district court dismissed the misdemeanor reckless handling of a firearm charge and refused to certify Defendant’s felony charges to the circuit court for lack of probable cause. The Commonwealth subsequently obtained direct indictments charging Defendant with first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the charges. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions and dismissed the indictments, holding that the Commonwealth was collaterally estopped from prosecuting Defendant for murder or attempted murder after Defendant’s acquittal of reckless handling of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant’s misdemeanor acquittal and subsequent felony convictions were based on the same issue of ultimate fact, the felony convictions were barred by the prohibition of double jeopardy. View "Commonwealth v. Davis" on Justia Law

Insured filed a complaint alleging that Insured had breached a title insurance policy. Insured also alleged that Insurer had acted in bad faith and requested an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 38.2-209. Insured demanded a jury trial “on all counts so triable.” Insurer sought to have the trial judge, rather than the jury, consider the issues of bad faith and attorney’s fees. The jury was permitted to award attorney’s fees. The jury found in favor of Insured and awarded $442,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. The trial court judge vacated the jury’s award of attorney’s fees and costs, ruling that section 38.2-209(A) requires a judge, not a jury, to determine whether an insurer committed a bad faith breach of an insurance contract warranting an award of attorney’s fees. Reconsidering the evidence de novo, the judge then concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Insurer had acted in bad faith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a judge, not a jury, must determine whether an insurer has acted in bad faith under the policy; and (2) section 38.2.209(A) does not implicate the right to a jury trial under Va. Const. art. I, 11. View "REVI, LLC v. Chicago Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant made a conditional plea of guilty to charges of cocaine distribution and unlawful possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, claiming that police officers unlawfully entered his apartment and seized his weapons and drugs. The court of appeals denied Defendant’s petition for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantees entry by the policy officers into Defendant’s apartment, and the trial court did not thus err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "Evans v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant, a native of Ethiopia, pleaded guilty to petit larceny. At no time did Appellant’s court-appointed attorney advise Appellant of the collateral consequences of the plea and sentence upon his immigration status. Appellant was subsequently informed that he was subject to removal as a result of his conviction. Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The circuit court sustained the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the petition, concluding that Appellant was not prejudiced from his counsel’s failure to advise him of the adverse consequences on his immigration status of accepting the plea agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court applied an incorrect standard for determining whether prejudice resulted from the attorney’s failure to advise Appellant of the negative consequences of accepting the plea agreement. View "Zemene v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of Internet solicitation of a minor. The parties agreed that Defendant was accused of soliciting oral sex from a minor and that oral sex between an adult and a minor is an act forbidden by Virginia’s anti-sodomy law, Va. Code 18.2-361(A). After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 18.2-361(A) was facially unconstitutional in light of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that section 18.2-361(A) was constitutional as applied to Defendant because the Lawrence decision did not prevent a state from criminalizing sodomy between an adult and a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 18.2-361(A) is not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant in this instance; and (2) it is proper to prohibit those applications of the statute that are unconstitutional and leaving the constitutional applications of the statute to be enforced. View "Toghill v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of murder, robbery, use of a firearm in the commission of robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the prosecution suppressed or failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The trial court ultimately dismissed the petition, concluding that it was untimely filed under Va. Code 8.01-654(A)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tolling provision of Va. Code 8.01-229(D) was applicable to the limitations period of section 8.01-654(A)(2), and therefore, it was error to conclude that Defendant’s petition for habeas corpus was untimely; but (2) because the allegedly withheld evidence was not material, Defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the error. View "Hicks v. Dir., Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

The Commonwealth filed a complaint alleging that Windsor Plaza Condominium violated Va. Code 36-96.3(B)(ii) by failing to make reasonable accommodations in rules or services that were necessary to afford Michael Fishel equal opportunity to enjoy his dwelling. Fishel and his wife moved to intervene in the lawsuit, alleging additional causes of action. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Windsor Plaza. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling that the evidence relating to conversion of a bicycle storage space into an accessible parking space supported a claim for reasonable modification rather than a claim for reasonable accommodation; (2) did not err in ruling granting Windsor Plaza’s motion to strike; (3) erred in ruling that Windsor Plaza’s request for attorney’s fees against the Commonwealth was not barred by sovereign immunity, but the error was harmless; (4) did not err in concluding that the statute of limitations barred the Fishels’ additional claims; and (5) did not err by refusing to award Windsor Plaza attorney’s fees against the Fischels. View "Commonwealth v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape and capital murder in the commission of abduction with intent to defile. Defendant was sentenced to death on each conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences. Here the Supreme Court considered Defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court dismissed the petition, holding (1) the Commonwealth did not commit Brady violations or present false testimony or allow it to go uncorrected; (2) Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel; and (3) the remainder of Defendant’s claims were either barred or without merit. View "Lawlor v. Warden" on Justia Law

After a trial, the circuit court found Defendant guilty of possessing heroin with the intent to distribute. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated Sixth Amendment rights by denying him a continuance on the day of trial for the purported purpose of substituting court appointed counsel with retained counsel of his choice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s continuance request was deficient as a matter of law because Defendant established no factual predicate for seeking substitution of other counsel in place of his court appointed counsel under the authority of the Sixth Amendment; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a continuance and in proceeding to trial with Defendant being represented by his court appointed attorney. View "Brown v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law