Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves Dilliraj Bista, who was accused of sexually assaulting an 11-year-old child, R.P., who has autism spectrum disorder. Bista, a close family friend, stayed with R.P.'s family in Fairfax County, Virginia, during which the assault occurred. R.P.'s mother discovered Bista in a compromising position with R.P. and, upon questioning, R.P. described the assault in detail. Bista initially denied but later admitted to some misconduct. The incident was reported to the police months later, leading to a forensic interview where R.P. provided a detailed account of the assault.The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Fairfax County held a preliminary hearing where R.P. testified, and Bista cross-examined her. The court certified the charges, and Bista was indicted. The Circuit Court of Fairfax County admitted R.P.'s out-of-court statements under Code § 19.2-268.3, finding them inherently trustworthy despite inconsistencies. The court also found R.P. incompetent to testify at trial due to her inability to understand the difference between truth and falsehood. Bista was convicted of forcible sodomy and aggravated sexual battery but acquitted of rape. His post-conviction motion to set aside the verdict was denied.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions, concluding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting R.P.'s statements and that Bista had a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine R.P. at the preliminary hearing. The court held that R.P.'s statements were inherently trustworthy and corroborated by other evidence, including Bista's admission and DNA evidence. The court also found that Bista's cross-examination at the preliminary hearing was constitutionally adequate, addressing the same allegations of sexual abuse.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, agreeing that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion and that Bista's constitutional rights were not violated. View "Bista v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Kevin Thomas King was convicted of felony unauthorized use of another’s vehicle after a bench trial. The incident occurred on December 31, 2020, when King attended a party at Isaac Robertson, Jr.'s home. King asked Robertson if he could drive Robertson’s Volkswagen Jetta, but Robertson refused. Despite this, King took the car while Robertson was asleep and was later found unconscious and inebriated near the heavily damaged vehicle. Robertson confirmed he owned the car, which his brother had given him in 2020, although he had not registered it with the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) due to a suspended driver’s license.The trial court denied King’s motion to strike the evidence, which argued that Robertson was not the legal owner since he had not registered the car with the DMV. The court found that Robertson was the owner based on his possession and control of the vehicle and his testimony that his brother had given it to him. Consequently, King was convicted of unauthorized use of a vehicle.King appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, reiterating his argument that Robertson was not the legal owner due to the lack of DMV registration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating that the definition of “owner” in Code § 18.2-102 does not require DMV registration and that Robertson’s testimony and possession of the car were sufficient to establish ownership.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Robertson’s testimony and the circumstances of his possession and control of the vehicle were sufficient to establish that he was the owner, even without DMV registration. Thus, the evidence supported King’s conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle. View "King v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Joshua Adam Eckard was convicted by a jury of 12 counts of possession of child pornography. Following the verdict, Eckard filed a motion to set aside the jury verdict, alleging juror misconduct. He claimed that one juror had intimidated another into voting guilty. The motion included an email from a sheriff’s office employee and a letter from the Sheriff, both indicating that a juror felt threatened during deliberations and had complained about the trial process. However, there was no follow-up from the juror who made the complaint.The Circuit Court denied Eckard’s motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, stating that the allegations did not justify vacating the verdict or warrant judicial intrusion into the jury’s decision-making process. Eckard appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion without a hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, noting that the record did not support Eckard’s claims and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The appellate court emphasized that the allegations were vague and amounted to internal discord rather than external threats.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and upheld the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the verdict without an evidentiary hearing. The Court noted that the allegations were insufficiently detailed and did not constitute an exceptional case warranting judicial intervention. The Court also declined to consider additional documents Eckard attempted to introduce, as they were not part of the record before the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, maintaining the jury’s verdict. View "Eckard v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Nakia Durham was stopped by Officer Labat for driving with a suspended license. During the stop, Officer Labat noticed the smell of alcohol and saw an open container in the car. A subsequent search revealed a concealed firearm, leading to Durham's convictions for possession of a firearm by a nonviolent felon, carrying a concealed weapon unlawfully, and drinking while driving.In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Durham moved to suppress the firearm evidence, arguing the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The court denied the motion, finding the search justified based on the totality of the circumstances, including the odor of alcohol and the open container. Durham was convicted and sentenced to three years for the firearm possession, with additional penalties for the other charges.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision, applying a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to uphold the search's constitutionality. The court found that the presence of the open container, the smell of alcohol, and Durham's behavior provided probable cause for the search. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Durham's firearm convictions, noting his proximity to the weapon and his actions during the stop.The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that the search was justified under the totality of the circumstances and that the evidence was sufficient to support Durham's convictions. The court emphasized that probable cause does not require meeting all statutory prongs but rather a reasonable belief based on the overall situation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Durham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Travis Alexander Bland-Henderson was charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a violent felony. He was to be tried by a jury and filed a “Notice of Demand for Jury Sentencing” pursuant to Code § 19.2-295. However, Bland-Henderson missed the statutory deadline to file his request for jury sentencing, filing his notice only 13 days before trial. The Commonwealth objected to Bland-Henderson’s request for jury sentencing as untimely. Bland-Henderson acknowledged that he had filed the request late, but argued that his untimeliness did not eliminate his statutory right to be sentenced by the jury. The circuit court denied Bland-Henderson’s request for jury sentencing.The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, ruling that the circuit court had “correctly concluded that Bland-Henderson waived his request for jury sentencing by failing to submit his demand at least 30 days before trial.” The Court of Appeals also held that if the jury would not be sentencing the defendant, voir dire on sentencing ranges is not permitted, since that line of questioning would be irrelevant and would only encourage jury nullification.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the “shall” command in Code § 19.2-295, that instructs a defendant to file a request for jury sentencing at least 30 days prior to trial, is mandatory. Therefore, Bland-Henderson had waived his statutory right to jury sentencing by missing the statutory deadline to file his request. The court also held that there is no absolute right to voir dire jurors regarding potential sentencing ranges, since this line of questioning remains irrelevant and improper when the jury will not be sentencing the defendant. View "Bland-Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Tony Thomas, who was indicted for aggravated malicious wounding following a physical altercation that resulted in permanent injuries to the victim. The parties initially reached a plea agreement, which was presented to the trial court but not immediately accepted. The court indicated it would review the agreement and make a decision at a later date. However, due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and changes in the circumstances of the case, the parties renegotiated and entered into a second plea agreement, which was presented to a different judge and accepted.The original judge, upon learning of the second plea agreement, insisted on enforcing the first agreement, despite the parties having withdrawn their assent to it. The defendant and the Commonwealth both objected to this decision, arguing that they were free to renegotiate the plea agreement as it had not been accepted by the court. The trial court rejected these arguments and convicted the defendant based on the first plea agreement.The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, relying on the doctrine of approbate and reprobate and the court's inherent authority to take a matter under advisement for a later decision. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant was required to either present a new plea agreement to the original judge or inform the original judge that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea.The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, reversed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that parties are free to modify or renegotiate plea agreements when a trial court has not yet accepted the agreement. The court found that the trial court's insistence upon and implementation of a plea agreement that the parties had revoked was reversible error. The court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Thomas v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Stephen Lamar Garrick was found asleep in a vehicle with the engine running. Upon waking him, officers noticed signs of intoxication and a faint smell of marijuana. This led to a search of the vehicle, where they found a bag of heroin and a loaded handgun in the glove compartment. Garrick, the sole occupant of the vehicle, stated that his mother owned the car and he drove it three days a week. The glove compartment also contained two receipts for vehicle maintenance, both listing Garrick as the customer. Garrick was convicted of possession of heroin and possession of a firearm by a violent felon.Garrick appealed his convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove possession. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, stating that Garrick's occupancy of the vehicle, his proximity to the items, and his admission of driving the vehicle were insufficient to establish constructive possession. The Court of Appeals also noted that the maintenance receipts only served as evidence that Garrick regularly used the car, not that he knew about the heroin and firearm.The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, stating that the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Garrick was aware of the presence of the heroin and firearm. The court noted that Garrick was the sole occupant of the vehicle, was in close proximity to the items, and had been in the vehicle for a significant period of time. The court also pointed out that the maintenance receipts indicated that Garrick was responsible for the vehicle's upkeep, suggesting that he used the glove compartment where the items were found. The court concluded that the combined circumstances were sufficient to support the conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Garrick" on Justia Law

Vernon Eugene Hannah was convicted of one felony count of forging a public record and one misdemeanor count of providing false information to a law enforcement officer. He was sentenced to five years of incarceration with two years suspended for the felony, and twelve months of incarceration with eight months suspended for the misdemeanor. The circuit court partially suspended Hannah’s sentences on the condition of good behavior, compliance with urine screens, payment of costs, and supervised probation. Despite these conditions, Hannah tested positive for controlled substances multiple times. As a result, Hannah’s probation officer requested that the circuit court issue a rule to show cause, which led to a probation revocation hearing.The circuit court found Hannah guilty of violating the terms of his probation on both the felony and misdemeanor convictions, revoked the suspended sentences for both, and resuspended the sentences for the same period of supervised probation, this time adding new special conditions. Hannah appealed the reimposition of his suspended sentence to the Court of Appeals on two grounds, challenging the circuit court’s jurisdiction to hold the probation revocation hearing, and challenging the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the circuit court’s May 2022 order revoking and resuspending Hannah’s sentence was not void ab initio under the 2021 statutory amendments. The court also held that the amended Code § 19.2-303.1 did not abrogate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to decide Hannah’s revocation. Furthermore, the court found that Hannah’s challenges based on Code § 19.2-303.1 were waived under Rules 5A:18 and 5A:20, and that Hannah’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was barred by Rule 5A:18. View "Hannah v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Marcus Cleophus Holman, who was convicted for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Holman had initially pleaded guilty to this charge as part of a strategic move to avoid a conviction for aggravated malicious wounding. However, he later challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the firearm charge. The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed Holman's conviction, applying the "ends of justice" exception to Rule 5A:18 and stating that the approbate and reprobate doctrine did not apply.The Commonwealth of Virginia appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals, arguing that the approbate and reprobate doctrine should apply. This doctrine prevents a litigant from taking inconsistent positions in the course of litigation. The Commonwealth argued that Holman had approbated by pleading guilty to the firearm charge and then reprobated by later challenging it.The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Commonwealth. It held that Holman had indeed approbated and reprobated on the charge of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The Court noted that Holman's decision not to contest the firearm charge was a clear trial strategy. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment for the Commonwealth. View "Commonwealth v. Holman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case of Dwayne Lamont Sample, Jr., who was convicted of attempted robbery. Sample challenged his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress an out-of-court identification from a victim based on a single photo showup, which he deemed impermissibly suggestive and thus unreliable. Sample also contested the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision of the lower courts, agreeing that the single photo showup, while generally viewed with suspicion, was not impermissibly suggestive in this case. The court found that the police officer's comment before showing the photo did not make the identification virtually inevitable, and was more of an expression of suspicion than a definite assertion. In evaluating the case, the court applied the five factors from Neil v. Biggers to assess the likelihood of misidentification, and found that all five factors weighed in favor of the victim’s identification reliability.Sample also argued that the DNA evidence and the victim's identification were insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court disagreed, noting that the trial court had considered and rejected Sample's theory of secondary DNA transfer due to a lack of supporting evidence. The court concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found Sample guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, given the DNA evidence, eyewitness identifications, and Sample's proximity to the scene of the crime. The court affirmed Sample's conviction for attempted robbery. View "Sample v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law