Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant, a native of Ethiopia, pleaded guilty to petit larceny. At no time did Appellant’s court-appointed attorney advise Appellant of the collateral consequences of the plea and sentence upon his immigration status. Appellant was subsequently informed that he was subject to removal as a result of his conviction. Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The circuit court sustained the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the petition, concluding that Appellant was not prejudiced from his counsel’s failure to advise him of the adverse consequences on his immigration status of accepting the plea agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court applied an incorrect standard for determining whether prejudice resulted from the attorney’s failure to advise Appellant of the negative consequences of accepting the plea agreement. View "Zemene v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of Internet solicitation of a minor. The parties agreed that Defendant was accused of soliciting oral sex from a minor and that oral sex between an adult and a minor is an act forbidden by Virginia’s anti-sodomy law, Va. Code 18.2-361(A). After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 18.2-361(A) was facially unconstitutional in light of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that section 18.2-361(A) was constitutional as applied to Defendant because the Lawrence decision did not prevent a state from criminalizing sodomy between an adult and a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 18.2-361(A) is not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant in this instance; and (2) it is proper to prohibit those applications of the statute that are unconstitutional and leaving the constitutional applications of the statute to be enforced. View "Toghill v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of murder, robbery, use of a firearm in the commission of robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the prosecution suppressed or failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The trial court ultimately dismissed the petition, concluding that it was untimely filed under Va. Code 8.01-654(A)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tolling provision of Va. Code 8.01-229(D) was applicable to the limitations period of section 8.01-654(A)(2), and therefore, it was error to conclude that Defendant’s petition for habeas corpus was untimely; but (2) because the allegedly withheld evidence was not material, Defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the error. View "Hicks v. Dir., Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

The Commonwealth filed a complaint alleging that Windsor Plaza Condominium violated Va. Code 36-96.3(B)(ii) by failing to make reasonable accommodations in rules or services that were necessary to afford Michael Fishel equal opportunity to enjoy his dwelling. Fishel and his wife moved to intervene in the lawsuit, alleging additional causes of action. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Windsor Plaza. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling that the evidence relating to conversion of a bicycle storage space into an accessible parking space supported a claim for reasonable modification rather than a claim for reasonable accommodation; (2) did not err in ruling granting Windsor Plaza’s motion to strike; (3) erred in ruling that Windsor Plaza’s request for attorney’s fees against the Commonwealth was not barred by sovereign immunity, but the error was harmless; (4) did not err in concluding that the statute of limitations barred the Fishels’ additional claims; and (5) did not err by refusing to award Windsor Plaza attorney’s fees against the Fischels. View "Commonwealth v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape and capital murder in the commission of abduction with intent to defile. Defendant was sentenced to death on each conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences. Here the Supreme Court considered Defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court dismissed the petition, holding (1) the Commonwealth did not commit Brady violations or present false testimony or allow it to go uncorrected; (2) Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel; and (3) the remainder of Defendant’s claims were either barred or without merit. View "Lawlor v. Warden" on Justia Law

After a trial, the circuit court found Defendant guilty of possessing heroin with the intent to distribute. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated Sixth Amendment rights by denying him a continuance on the day of trial for the purported purpose of substituting court appointed counsel with retained counsel of his choice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s continuance request was deficient as a matter of law because Defendant established no factual predicate for seeking substitution of other counsel in place of his court appointed counsel under the authority of the Sixth Amendment; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a continuance and in proceeding to trial with Defendant being represented by his court appointed attorney. View "Brown v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of rape, four counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of aggravated sexual battery for offenses committed against his stepdaughter. As a condition of Defendant’s probation, the court ordered that Defendant submit to warrantless, suspicionless searches of his person, property, residence, and vehicle at any time by any probation or law enforcement officer. Defendant challenged this probation condition on appeal. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the condition was reasonable under the facts of this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the probation condition at issue was not reasonable in light of the offenses for which Defendant was convicted, his background, and the surrounding circumstances. View "Murry v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suits against Defendants, alleging that she was injured by Defendants’ course of conduct while she was incarcerated in the Richmond City Jail. Plaintiff was not incarcerated when she filed her lawsuits. Plaintiff asserted state law claims and later amended her complaint to assert federal claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The circuit court (1) sustained Defendants’ pleas in bar to Plaintiff’s state law causes of action based on the statute of limitations in Va. Code Ann. 8.01-243.2, and (2) sustained Defendants’ special pleas and affirmative defense of the statute of limitations to the amended complaint, concluding that the section 1983 claims did not relate back to the original filings of the state law claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute of limitations in section 8.01-243.2 applies when the plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the time she files her action relating to the conditions of her confinement, and thus, the circuit court did not err in finding that Plaintiff’s state law claims were time barred; and (2) the circuit court did not err in not granting leave for Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint. View "Lucas v. Woody" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the City of Alexandria from 2008 until 2011, when the City terminated his employment. Plaintiff sued the City, alleging that the City unlawfully retaliated and discriminated against him by terminating his employment in response to complaints he made about a director of the department in which Plaintiff worked. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages of $104,096 in back pay. The circuit court subsequently granted Plaintiff’s motion to include liquidated damages to the back pay award, which doubled the award. Plaintiff then filed a motion for additional relief, including reinstatement or, in the alternative, an award of front-pay, and an award for his loss of pension benefits. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of an award of reinstatement, front pay, or pension compensation, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Plaintiff was made whole through his other awards against the City and that Plaintiff’s claim for pension compensation was “subject to too much speculation.” View "Lewis v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of malicious wounding and robbery. Petitioner was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for malicious wounding and five years’ imprisonment for robbery, to be served concurrently. On appeal, Petitioner asserted that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the elements of malicious wounding and that insufficient evidence supported the convictions. The court of appeals denied the appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing, among other things, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the malicious wounding jury instruction. The habeas court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court improperly instructed the jury and the elements of malicious wounding; but (2) Petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object to the instruction, as the erroneous malicious wounding instruction did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. View "Dominguez v. Pruett" on Justia Law