Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While on probation for a petit larceny as a third offense conviction, Christopher Forbes pled guilty to robbery and abduction. Because the new convictions constituted a violation of Forbes’ probation, the circuit court held a probation revocation hearing. The court found Forbes in violation of the terms of his probation on the petit larceny conviction and revoked his suspended sentence. Forbes later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his counsel was ineffective in refusing to file an appeal after Forbes “made known his desire to do so.” The habeas court ruled that Forbes was denied the effective assistance of counsel in appealing the revocation of his suspended sentence. The Warden of the Lunenburg Correctional Center appealed, arguing that Forbes was not constitutionally entitled to counsel at the revocation hearing, and therefore, he was not entitled to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Forbes had no federal constitutional right to counsel in his probation revocation hearing, and therefore, he could not have been denied the effective assistance of that counsel. View "Walker v. Forbes" on Justia Law

Eliseo Granado was convicted of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Granado filed a notice of appeal. On the deadline for filing a written statement of facts, Granado filed a proposed written statement of facts in the circuit court clerk’s office, but the clerk’s office did not include the original proposed written statement of facts in the contents of the record submitted to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied Granado’s petition for appeal, concluding that the statement of facts was not timely filed and was not part of the record to be considered on appeal, and therefore, the record was insufficient to address the assignments of error raised by Granado. Granado then filed a demand for review by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals. The panel denied Granado’s petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals erred by ruling that there was no statement of facts in the record for its consideration because that the statement of facts was timely filed in the circuit court and was properly part of the record. View "Granado v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of statutory burglary, possession of a firearm by a felon, assault and battery of a family member, pointing or brandishing a firearm, and credit card theft in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-192(1)(a). At issue on appeal was whether section 18.2-192(1)(a) requires proof of the specific intent to use, sell or transfer a credit card that has been taken from a cardholder without consent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that credit card theft under the first prong of section 18.2-192(1)(a) is a general intent crime completed upon an unlawful taking and does not require that the Commonwealth allege or prove the specific intent required to support a conviction under the second prong of the statute. View "Scott v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony malicious bodily injury by means of a caustic substance, felony assault and battery of a law enforcement officer, obstruction of justice, and grand larceny from the person. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Rule 5:17(c)(iii) precluded the Court from considering Defendant’s first and second assignments of error; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions for felony malicious bodily injury by means of a caustic substance, assault and battery of a law enforcement officer, and obstruction of justice. View "Wright v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm after conviction of a felony. Prior to sentencing, Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he had a reasonable basis for asserting the defense of duress. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, concluding that there was no evidence of imminent harm, and therefore, Defendant’s defense of duress was not reasonable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no indication that any harm was imminent and in therefore denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. View "Edmonds v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm after conviction of a felony. Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he made a material mistake of fact in pleading guilty in that he had a reasonable basis for asserting the defense of necessity. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) prejudice to the Commonwealth is a relevant factor that should be considered when reviewing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, and, in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the prejudice to the Commonwealth outweighed any equities that favored granting Defendant’s motion; and (2) the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that Defendant did not have a reasonable defense to the charge of possession of a firearm after conviction of a felony. View "Small v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement Defendant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor hit-and-run and driving while intoxicated. The United States Department of Homeland Security subsequently notified Defendant that his temporary protected status would be revoked as a result of his criminal convictions. Defendant sought habeas corpus relief, alleging that his prior counsel had given him erroneous advice about the effect of his plea agreement on his immigration status and that, had he been given accurate information, he would have gone to trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court ruled in favor of Defendant and granted the writ. The Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections appealed, arguing that the habeas court erred in holding that Defendant satisfied the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judgment of the habeas court was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. View "Clarke v. Galdamez" on Justia Law

Wilkins was convicted of petit larceny, a subsequent offense, and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Before trial, Wilkins’s counsel objected to Wilkins being tried while wearing jail-issued clothing, described as "green, sort of scrub outfit,” black sneakers, and “a visible bracelet.” The court ordered a recess for Wilkins’s counsel to look in “a clothes closet” maintained by the public defender’s office. The record does not indicate whether Wilkins’s counsel used the opportunity. After the recess, Wilkins’s counsel unsuccessfully renewed his objection, explaining that Wilkins’s friend” had twice attempted to bring Wilkins non-jail-issued clothes but that the Portsmouth City Jail had refused to accept them. Wilkins did not put on any evidence. The jury was instructed that Wilkins was presumed innocent, but did not receive any instruction concerning his clothing or appearance. While the jury was deliberating, the judge reviewed Wilkins’ behavioral issues and referred to the clothing issue as part of “a pattern of trying to avoid going to trial. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction. There is no indication that Wilkins’s outfit was marked in any manner that would indicate it was from any detention facility. Neither the “sneakers” nor the “visible bracelet,” as described, were clear indicia of incarceration. Wilkins failed to meet his burden of proving that his clothing was readily identifiable as jail-issued clothing. View "Wilkins v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Richmond police obtained warrants charging Bass with two robberies and an attempted robbery, arising out of a 2013 home invasion. A grand jury returned indictments charging Bass with the robberies of Irving Smith and Brown, and the attempted robbery of Videll Smith, transposing the first names of the victims from the warrants. The grand jury also returned indictments charging Bass with using a firearm in the commission of these felonies. During the arraignment, the court informed Bass that he was charged with the robberies of Irving Smith and Brown, and the attempted robbery of Videll Smith, as well as with three counts of using a firearm in the commission of these felonies. Bass was tried for these offenses by a jury. The Court of Appeals, applying the ends-of-justice exception to Rule 5A:18, reversed his conviction due to a variance between the indictments and the evidence presented at trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. Nothing in the record demonstrated that Bass could not properly be convicted for robbery based on the evidence adduced at trial, and his situation is not analogous to any of the “very limited circumstances” under which the ends of justice exception is properly invoked. View "Commonwealth v. Bass" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three felony drug offenses. Defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop, arguing that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. A panel of the Court of Appeals ordered reversal and remand to the circuit court for a new trial, ruling that the facts and circumstances available to the arresting officer at the time of the stop did not support a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was violating or about to violate the law. The full court reversed the panel decision and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the investigatory stop of the vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger was justified by reasonable suspicion that a violation of the law was occurring, and therefore, Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. View "Mason v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law