Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Contracts
21st Century Sys. v. Perot Sys. Gov’t Servs., Inc.
Perot Systems Government Services filed an amended complaint against Defendants, 21st Century Systems, Inc, and several individuals, alleging that Defendants, all of whom were former Perot employees, conspired for the purpose of willfully and maliciously attempting to destroy Perot and steal away Perot business by unfairly and improperly using Perot's confidential and proprietary information. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Perot on all claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defense motions to strike testimony regarding lost goodwill damages, and accordingly, the court erred when it refused to set aside the jury's award of lost goodwill damages based upon that testimony; (2) the court did not err when it refused to set aside the jury's award of both punitive and treble damages in favor of Perot; and (3) the court did not err when it refused to set aside the jury's award of computer forensics damages. View "21st Century Sys. v. Perot Sys. Gov't Servs., Inc." on Justia Law
Prof’l Bldg. Maint. Corp. v. School Bd.
Professional Building Maintenance Corporation (PBM), which provides janitorial and industrial cleaning services, filed an amended complaint against the School Board of the County of Spotsylvania asserting causes of action arising under the Virginia Public Procurement Act. PBM asserted that the School Board violated the Act because it did not award a custodial services contract to PBM, who was the lowest responsive and responsible bidder, and that the School Board's failure to select PMB as the successful bidder was arbitrary and capricious. The circuit court sustained the School Board's demurrer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in sustaining the School Board's demurrer, as the amended complaint (1) adequately alleged that the School Board failed to properly follow the requirements of the Act, and (2) alleged sufficient facts of arbitrary or capricious conduct. View "Prof'l Bldg. Maint. Corp. v. School Bd." on Justia Law
PBM Nutritionals, LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co.
PBM Nutritionals filed a declaratory judgment action against three insurance companies (collectively the Insurers) seeking insurance coverage for its loss resulting from infiltration of filter elements into the infant formula it manufactured between January 22 and January 30, 2009. The Insurers claimed that the insurance policies' "Pollution Exclusion Endorsements" excluded coverage for PBM's infant formula loss because the formula was "contaminated." The circuit court entered judgment for the Insurers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did no err in finding that the Insurers were not liable to provide insurance coverage for PBM's loss of infant formula product. View "PBM Nutritionals, LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Orthopedic & Sports Physical Therapy Assocs. v. Summit Group Props., LLC
Summit Group Properties, LLC (Summit) sued Orthopedic & Sports Physical Therapy Associates (OSPTA) and its partners for breach of lease and damages. OSPTA filed a counterclaim in which it alleged fraud in the inducement and damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Summit against OSPTA in the amount of $187,000. The jury found for Summit on OSPTA's counterclaim. OSPTA appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting a jury instruction offered by Summit because it misstated the law by instructing the jury that a limited liability company could not be liable for any fraudulent activity unless the fraud was approved by the members of the LLC. The Supreme Court agreed with OSPTA that the instruction was misleading because it was not a complete statement of the law and held that the trial court erred in giving the instruction. Remanded. View "Orthopedic & Sports Physical Therapy Assocs. v. Summit Group Props., LLC" on Justia Law
Mathews v. PHH Mortgage Corp.
The Mathewses conveyed a parcel of land by deed of trust to a credit union to secure a promissory note. PHH Mortgage Corporation subsequently became the holder of the note and the beneficiary of the deed of trust. After the Mathewses failed to make payments, PHH commenced foreclosure proceedings on the parcel. The Mathewses filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the foreclosure sale would be void because PHH had not satisfied conditions precedent to foreclosure set forth in the deed of trust. Specifically, they alleged that 24 C.F.R. 203.604 (the Regulation) required PHH to have a meeting with them thirty days before the commencement of foreclosure proceedings. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the Regulation was incorporated into the deed of trust as a condition precedent to foreclosure but that, under Virginia common law, the party who breaches a contract first cannot sue to enforce it. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) borrowers may sue to enforce conditions precedent to foreclosure even if they were the first party to breach the note secured by a deed of trust through non-payment; and (2) the Mathewses pled sufficient facts for the Regulation to apply. Remanded. View "Mathews v. PHH Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law
Envtl. Staffing Corp. v. B & R Constr. Mgmt.
A developer contracted with B&R Construction Management (B&R) for the demolition a redevelopment and housing authority facility (hereafter referred to as the Contract). B&R subcontracted some of the demolition work to Beamon Enterprises (Beamon). Beamon, in turn, subcontracted with Environmental Staffing Acquisition Corporation (En-Staff) to provide labor. After Beamon failed to pay En-Staff for the work performed, En-Staff filed a complaint against B&R seeking the amount it was owed under its contract with Beamon. En-Staff asserted it had standing to bring a breach of contract claim against B&R as a third-party beneficiary of the Contract. B&R filed a demurrer disputing En-Staff's status as a third-party beneficiary. The circuit court sustained B&R's demurrer and dismissed En-Staff's claims against B&R with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred in finding that the language of the Contract precluded third-party action against B&R, but the error was harmless; and (2) En-Staff was not a third-party beneficiary of the Contract because it benefitted only incidentally from the Contract.
View "Envtl. Staffing Corp. v. B & R Constr. Mgmt." on Justia Law
Cattano v. Bragg
This case arose out of a dispute between two attorneys, John Cattano and Carolina Bragg, the only shareholders of Cattano Law Firm. Bragg filed an amended complaint including claims for a writ of mandamus for the copying and inspection of corporate records, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, breach of contract, and judicial dissolution. A jury returned a verdict finding (1) Bragg owned 27.35 percent of the firm; (2) in Bragg's favor on her claim of derivative conversion, awarding the firm damages; and (3) in favor of Bragg on the breach of contract and judicial dissolution claims, awarding Bragg damages individually. The circuit court then awarded what it determined to be reasonable fees to Bragg. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that there was no error in the judgment of the circuit court. View "Cattano v. Bragg" on Justia Law
AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co.
The AES Corporation paid premiums to Steadfast Insurance Company for commercial general liability (CGL) policies. In February 2008, the village and city of Kivalina, a community located on an Alaskan barrier island, filed a lawsuit (the Complaint) in the U.S. district court against AES and other defendants for allegedly damaging the village by causing global warming through emission of greenhouse gases. Steadfast provided AES a defense under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment action, claiming that it did not owe AES a defense or indemnity regarding the Complaint. The circuit court granted Steadfast's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Complaint did not allege property damage caused by an "occurrence" as that term was defined in AES's contracts of insurance with Steadfast. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kivalina did not allege that its property damage was the result of a fortuitous event or accident, and therefore, such a loss was not covered under the relevant CGL policies. View "AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co." on Justia Law
St. Joe Co. v. Norfolk Redev. and Hous. Auth.
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NRHA) filed a complaint against the St. Joe Company and Advantis Real Estate Services Company alleging unjust enrichment and seeking imposition of a constructive trust and recovery of funds supplied by NRHA to its agent, Advantis, for the payment of contractors who had performed services for NRHA. St. Joe held a perfected secured interest in Advantis's operating account and exercised its rights as a secured creditor over that account to have funds from Advantis's account, including those entrusted to Advantis as NRHA's agent, transferred to a St. Joe account. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of NRHA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the imposition of a constructive was was proper and necessary to prevent a failure of justice and unjust enrichment. View "St. Joe Co. v. Norfolk Redev. and Hous. Auth." on Justia Law
Specialty Hosps. v. Rappahannock Goodwill Indus.
Rappahannock Goodwill Industries (RGI) enterd into an agreement with Specialty Hospitals of Washington. When Specialty Hospitals failed to perform under the agreement, RGI filed a complaint against Specialty Hospitals, asserting claims for breach of contract, conversion, and quantum meruit. No responsive pleadings were filed on behalf of Specialty Hospitals, and the circuit court entered default judgment in favor of RGI. Specialty Hospitals then filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, alleging that service of process was defective, that RGI's claims were against a different entity, and that RGI had erroneously sued Specialty Hospitals. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) failing to find actual notice to Specialty Hospitals, and (2) failing to consider all the factors set forth in Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3:19(d)(1). View "Specialty Hosps. v. Rappahannock Goodwill Indus." on Justia Law