Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lawton Rogers, an attorney, and three associates (Plaintiffs) formed a partnership (the Firm) by signing a partnership agreement. Each Plaintiff signed a note securing his indebtedness with his interest in the Firm. Later, all four partners joined a new firm, and the Firm remained extant but inactive. Several years later, Rogers and his wife later filed an amended complaint against Plaintiffs, demanding repayment of the notes. Plaintiffs filed a separate complaint asserting that Rogers had overdrawn his capital account by $611,147 and that this amount was owed to the Firm under the partnership agreement. Plaintiffs sought a final accounting and judgment against Rogers in favor of the Firm, the distribution of the Firm's assets equally among the partners, and the judicial dissolution of the Firm. The circuit court consolidated the two cases and ultimately ordered the judicial dissolution of the Firm without performing an accounting and settlement of the partners' accounts. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, (1) remanding for an accounting and settlement of the Firm's assets and liabilities, and (2) affirming the portion of the circuit court judgment awarding Rogers unpaid interest on his $150,000 capital contribution to the Firm. View "Comtois v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Kivalina, a native community located on an Alaskan barrier island, filed a lawsuit (Complaint) in a California district court against The AES Corporation, a Virginia-based energy company, and numerous other defendants for allegedly damaging the community by causing global warming through emission of greenhouse gases. Steadfast Insurance, which provided commercial general liability (CGL) to AES, provided AES a defense under a reservation of rights. Later AES filed a declaratory judgment action, claiming it did not owe AES a defense or indemnity coverage in the underlying suit. The circuit court granted Steadfast's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Complaint did not allege an "occurrence" as that term was defined in AES's contracts of insurance with Steadfast, and that Steadfast, therefore, did not owe AES a defense or liability coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kivalina did not allege that its property damage was the result of a fortuitous event or accident, but rather that its damages were the natural and probable consequence of AES's intentional actions, and such loss was not covered under the relevant CGL policies. View "AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2005, Southwest Emergency Physicians, Inc. (SWEP) and Alldredge entered into a contract under which SWEP's physician-employees staffed Lewis-Gale's emergency department. The contract provided that it could be terminated by either party without cause. In 2008, Alldredge became involved with some signatories to a letter addressed to the Lewis-Gale administration voicing work-related concerns. Certain Lewis-Gale administrators expressed concern that Alldredge had become involved in the hospital's personnel matters, and SWEP later terminated Alldredge's employment. Alldredge sued Lewis-Gale for tortious interference with her employment contract with SWEP, and the circuit court found in favor of Alldredge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the administrators' statements of intimidation and animus toward Allredge did not rise as a matter of law to the level of "improper methods"- such as fraud, deceit, or defamation - necessary to establish a cause of action for tortious interference with contract expectancy when a contract is terminable at will. View "Lewis-Gale Medical Center v. Alldredge" on Justia Law

Brenda Britt obtained a new car from a car dealership after completing and signing, among other documents, a buyer's order and a retail installment sales contract. After failing to obtain financing for the sale of the car, the dealership repossessed and disposed of the vehicle without providing prior notice to Britt. Britt filed a warrant in debt against the dealership in the city general district court, alleging the dealership violated Article Nine of the UCC, which requires a secured party, after repossessing collateral, to provide the debtor with notice before disposing of the collateral. The district court and trial court both found in favor of Britt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the dealership was a secured creditor and Britt a debtor under Article Nine. Therefore, the dealership failed to provide Britt the required notice of disposition following repossession required by Article Nine. View "Cappo Management V, Inc. v. Britt" on Justia Law

Robert Bennett signed a one-year employment agreement with Sage. That summer, Bennett communicated to Sage that he would require an increase of almost triple his salary or he would transition out of the company. When Sage did not meet his demands, Bennett continued working for Sage but pursued other employment opportunities. Bennett's employment was terminated that fall. Bennett filed a complaint against Sage seeking severance payments. During trial, the circuit court granted Sage's motion to amend its pleadings to include a defense of repudiation and submitted the issue of repudiation to the jury. The jury ruled against Bennett, and Bennett appealed. At issue was whether a party may repudiate his contractual duties after performance has commenced. The Supreme Court held that (1) repudiation may apply to a contract that has been partially performed when future obligations under the contract are repudiated, and (2) the circuit court properly rejected Bennett's argument that he did not repudiate the contract as a matter of law. Based on the evidence, the jury was entitled to conclude that Bennett's communications while he attempted to transition out of the company constituted a repudiation of his future obligations under the contract. View "Bennett v. Sage Payment Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the circuit court erred in its interpretation of a management agreement between Condominium Services, Inc. (CSI) and First Owners' Association of Forty Six Hundred Condominium, Inc. (FOA). FOA filed a complaint alleging CSI breached the terms of the management agreement and had wrongfully converted FOA's funds. CSI filed a counterclaim and amended counterclaim for breach of contract. The circuit court sustained FOA's demurrers to the counterclaim and amended counterclaim. FOA's claims proceeded to a jury trial; the jury returned a verdict in favor of FOA on both its claims . CSI sought to strike the jury verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court denied the motion and CSI appealed. On review, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's holding and affirmed the judgment in favor of FOA.