Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1992, Plaintiff was convicted of a felony drug offense. In 2006, Plaintiff applied to the Fairfax County School Board for a teaching position and disclosed her prior conviction on her application. The Board subsequently hired Plaintiff as a special education teacher. In 2012, the school system’s Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources determined that, pursuant to Va. Code 22.1-296.1(A), Plaintiff’s 2006 hiring had been in error because her conviction made her ineligible for employment by the Board. The Board subsequently filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that section 22.1-296.1(A) made Plaintiff ineligible for hire. The circuit court entered an order declaring that the Board lacked authority to hire Plaintiff under section 22.1-296.1(A). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board lacked authority to make the contract, and therefore, the contract was void ab initio. View "Butler v. Fairfax County School Board" on Justia Law

Mitchell Kambis owns John Rolfe Realty and Elegant Homes of Virginia (collectively, the Kambis parties). Kambis and April Considine formed and were the sole members of Villa Deste, LLC. Patricia Wolfe, Considine’s mother, later loaned money to Villa Deste for the purchase and development of real estate and the construction of a home that Considine and Kambis later occupied. Kambis eventually transferred his interest in Villa Deste and its assets to Considine for value received. Later, the Kambis parties filed a second and third amended complaint alleging several claims agains Considine, Villa Deste, and Wolfe (collectively, the Considine parties). After a complex procedural history, the Kambis parties eventually nonsuited their claims against the Considine parties. The trial court also granted the Considine parties’ motion for sanctions, ordering Kambis to pay $84,541 in sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s award of sanctions, holding that the award of sanctions was properly based on the reasons enumerated in Va. Code 8.01-271.1. View "Kambis v. Considine" on Justia Law

Jennifer Ploutis’ home was insured under a policy issued by Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company when water pipes in the home burst, damaging the home and certain contents. When the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the cost of certain repairs, Ploutis filed a complaint for breach of contract against Allstate. Upon the request of Ploutis, the action was nonsuited. Well after two years after the damage was sustained, Ploutis filed the present action. Allstate filed a demurrer asserting that Ploutis failed to comply with the conditions precedent under the policy by bringing the action within two years “after the inception of loss or damage.” The circuit court overruled the demurrer, concluding that the limitations period was tolled pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-229(E)(3), which tolls the “statute of limitations” with respect to nonsuited actions. Judgment was entered in favor of Ploutis. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and entered final judgment for Allstate, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that section 8.01-229(E)(3) applies to the contractual period of limitations for filing an action under Allstate’s policy. View "Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ploutis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an LLC formed to own, develop, and sell real estate. Defendants were two entities formed to develop and sell real estate under the management and control of two of Plaintiff’s managers. The managers transferred funds from Plaintiff to Defendants, which used the funds to develop and sell their respective properties. Plaintiff was later dissolved, and a liquidating trustee appointed by the circuit court demanded the immediate repayment of the money owed by Defendants to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint against Defendants alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty and seeking the imposition of constructive trusts on Defendants’ respective properties and proceeds from the sale of their properties. The circuit court granted Defendants’ plea in bar and dismissed the amended complaint, concluding that the complaint was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not prove its entitlement to the tolling of the statute of limitations. View "Birchwood-Manassas Assocs., LLC v. Birchwood at Oak Knoll Farm, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Spectra-4 LLP and Spectet Limited Partnership, LLC, individually owned and leased neighboring commercial buildings. Uniwest Commercial Realty provided management services for the commercial buildings. As between Uniwest and Spectra-4, and between Uniwest and Spectet, two separate implied-in-fact contracts existed. The implied-in-fact contracts encompassed specific portions of previously expired express contract executed by a different set of parties. After Plaintiffs terminated Uniwest’s management services for both commercial buildings Uniwest withdrew premature termination fees and copying charges from Plaintiffs’ operating accounts. Plaintiffs filed warrants in debt against Uniwest alleging conversion. Plaintiffs later amended the complaints to include breach of contract claims. The district court awarded judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The circuit court reversed and entered judgment in favor of Uniwest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the implied-in-fact contracts permitted Uniwest’s withdrawal of premature termination fees from Plaintiffs’ operating accounts because the implied-in-fact contracts did not include terms and conditions permitting Uniwest to withdraw premature termination fees or copying charges from the operating accounts. View "Spectra-4, LLP v. Uniwest Commercial Realty" on Justia Law

In 2005, Donald Devine and his wife Nancy Devine acquired ownership of Rock Hall, a 200-year-old house. In 2007, Charles Buki and Kimberly Marsho signed a contract agreeing to purchase Rock Hall. Later that year, Buki and Marsho (together, Plaintiffs) brought suit against Donald and Nancy (together Defendants), alleging that Defendants fraudulently induced them to enter into the real estate contract and to close on Rock Hall by misrepresenting and concealing the true condition of the house. The trial court concluded that Nancy had committed no wrong but nonetheless granted rescission of the real estate contract against both Donald and Nancy, concluding that Nancy should be “responsible jointly and severally with her husband for the payment of the purchase price” of Rock Hall. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because there was no evidence of any wrongdoing on the part of Nancy, the trial court had no basis for awarding any remedy, including rescission, against Nancy. View "Devine v. Buki" on Justia Law

In 2005, Donald Devine and his wife Nancy Devine acquired ownership of Rock Hall, a 200-year-old house. In 2007, Charles Buki and Kimberly Marsho signed a contract agreeing to purchase Rock Hall. Later that year, Buki and Marsho (together, Plaintiffs) brought suit against Donald and Nancy (together Defendants), alleging that Defendants fraudulently induced them to enter into the real estate contract and to close on Rock Hall by misrepresenting and concealing the true condition of the house. The trial court concluded that Plaintiffs were entitled to rescission of the contract where David, but not Nancy, committed fraud. The court awarded consequential damages and attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in granting rescission of the real estate contract based on Donald’s fraudulent concealment of the true state of the house and did not err in awarding attorney’s fees; (2) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award punitive damages; and (3) erred in awarding consequential damages and prejudgment interest. View "Devine v. Buki" on Justia Law

Zachary Gage Duncan sustained a serious injury while driving his 2008 Hyundai Tiburon when he struck a tree. The side airbag did not deploy. Plaintiffs, individual and as Duncan’s guardians and conservators, filed suit against Hyundai, claiming breach of implied warranty of merchantability. During trial, Plaintiffs’ designated expert witness Geoffrey Mahon testified that the location of the side airbag sensor rendered the Tiburon unreasonably dangerous. Hyundai appealed from the judgment of the trial court, arguing that there was an insufficient foundation for the expert witness’s opinion. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) Mahon’s opinion was premised upon his unfounded assumption that the side airbag would have deployed if the sensor had been located in a different area; and (2) because Mahon’s opinion supplied the only support for Plaintiffs’ claim that the vehicle was unreasonably dangerous, the inadmissibility of Mahon’s opinion was fatal to Plaintiffs’ claim. View "Hyundai Motor Co. v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs hired Defendants, an automotive business and its owner, to repair and restore a 1960 Ford Thunderbird. After disputes arose between the parties, Plaintiffs filed this action in the circuit court alleging breach of contract, violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA), fraud and detinue. Defendants moved to strike Plaintiffs’ evidence as to all counts. The trial court granted the motion as to the fraud and VCPA counts. After a trial on the breach of contract count, the jury returned a verdict for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) striking the evidence after commenting that two witnesses were “believable” and “credible,” as the comments did not usurp the function of the jury; and (2) striking the evidence on the VCPA claim because the evidence was insufficient to go to the jury. View "Owens v. DRS Auto. FantomWorks, Inc." on Justia Law

DHRI, Inc. entered into a contract to purchase a parcel of land from William Hanback. DHRI later sued Defendant for specific performance of the land purchase contract. On June 9, 2004, the trial court entered a decree providing that Hanback should sell the property to DHRI and DHRI should pay to Hancock certain sums. On November 21, 2012, Hancock filed a petition for rule to show cause, asserting that after closing on the property, DHRI refused to pay funds owed him under the June 9, 2004 order. After a hearing, the circuit court issued a rule to show cause to DHRI. The court then determined that DHRI had not paid Hancock the required amount of $350,000, found DHRI in contempt of the June 9, 2004 order, and entered judgment for Defendant against Plaintiff in the amount of $350,000. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the rule to show cause, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion because the June 9, 2004 order did not contain definite terms as to the total amount DRHI was required to pay and when such payment was due. View "DRHI, Inc. v. Hanback" on Justia Law