Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction for possession of heroin with the intent to distribute, third or subsequent offense, concluding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained after a search of Defendant’s person and that the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the conviction, holding that the alleged trial court error, if error at all, was harmless as a matter of law because a rational fact-finder, beyond a reasonable doubt, would have found Defendant guilty absent the error. View "Commonwealth v. White" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with unreasonable refusal to submit a breath sample under Va. Code 18.2-268.3. At trial, Defendant argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was operating a motor vehicle on a “highway” as defined by Va. Code 46.2-100. The trial court denied the motion. Ultimately, the trial court determined that Defendant had unreasonably refused to submit a breath sample and ordered that his license to drive be suspended for twelve months. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the roadway upon which Defendant was operating his motor vehicle did not meet the statutory definition of highway under section 46.2-100, and therefore, the implied consent statute had no applicability and Defendant was not required to submit a breath sample. View "Kim v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of carjacking and use of a firearm in the commission of carjacking, along with robbery, attempted robbery, attempted malicious wounding, and three other counts of using a firearm in the commission of these felonies. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence as insufficient to sustain the carjacking and related firearm convictions; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Defendant’s proffered jury instruction on carjacking. View "Hilton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress the fruits of the search that led to his arrest on the ground that the probable cause for the search was provided by the warrantless use of a drug-sniffing dog in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress and found Defendant guilty of felony possession with intent to distribute. After Defendant’s conviction became legal, the United States Supreme Court decided Florida v. Jardines, which announced that use of a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch constitutes a search within the meaning of the of the Fourth Amendment. Thereafter, Defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court, alleging that Jardines confirmed that the search of his home was invalid and that Jardines was retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. The habeas court dismissed the petition, concluding that Jardines introduced a new rule and was not retroactive. The court also denied a plenary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Jardines does not apply retroactively to convictions such as Defendant’s because it announced a new rule of constitutional law; and (2) the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s request for a plenary hearing. View "Oprisko v. Director" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an Alford guilty plea to capital murder and other related charges. The trial court imposed a life sentence pursuant to the plea agreement plus a sixty-eight-year term of incarceration on the remaining charges. Defendant later filed a motion to vacate his life sentence, claiming that it violated the principles articulated in Miller v. Alabama. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed. Acting on a petition for certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Montgomery v. Louisiana. On remand, the Supreme Court reinstated its holding in Jones I, subject to the qualifications made herein, and affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to vacate, holding that Defendant need not be resentenced to a specific term of years under either Miller or Montgomery. View "Jones v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of petit larceny, third or subsequent offense. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in giving Instruction 16 to the jury rather than Instruction O, Defendant’s proposed alternate instruction, and that he suffered a denial of due process resulting from the challenged jury instruction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give Instruction O because Instruction 16 did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defense. View "Lindsey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count each of robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony The circuit court sentenced Defendant to six years’ active incarceration on the robbery count and three years’ active incarceration on the firearm count. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by excluding a redacted portion of an email sent by the detective investigating the robbery and by refusing his proffered instruction endorsed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Holley. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no reversible error in the court of appeals’ judgment. View "Payne v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant, a preschool education teacher, was convicted of assault and battery of a special needs student. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that Defendant acted outside the scope of her official capacity and was therefore not entitled to the benefit of the statutory school personnel exception for simple assault and battery charges afforded under Va. Code 18.2-57(G)(i); and (2) the trial court inappropriately applied the “due deference” standard in section 18.2-57(G). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s alternative holding provided an independent and sufficient basis upon which to support Defendant’s conviction. The trial court’s alternative holding was that Defendant’s response to the student was still “unreasonable” and exceeded the physical contact permitted by school personnel under section 18.2-57(G)(i). That factual finding was fully supported by the record in this action and rendered the section 18.2-57(G)(i) exception inapplicable. View "Commonwealth v. Lambert" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in the trial court for DUI-reckless-victim permanently impaired (DUI maiming). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove causation and the criminal negligence element of DUI maiming, and further, that the court of appeals erred in affirming her conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did no err in finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove the elements of DUI maiming; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in affirming Defendant’s conviction. View "Rich v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2000, Gregory Devon Murphy was indicted for capital murder of a child and two counts of malicious wounding. The Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria found Murphy was incompetent to stand trial, and Murphy received treatment continuing in Central State Hospital in Dinwiddie County. In 2015, Murphy filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Dinwiddie County arguing, inter alia, that the Director of Central State Hospital was detaining him without lawful authority. The Director moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Dinwiddie Court lacked jurisdiction under Va. Code 8.01-654(B)(1). The court rejected the augment, finding that section 8.01-654(A)(1) permitted the petition to be filed in any circuit court. The Director filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the Dinwiddie Court from proceeding in Murphy’s habeas matter, arguing that the Dinwiddie Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to hear Murphy’s petition and that she had no other adequate remedy. The Supreme Court denied the requested writ of prohibition, holding that the Dinwiddie Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy and the Director had alternative remedies. View "In re Vauter" on Justia Law