Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement Defendant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor hit-and-run and driving while intoxicated. The United States Department of Homeland Security subsequently notified Defendant that his temporary protected status would be revoked as a result of his criminal convictions. Defendant sought habeas corpus relief, alleging that his prior counsel had given him erroneous advice about the effect of his plea agreement on his immigration status and that, had he been given accurate information, he would have gone to trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court ruled in favor of Defendant and granted the writ. The Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections appealed, arguing that the habeas court erred in holding that Defendant satisfied the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judgment of the habeas court was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. View "Clarke v. Galdamez" on Justia Law

Wilkins was convicted of petit larceny, a subsequent offense, and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Before trial, Wilkins’s counsel objected to Wilkins being tried while wearing jail-issued clothing, described as "green, sort of scrub outfit,” black sneakers, and “a visible bracelet.” The court ordered a recess for Wilkins’s counsel to look in “a clothes closet” maintained by the public defender’s office. The record does not indicate whether Wilkins’s counsel used the opportunity. After the recess, Wilkins’s counsel unsuccessfully renewed his objection, explaining that Wilkins’s friend” had twice attempted to bring Wilkins non-jail-issued clothes but that the Portsmouth City Jail had refused to accept them. Wilkins did not put on any evidence. The jury was instructed that Wilkins was presumed innocent, but did not receive any instruction concerning his clothing or appearance. While the jury was deliberating, the judge reviewed Wilkins’ behavioral issues and referred to the clothing issue as part of “a pattern of trying to avoid going to trial. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction. There is no indication that Wilkins’s outfit was marked in any manner that would indicate it was from any detention facility. Neither the “sneakers” nor the “visible bracelet,” as described, were clear indicia of incarceration. Wilkins failed to meet his burden of proving that his clothing was readily identifiable as jail-issued clothing. View "Wilkins v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Richmond police obtained warrants charging Bass with two robberies and an attempted robbery, arising out of a 2013 home invasion. A grand jury returned indictments charging Bass with the robberies of Irving Smith and Brown, and the attempted robbery of Videll Smith, transposing the first names of the victims from the warrants. The grand jury also returned indictments charging Bass with using a firearm in the commission of these felonies. During the arraignment, the court informed Bass that he was charged with the robberies of Irving Smith and Brown, and the attempted robbery of Videll Smith, as well as with three counts of using a firearm in the commission of these felonies. Bass was tried for these offenses by a jury. The Court of Appeals, applying the ends-of-justice exception to Rule 5A:18, reversed his conviction due to a variance between the indictments and the evidence presented at trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. Nothing in the record demonstrated that Bass could not properly be convicted for robbery based on the evidence adduced at trial, and his situation is not analogous to any of the “very limited circumstances” under which the ends of justice exception is properly invoked. View "Commonwealth v. Bass" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three felony drug offenses. Defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop, arguing that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. A panel of the Court of Appeals ordered reversal and remand to the circuit court for a new trial, ruling that the facts and circumstances available to the arresting officer at the time of the stop did not support a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was violating or about to violate the law. The full court reversed the panel decision and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the investigatory stop of the vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger was justified by reasonable suspicion that a violation of the law was occurring, and therefore, Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. View "Mason v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2011, Dmitry Mikhaylov pleaded guilty to assault and battery of Lisa Sales. In 2013, Sales filed a civil suit against Mikhaylov seeking damages for the assault and battery. Throughout the proceeding, Mikhaylov took the position that Sales had fabricated the story and that he had a mitigating explanation for his earlier guilty plea. Sales filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the counts for assault and battery, arguing that Mikhaylov’s guilty plea was admissible evidence of civil battery and assault and was sufficient to establish Mikhaylov’s liability as a matter of law. Despite concluding that Defendant could not deny that he committed an assault and battery on the grounds of the judicial estoppel doctrine, the court denied Sales’ motion for partial summary judgment. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for Sales on assault and battery. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) erred in applying judicial estoppel to preclude Mikhaylov from denying that he had assaulted or battered Sales and in incorporating its error into a jury instruction; and (2) abused its discretion by permitting Sales to introduce expert opinions not previously disclosed during the discovery process. Remanded. View "Mikhaylov v. Sales" on Justia Law

In 2008, the circuit court found Defendant guilty of multiple non-homicide offenses that he had committed as a juvenile. Defendant was sentenced to six consecutive life terms. In 2012, Defendant filed a federal habeas petition contending that his life sentences were unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida. While discovery was pending, Defendant filed a request for a conditional pardon with the Governor’s office. The Governor issued an executive order granting Defendant a commutation of sentence and reduced his term of incarceration for a total of forty years. The Commonwealth subsequently argued that the Governor’s commutation of Defendant’s sentence made Defendant’s petition for habeas corpus moot. Defendant responded by claiming that the Governor’s executive order may only be construed as a “conditional pardon.” The district court granted Defendant’s motion to continue, ruling that the Governor did not have the authority to commute a non-capital offense. The federal district court certified two questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) the executive order from the Governor constitutes a partial pardon; and (2) the Governor’s actions were valid under the Virginia Constitution. View "Blount v. Clarke" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell or distribute a Schedule I or II controlled substance. The court of appeals upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to quash the indictment; (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to the speedy trial statute; (3) the record did not support Defendant’s assertion that the circuit court denied Defendant the right to represent himself at trial; and (4) the circuit court did not err in granting a continuance to the Commonwealth. View "Herrington v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to felony murder and distribution of a Schedule I controlled substance. Defendant later filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the felony-murder conviction and sentence. In his petition, Defendant claimed that her trial counsel failed to give her reasonable advice on whether to plead guilty to felony murder. The circuit court dismissed the habeas petition without taking evidence ore tenus or by affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances, the circuit court should have received additional evidence beyond the recorded matters to determine whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. View "Smith v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendants, two sixteen-year-old males, were convicted of multiple felonies for breaking into the townhouse of a college student and raping her at knifepoint. On appeal, Defendants challenged the constitutionality of their sentences and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions for breaking and entering while armed with a deadly weapon. The court of appeals denied the petitions regarding the issues before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for appeal and affirmed, holding (1) the aggregate term-of-years sentences imposed on Defendants did not violate the Eighth Amendment; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that both Defendants committed the crime of breaking and entering while armed with a deadly weapon. View "Vasquez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Douglas Kozich pled guilty to one count of grand larceny and two counts of obtaining money by false pretenses. After a sentencing hearing, the court issued two-year active sentences, running consecutively, for each of the three offenses. Kozich later filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. At an evidentiary hearing on the petition, Kozich’s habeas counsel contended that Kozich’s trial attorney had provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to present a specific drug-treatment plan at the sentencing hearing as an alternative to incarceration and by failing to file a timely motion to reconsider the sentence. The habeas court vacated the sentencing orders, concluding that the failure to file a timely motion to reconsider and to ensure that the court had an opportunity to rule on it constituted ineffective assistance, and Kozich was prejudiced. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that trial counsel’s failure to file a timely motion to reconsider the sentences and to ensure that the trial court had an opportunity to rule on it was objectively unreasonable, and this omission demonstrated prejudice. View "Dir. of Dep’t of Corr. v. Kozich" on Justia Law