Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency sought a prime contractor to provide event-planning services. Plaintiffs offered their services as joint subcontractors to Navar, Inc. Plaintiffs and Navar entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) and a Teaming Agreement, which provided that if Navar were awarded a prime contract then it would negotiate in good faith with Plaintiffs. The Defense Agency awarded Navar a five-year prime contract, but Navar did not extend subcontracts to either Plaintiff. Thereafter, Plaintiffs sued Navar, asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and trade secret misappropriation. A jury found (1) Navar had breached the NDA and Teaming Agreement, and (2) Navar misappropriated one plaintiff’s trade secretes under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The trial court set aside the verdict on breach of the Teaming Agreement and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in the total amount of $1.25 million. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Navar could not be found liable for breach of contract because nothing in the Act or the NDA required Navar to use Plaintiffs as subcontractors; and (2) the trial court did not err in finding the Teaming Agreement was unenforceable as a binding contract. View "Navar, Inc. v. Federal Bus. Council" on Justia Law

In 2010, JSR Mechanical (JSR) filed a complaint against Aireco Supply alleging breach of contract and negligence. Aireco filed an answer, but there were no further pleadings filed for the next four years. In 2014, under the authority of Va. Code 8.01-335(B), the circuit court entered a final order stating that the case was discontinued and stricken from the docket. In 2015, JSR filed a motion to reinstate the case. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that just cause and sufficient grounds did not exist for granting Plaintiff’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, once a plaintiff has complied with the timeliness and notice requirements of Va. Code 8.01-335(B), the circuit court does not have discretion to deny a procedural motion to reinstate a case that has been discontinued or dismissed pursuant to the statute based on lack of “good cause” or “just cause.” Remanded. View "JSR Mechanical, Inc. v. Aireco Supply, Inc." on Justia Law

Church entered into an engineering contract with Civil Engineer (Engineer) to design site plans for a rain tank system. Church entered into a contract with General Contractor (GC) for the construction of the rain tank. After GC installed the rain tank, the tank collapsed. Engineer designed and GC installed a different storm water management system, but Church refused to pay GC for installing the new storm water system. GC sued Church for payment, and Church counterclaimed against GC for breach of contract. Church filed a third-party claim against Engineer for repair and replacement costs it was found to owe GC because of the rain tank collapse. Church filed a separate suit against Engineer. The circuit court concluded that the rain tank collapse was the failure of Engineer, entered judgment for GC on its claims against Church, and awarded Church damages for delay and other damages associated with removing and replacing the rain tank. Engineer appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding Church’s claims timely and Engineer liable on Church’s breach of contract claims; and (2) reversed the circuit court’s judgment granting Church damages in the form of construction loan interest that was not incurred as a result of the breach of contract. Remanded. View "William H. Gordon Assocs. v. Heritage Fellowship, United Church of Christ" on Justia Law

Scott Harvard was a former senior executive officer of Shore Bank and Hampton Roads Bankshares (HRB). During the 2008 financial crisis, HRB elected to participate in the federal Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). The TARP agreement required HRB to comply with the limits on executive compensation set forth in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) and its implementing regulations. In 2009, Harvard terminated his employment. Thereafter, Harvard filed a breach of contract action against Shore Bank and HRB alleging that HRB breached the parties’ employment agreement by refusing to make a “golden parachute payment” pursuant to the agreement. HRB filed a plea in bar, arguing that the prohibition on golden parachute payments in EESA section 111, as implemented by the June Rule, barred it from paying Harvard pursuant to the employment agreement. The circuit court rejected HRB’s argument and awarded Harvard $655,495 plus interest. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the award of damages in favor of Harvard, holding that EESA section 111, as implemented by the June Rule, prohibited the golden parachute payment under the circumstances of this case. View "Hampton Roads Bankshares, Inc. v. Harvard" on Justia Law

Virginia Fuel Corporation and Lambert Coal Company entered into an agreement by which Virginia Fuel agreed to acquire certain assets owned by Lambert. James C. Justice Companies, Inc. executed a guaranty guaranteeing Lambert’s obligations under the agreement. After Virginia Fuel stopped making payments under the agreement, Lambert filed suit against Virginia Fuel and Justice Companies, alleging breach of the agreement and breach of the guaranty. Virginia Fuel and Justice Companies counterclaimed for breach of contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Lambert and dismissed Defendant’s affirmative defense of recoupment as well as Defendants’ counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to Lambert on its complaint, sustaining Lambert’s demurrer to Defendants’ counterclaim, and dismissing Defendants’ defense of recoupment. View "Virginia Fuel Corp. v. Lambert Coal Co." on Justia Law

In 2006, CPM Virginia, LLC entered into an agreement with MJM Golf, LLC for the sale of a golf course. In 2013, CPM filed suit against MJM claiming that MJM failed to pay in full the purchase price by the date identified in the promissory note. MJM counterclaimed, alleging that CPM had violated the warranty provisions of the agreement. The trial court concluded that CPM breached the warranty requirements in the contract by failing to place eighteen inches of topsoil on top of fly ash on the property, thus entitling MJM to disregard the promissory note. The trial court canceled the note and awarded MJM $694,357 in damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warranty provisions in the agreement did not require CPM to cover the fly ash with eighteen inches of topsoil, and therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding a breach of contract and awarding damages to MJM as a result. Remanded. View "CPM Virginia, LLC v. MJM Golf, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1992, Plaintiff was convicted of a felony drug offense. In 2006, Plaintiff applied to the Fairfax County School Board for a teaching position and disclosed her prior conviction on her application. The Board subsequently hired Plaintiff as a special education teacher. In 2012, the school system’s Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources determined that, pursuant to Va. Code 22.1-296.1(A), Plaintiff’s 2006 hiring had been in error because her conviction made her ineligible for employment by the Board. The Board subsequently filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that section 22.1-296.1(A) made Plaintiff ineligible for hire. The circuit court entered an order declaring that the Board lacked authority to hire Plaintiff under section 22.1-296.1(A). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board lacked authority to make the contract, and therefore, the contract was void ab initio. View "Butler v. Fairfax County School Board" on Justia Law

Mitchell Kambis owns John Rolfe Realty and Elegant Homes of Virginia (collectively, the Kambis parties). Kambis and April Considine formed and were the sole members of Villa Deste, LLC. Patricia Wolfe, Considine’s mother, later loaned money to Villa Deste for the purchase and development of real estate and the construction of a home that Considine and Kambis later occupied. Kambis eventually transferred his interest in Villa Deste and its assets to Considine for value received. Later, the Kambis parties filed a second and third amended complaint alleging several claims agains Considine, Villa Deste, and Wolfe (collectively, the Considine parties). After a complex procedural history, the Kambis parties eventually nonsuited their claims against the Considine parties. The trial court also granted the Considine parties’ motion for sanctions, ordering Kambis to pay $84,541 in sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s award of sanctions, holding that the award of sanctions was properly based on the reasons enumerated in Va. Code 8.01-271.1. View "Kambis v. Considine" on Justia Law

Jennifer Ploutis’ home was insured under a policy issued by Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company when water pipes in the home burst, damaging the home and certain contents. When the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the cost of certain repairs, Ploutis filed a complaint for breach of contract against Allstate. Upon the request of Ploutis, the action was nonsuited. Well after two years after the damage was sustained, Ploutis filed the present action. Allstate filed a demurrer asserting that Ploutis failed to comply with the conditions precedent under the policy by bringing the action within two years “after the inception of loss or damage.” The circuit court overruled the demurrer, concluding that the limitations period was tolled pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-229(E)(3), which tolls the “statute of limitations” with respect to nonsuited actions. Judgment was entered in favor of Ploutis. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and entered final judgment for Allstate, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that section 8.01-229(E)(3) applies to the contractual period of limitations for filing an action under Allstate’s policy. View "Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ploutis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an LLC formed to own, develop, and sell real estate. Defendants were two entities formed to develop and sell real estate under the management and control of two of Plaintiff’s managers. The managers transferred funds from Plaintiff to Defendants, which used the funds to develop and sell their respective properties. Plaintiff was later dissolved, and a liquidating trustee appointed by the circuit court demanded the immediate repayment of the money owed by Defendants to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint against Defendants alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty and seeking the imposition of constructive trusts on Defendants’ respective properties and proceeds from the sale of their properties. The circuit court granted Defendants’ plea in bar and dismissed the amended complaint, concluding that the complaint was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not prove its entitlement to the tolling of the statute of limitations. View "Birchwood-Manassas Assocs., LLC v. Birchwood at Oak Knoll Farm, LLC" on Justia Law