Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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On May 22, 2020, Officers Massie and Hubbard of the Lynchburg Police Department attempted to stop Tara Ann Baez for speeding. After a brief pursuit, Baez stopped her vehicle and was arrested for reckless driving and eluding law enforcement. Officer File arrived and conducted a canine sniff, leading to a search of Baez’s vehicle, where a glass smoking device was found. Officer File also found a folded piece of paper with a substance suspected to be narcotics in Baez’s pocket, which tested positive for cocaine.At trial, the Commonwealth sought to admit video footage from Officer File’s body-worn camera to establish the chain of custody for the drugs. Baez objected, arguing the video lacked foundation and violated the Confrontation Clause. The trial court overruled the objections, finding the video could be authenticated by Officer Massie’s testimony and did not contain hearsay. Baez was found guilty of possession of cocaine but not guilty of eluding. Her conviction was later set aside, and she was placed on probation, which she violated, leading to a finding of guilt and a suspended two-year sentence.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the trial court’s decision, rejecting Baez’s arguments that the video was testimonial hearsay and lacked proper authentication. The court held that the video did not contain any conduct intended as an assertion and thus did not implicate the Confrontation Clause. It also found that Officer Massie’s testimony provided a sufficient basis to authenticate the video.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and agreed with the lower courts. It held that the video did not contain hearsay and was properly authenticated, affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Baez v. Commonwealth of Virginia" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Patrick Austin Carolino was convicted of strangulation after a bench trial. The incident involved Carolino and his then-girlfriend, Hannah Ford, who testified that Carolino choked her during an argument, causing her to experience difficulty breathing and other symptoms. Ford did not immediately report the incident to the police but did so a month later. Evidence included photographs of Ford's injuries and testimony from a nurse examiner and other witnesses.The trial court admitted photographs of bruises on Ford's buttocks from a previous incident where Carolino allegedly whipped her with a belt. Carolino objected to this evidence, arguing it was irrelevant, constituted prior bad acts, and was beyond the scope of direct examination. The trial court overruled these objections and admitted the evidence, which it referenced in its ruling to convict Carolino.The Court of Appeals of Virginia, sitting en banc, reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the belt-whipping evidence solely to attack Carolino’s credibility, violating the precedent set in McGowan v. Commonwealth. The majority found that the evidence was used improperly for impeachment on a collateral matter and that this error was not harmless.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and determined that Carolino did not preserve his argument regarding improper impeachment on a collateral matter at trial. The objections made at trial were limited to relevance, prior bad acts, and scope of direct examination, none of which specifically invoked the rule from McGowan. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, vacated its judgment, and reinstated Carolino’s conviction for strangulation. View "Commonwealth v. Carolino" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Junior Josephson was convicted of possession of heroin and fentanyl, as well as petit larceny. He received suspended sentences for the drug offenses and 90 days to serve on the larceny charge, with the condition that he comply with supervised probation for three years. Josephson appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Josephson had absconded from probation and failed to stay in contact with his probation officer. The court issued a capias for his arrest, which remained outstanding at the time of the motion.The Court of Appeals dismissed Josephson’s appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, concluding that he forfeited his right to appellate review by absconding from probation. Josephson’s counsel filed a petition for rehearing, but the Court of Appeals denied it. Josephson then appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The court held that an appellate court may consider factual developments that occur after the trial, such as a defendant becoming a fugitive, to determine whether to adjudicate the case. The court found that there was no genuine dispute about Josephson’s fugitive status, as he did not deny it. The court also held that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the appeal, as the fugitive disentitlement doctrine allows courts to dismiss appeals when a defendant is a fugitive, there is a nexus between the appeal and the fugitive status, and dismissal is necessary to effectuate the policy concerns underlying the doctrine.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, upholding the dismissal of Josephson’s appeal. View "Josephson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2003, Stanley Edward Johnson-Bey was convicted of a drug offense and received a suspended sentence. Over the next seventeen years, he repeatedly violated the conditions of his probation and suspended sentence, leading to multiple revocations and resuspensions. In 2022, following his fifth violation, the sentencing court imposed a portion of his remaining suspended sentence. Johnson-Bey appealed, arguing that a 2021 amendment to Code § 19.2-306(A) stripped the court of jurisdiction to enter the revocation order.The circuit court conducted a revocation hearing in May 2022 and found that Johnson-Bey had violated the conditions of his suspended sentence. The court rejected his argument regarding the 2021 amendment, agreeing with the Commonwealth that the amendment did not retroactively apply to his 2003 conviction or subsequent revocation orders. Johnson-Bey appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that the 2021 amendment operated prospectively and did not affect sentencing orders entered before July 2021.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and upheld the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the 2021 amendments to Code §§ 19.2-303.1 and 19.2-306 did not retroactively apply to Johnson-Bey's 2003 conviction or any subsequent revocation orders. The court emphasized the presumption against retroactive legislation and concluded that the amendments did not limit the court's sentencing options at the May 2022 revocation hearing. The court also rejected Johnson-Bey's argument that the amendments should be applied prospectively to withdraw the court's jurisdiction, finding that the changes were substantive rather than procedural. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, maintaining the validity of the 2022 revocation order. View "Johnson-Bey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case involves Dilliraj Bista, who was accused of sexually assaulting an 11-year-old child, R.P., who has autism spectrum disorder. Bista, a close family friend, stayed with R.P.'s family in Fairfax County, Virginia, during which the assault occurred. R.P.'s mother discovered Bista in a compromising position with R.P. and, upon questioning, R.P. described the assault in detail. Bista initially denied but later admitted to some misconduct. The incident was reported to the police months later, leading to a forensic interview where R.P. provided a detailed account of the assault.The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Fairfax County held a preliminary hearing where R.P. testified, and Bista cross-examined her. The court certified the charges, and Bista was indicted. The Circuit Court of Fairfax County admitted R.P.'s out-of-court statements under Code § 19.2-268.3, finding them inherently trustworthy despite inconsistencies. The court also found R.P. incompetent to testify at trial due to her inability to understand the difference between truth and falsehood. Bista was convicted of forcible sodomy and aggravated sexual battery but acquitted of rape. His post-conviction motion to set aside the verdict was denied.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions, concluding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting R.P.'s statements and that Bista had a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine R.P. at the preliminary hearing. The court held that R.P.'s statements were inherently trustworthy and corroborated by other evidence, including Bista's admission and DNA evidence. The court also found that Bista's cross-examination at the preliminary hearing was constitutionally adequate, addressing the same allegations of sexual abuse.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, agreeing that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion and that Bista's constitutional rights were not violated. View "Bista v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Kevin Thomas King was convicted of felony unauthorized use of another’s vehicle after a bench trial. The incident occurred on December 31, 2020, when King attended a party at Isaac Robertson, Jr.'s home. King asked Robertson if he could drive Robertson’s Volkswagen Jetta, but Robertson refused. Despite this, King took the car while Robertson was asleep and was later found unconscious and inebriated near the heavily damaged vehicle. Robertson confirmed he owned the car, which his brother had given him in 2020, although he had not registered it with the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) due to a suspended driver’s license.The trial court denied King’s motion to strike the evidence, which argued that Robertson was not the legal owner since he had not registered the car with the DMV. The court found that Robertson was the owner based on his possession and control of the vehicle and his testimony that his brother had given it to him. Consequently, King was convicted of unauthorized use of a vehicle.King appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, reiterating his argument that Robertson was not the legal owner due to the lack of DMV registration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating that the definition of “owner” in Code § 18.2-102 does not require DMV registration and that Robertson’s testimony and possession of the car were sufficient to establish ownership.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Robertson’s testimony and the circumstances of his possession and control of the vehicle were sufficient to establish that he was the owner, even without DMV registration. Thus, the evidence supported King’s conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle. View "King v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Joshua Adam Eckard was convicted by a jury of 12 counts of possession of child pornography. Following the verdict, Eckard filed a motion to set aside the jury verdict, alleging juror misconduct. He claimed that one juror had intimidated another into voting guilty. The motion included an email from a sheriff’s office employee and a letter from the Sheriff, both indicating that a juror felt threatened during deliberations and had complained about the trial process. However, there was no follow-up from the juror who made the complaint.The Circuit Court denied Eckard’s motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, stating that the allegations did not justify vacating the verdict or warrant judicial intrusion into the jury’s decision-making process. Eckard appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion without a hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, noting that the record did not support Eckard’s claims and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The appellate court emphasized that the allegations were vague and amounted to internal discord rather than external threats.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and upheld the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the verdict without an evidentiary hearing. The Court noted that the allegations were insufficiently detailed and did not constitute an exceptional case warranting judicial intervention. The Court also declined to consider additional documents Eckard attempted to introduce, as they were not part of the record before the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, maintaining the jury’s verdict. View "Eckard v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Nakia Durham was stopped by Officer Labat for driving with a suspended license. During the stop, Officer Labat noticed the smell of alcohol and saw an open container in the car. A subsequent search revealed a concealed firearm, leading to Durham's convictions for possession of a firearm by a nonviolent felon, carrying a concealed weapon unlawfully, and drinking while driving.In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Durham moved to suppress the firearm evidence, arguing the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The court denied the motion, finding the search justified based on the totality of the circumstances, including the odor of alcohol and the open container. Durham was convicted and sentenced to three years for the firearm possession, with additional penalties for the other charges.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision, applying a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to uphold the search's constitutionality. The court found that the presence of the open container, the smell of alcohol, and Durham's behavior provided probable cause for the search. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Durham's firearm convictions, noting his proximity to the weapon and his actions during the stop.The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that the search was justified under the totality of the circumstances and that the evidence was sufficient to support Durham's convictions. The court emphasized that probable cause does not require meeting all statutory prongs but rather a reasonable belief based on the overall situation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Durham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Travis Alexander Bland-Henderson was charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a violent felony. He was to be tried by a jury and filed a “Notice of Demand for Jury Sentencing” pursuant to Code § 19.2-295. However, Bland-Henderson missed the statutory deadline to file his request for jury sentencing, filing his notice only 13 days before trial. The Commonwealth objected to Bland-Henderson’s request for jury sentencing as untimely. Bland-Henderson acknowledged that he had filed the request late, but argued that his untimeliness did not eliminate his statutory right to be sentenced by the jury. The circuit court denied Bland-Henderson’s request for jury sentencing.The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, ruling that the circuit court had “correctly concluded that Bland-Henderson waived his request for jury sentencing by failing to submit his demand at least 30 days before trial.” The Court of Appeals also held that if the jury would not be sentencing the defendant, voir dire on sentencing ranges is not permitted, since that line of questioning would be irrelevant and would only encourage jury nullification.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the “shall” command in Code § 19.2-295, that instructs a defendant to file a request for jury sentencing at least 30 days prior to trial, is mandatory. Therefore, Bland-Henderson had waived his statutory right to jury sentencing by missing the statutory deadline to file his request. The court also held that there is no absolute right to voir dire jurors regarding potential sentencing ranges, since this line of questioning remains irrelevant and improper when the jury will not be sentencing the defendant. View "Bland-Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case revolves around a defendant, Tony Thomas, who was indicted for aggravated malicious wounding following a physical altercation that resulted in permanent injuries to the victim. The parties initially reached a plea agreement, which was presented to the trial court but not immediately accepted. The court indicated it would review the agreement and make a decision at a later date. However, due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and changes in the circumstances of the case, the parties renegotiated and entered into a second plea agreement, which was presented to a different judge and accepted.The original judge, upon learning of the second plea agreement, insisted on enforcing the first agreement, despite the parties having withdrawn their assent to it. The defendant and the Commonwealth both objected to this decision, arguing that they were free to renegotiate the plea agreement as it had not been accepted by the court. The trial court rejected these arguments and convicted the defendant based on the first plea agreement.The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, relying on the doctrine of approbate and reprobate and the court's inherent authority to take a matter under advisement for a later decision. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant was required to either present a new plea agreement to the original judge or inform the original judge that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea.The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, reversed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that parties are free to modify or renegotiate plea agreements when a trial court has not yet accepted the agreement. The court found that the trial court's insistence upon and implementation of a plea agreement that the parties had revoked was reversible error. The court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Thomas v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law