Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Travis Alexander Bland-Henderson was charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a violent felony. He was to be tried by a jury and filed a “Notice of Demand for Jury Sentencing” pursuant to Code § 19.2-295. However, Bland-Henderson missed the statutory deadline to file his request for jury sentencing, filing his notice only 13 days before trial. The Commonwealth objected to Bland-Henderson’s request for jury sentencing as untimely. Bland-Henderson acknowledged that he had filed the request late, but argued that his untimeliness did not eliminate his statutory right to be sentenced by the jury. The circuit court denied Bland-Henderson’s request for jury sentencing.The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, ruling that the circuit court had “correctly concluded that Bland-Henderson waived his request for jury sentencing by failing to submit his demand at least 30 days before trial.” The Court of Appeals also held that if the jury would not be sentencing the defendant, voir dire on sentencing ranges is not permitted, since that line of questioning would be irrelevant and would only encourage jury nullification.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the “shall” command in Code § 19.2-295, that instructs a defendant to file a request for jury sentencing at least 30 days prior to trial, is mandatory. Therefore, Bland-Henderson had waived his statutory right to jury sentencing by missing the statutory deadline to file his request. The court also held that there is no absolute right to voir dire jurors regarding potential sentencing ranges, since this line of questioning remains irrelevant and improper when the jury will not be sentencing the defendant. View "Bland-Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Tony Thomas, who was indicted for aggravated malicious wounding following a physical altercation that resulted in permanent injuries to the victim. The parties initially reached a plea agreement, which was presented to the trial court but not immediately accepted. The court indicated it would review the agreement and make a decision at a later date. However, due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and changes in the circumstances of the case, the parties renegotiated and entered into a second plea agreement, which was presented to a different judge and accepted.The original judge, upon learning of the second plea agreement, insisted on enforcing the first agreement, despite the parties having withdrawn their assent to it. The defendant and the Commonwealth both objected to this decision, arguing that they were free to renegotiate the plea agreement as it had not been accepted by the court. The trial court rejected these arguments and convicted the defendant based on the first plea agreement.The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, relying on the doctrine of approbate and reprobate and the court's inherent authority to take a matter under advisement for a later decision. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant was required to either present a new plea agreement to the original judge or inform the original judge that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea.The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, reversed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that parties are free to modify or renegotiate plea agreements when a trial court has not yet accepted the agreement. The court found that the trial court's insistence upon and implementation of a plea agreement that the parties had revoked was reversible error. The court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Thomas v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Stephen Lamar Garrick was found asleep in a vehicle with the engine running. Upon waking him, officers noticed signs of intoxication and a faint smell of marijuana. This led to a search of the vehicle, where they found a bag of heroin and a loaded handgun in the glove compartment. Garrick, the sole occupant of the vehicle, stated that his mother owned the car and he drove it three days a week. The glove compartment also contained two receipts for vehicle maintenance, both listing Garrick as the customer. Garrick was convicted of possession of heroin and possession of a firearm by a violent felon.Garrick appealed his convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove possession. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, stating that Garrick's occupancy of the vehicle, his proximity to the items, and his admission of driving the vehicle were insufficient to establish constructive possession. The Court of Appeals also noted that the maintenance receipts only served as evidence that Garrick regularly used the car, not that he knew about the heroin and firearm.The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, stating that the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Garrick was aware of the presence of the heroin and firearm. The court noted that Garrick was the sole occupant of the vehicle, was in close proximity to the items, and had been in the vehicle for a significant period of time. The court also pointed out that the maintenance receipts indicated that Garrick was responsible for the vehicle's upkeep, suggesting that he used the glove compartment where the items were found. The court concluded that the combined circumstances were sufficient to support the conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Garrick" on Justia Law

Vernon Eugene Hannah was convicted of one felony count of forging a public record and one misdemeanor count of providing false information to a law enforcement officer. He was sentenced to five years of incarceration with two years suspended for the felony, and twelve months of incarceration with eight months suspended for the misdemeanor. The circuit court partially suspended Hannah’s sentences on the condition of good behavior, compliance with urine screens, payment of costs, and supervised probation. Despite these conditions, Hannah tested positive for controlled substances multiple times. As a result, Hannah’s probation officer requested that the circuit court issue a rule to show cause, which led to a probation revocation hearing.The circuit court found Hannah guilty of violating the terms of his probation on both the felony and misdemeanor convictions, revoked the suspended sentences for both, and resuspended the sentences for the same period of supervised probation, this time adding new special conditions. Hannah appealed the reimposition of his suspended sentence to the Court of Appeals on two grounds, challenging the circuit court’s jurisdiction to hold the probation revocation hearing, and challenging the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the circuit court’s May 2022 order revoking and resuspending Hannah’s sentence was not void ab initio under the 2021 statutory amendments. The court also held that the amended Code § 19.2-303.1 did not abrogate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to decide Hannah’s revocation. Furthermore, the court found that Hannah’s challenges based on Code § 19.2-303.1 were waived under Rules 5A:18 and 5A:20, and that Hannah’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was barred by Rule 5A:18. View "Hannah v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Marcus Cleophus Holman, who was convicted for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Holman had initially pleaded guilty to this charge as part of a strategic move to avoid a conviction for aggravated malicious wounding. However, he later challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the firearm charge. The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed Holman's conviction, applying the "ends of justice" exception to Rule 5A:18 and stating that the approbate and reprobate doctrine did not apply.The Commonwealth of Virginia appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals, arguing that the approbate and reprobate doctrine should apply. This doctrine prevents a litigant from taking inconsistent positions in the course of litigation. The Commonwealth argued that Holman had approbated by pleading guilty to the firearm charge and then reprobated by later challenging it.The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Commonwealth. It held that Holman had indeed approbated and reprobated on the charge of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The Court noted that Holman's decision not to contest the firearm charge was a clear trial strategy. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment for the Commonwealth. View "Commonwealth v. Holman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case of Dwayne Lamont Sample, Jr., who was convicted of attempted robbery. Sample challenged his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress an out-of-court identification from a victim based on a single photo showup, which he deemed impermissibly suggestive and thus unreliable. Sample also contested the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision of the lower courts, agreeing that the single photo showup, while generally viewed with suspicion, was not impermissibly suggestive in this case. The court found that the police officer's comment before showing the photo did not make the identification virtually inevitable, and was more of an expression of suspicion than a definite assertion. In evaluating the case, the court applied the five factors from Neil v. Biggers to assess the likelihood of misidentification, and found that all five factors weighed in favor of the victim’s identification reliability.Sample also argued that the DNA evidence and the victim's identification were insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court disagreed, noting that the trial court had considered and rejected Sample's theory of secondary DNA transfer due to a lack of supporting evidence. The court concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found Sample guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, given the DNA evidence, eyewitness identifications, and Sample's proximity to the scene of the crime. The court affirmed Sample's conviction for attempted robbery. View "Sample v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this case, Andrew Schmuhl ("Schmuhl") appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At his trial, Schmuhl had claimed he was involuntarily intoxicated due to prescription medications at the time of committing a home invasion, which resulted in several criminal charges. His trial counsel argued that Schmuhl's involuntary intoxication was a separate defense from an insanity defense, which they chose not to raise. However, the trial court ruled that without an insanity defense, Schmuhl could not present expert testimony about his mental state, effectively barring his involuntary intoxication defense. Schmuhl was found guilty on all counts. Schmuhl later filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective due to misunderstanding the law regarding the admissibility of mental state evidence without an insanity defense. The habeas court ruled that trial counsel's performance was not deficient and that Schmuhl was not prejudiced by their performance. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the habeas court's decision, finding that Schmuhl's trial counsel's performance was objectively reasonable given the unclear state of the law at the time. The court noted that had trial counsel’s arguments been successful, they would have carried significant strategic benefits for Schmuhl, and that trial counsel's unsuccessful attempt to extend existing law for their client's benefit was not deficient. View "Schmuhl v. Clarke" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia was asked to interpret Code § 19.2-306.1, a statute enacted in 2021 that addresses the range of punishment a court may impose upon the revocation of a suspended sentence. The defendant, Emily Katherine Delaune, was convicted of three drug offenses in 2019 and was sentenced to six years of incarceration, with four years suspended. After her release, she violated the terms of her probation by using drugs and absconding from supervision. The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach revoked Delaune's suspended sentence based on these violations and ordered her to serve 60 days of active incarceration.Delaune appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing that under Code § 19.2-306.1, the circuit court was prohibited from imposing more than 14 days of active incarceration based on her technical violations. The Attorney General asserted that Code § 19.2-306.1 did not retroactively apply to Delaune’s probation violations.The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the parties had implicitly agreed to proceed under Code § 19.2-306.1 during the probation revocation hearing, and that the Attorney General was bound by this agreement. The Supreme Court of Virginia also agreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Code § 19.2-306.1, stating that the circuit court could not impose a term of active incarceration based on Delaune’s drug use, which constituted a first technical violation under the statute, and could impose a maximum of 14 days of active incarceration for Delaune’s absconding violation, which was automatically classified as a second technical violation under the statute. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the circuit court erred when it ordered Delaune to serve 60 days of active incarceration. View "Commonwealth v. Delaune" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's sentence for malicious wounding, holding that the court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court's restitution order as violative of Va. Code 19.2-305.1.Defendant was convicted of the malicious wounding of Justin Hawks. As a condition of Defendant's probation and suspended sentence the trial court ordered Defendant to reimburse the Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services (DMAS) for Hawks's medical expenses. The court of appeals reversed the restitution award to DMAS and remanded the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 19.2-305.1 authorized the trial court to order restitution as a condition of Defendant's probation and sentence and to order payment of that restitution to DMAS for the portion of the medical expenses incurred by Hawks that DMAS had paid. View "Commonwealth v. Puckett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions of three counts of aggravated sexual battery by a parent under Va. Code 18.2-67.3 and four counts of taking indecent liberties with a child under Va. Code 18.2-370.1 but vacated the portion of the court of appeals' opinion deciding that Laurie Lee's proffered testimony provided Defendant with an alibi, holding that the court erred in part.In affirming Defendant's convictions the court of appeals defined alibi as a defense based on the physical impossibility of committing a crime and held that Lee's proffered testimony served as an alibi because it placed Defendant outside of the room where the offenses occurred. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the opinion deciding that the proffered testimony provided Defendant with an alibi but affirmed the otherwise affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erred in ruling on the merits of this case because Defendant waived his challenge that the proffered testimony was offered for impeachment. View "Moison v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law