Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of distributing child pornography. The court of appeals upheld the convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove distribution because the peer-to-peer software he used to access and download child pornography automatically placed the files into a shared folder accessible to other users of the software. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Defendant reproduced by any means, including by computer, sold, gave away, electronically transmitted, or distributed child pornography in violation of Va. Code 18.2-374.1:1(C)(i). View "Kelley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was arrested on warrants charging him with several crimes. The general district court admitted Appellant to bail. The Commonwealth appealed the bail decision. The circuit court admitted Appellant to bail pending trial, setting his bond at $60,000. The Commonwealth again appealed the bail decision. The Court of Appeals revoked the circuit court’s order setting bond and ordered Appellant’s incarceration pending trial, concluding that Appellant failed to rebut the statutory presumption against bail in the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals did not err in its appellate review of the circuit court’s decision. View "Shannon v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant, a native of Ethiopia, pleaded guilty to petit larceny. At no time did Appellant’s court-appointed attorney advise Appellant of the collateral consequences of the plea and sentence upon his immigration status. Appellant was subsequently informed that he was subject to removal as a result of his conviction. Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The circuit court sustained the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the petition, concluding that Appellant was not prejudiced from his counsel’s failure to advise him of the adverse consequences on his immigration status of accepting the plea agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court applied an incorrect standard for determining whether prejudice resulted from the attorney’s failure to advise Appellant of the negative consequences of accepting the plea agreement. View "Zemene v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of Internet solicitation of a minor. The parties agreed that Defendant was accused of soliciting oral sex from a minor and that oral sex between an adult and a minor is an act forbidden by Virginia’s anti-sodomy law, Va. Code 18.2-361(A). After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 18.2-361(A) was facially unconstitutional in light of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that section 18.2-361(A) was constitutional as applied to Defendant because the Lawrence decision did not prevent a state from criminalizing sodomy between an adult and a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 18.2-361(A) is not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant in this instance; and (2) it is proper to prohibit those applications of the statute that are unconstitutional and leaving the constitutional applications of the statute to be enforced. View "Toghill v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of murder, robbery, use of a firearm in the commission of robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the prosecution suppressed or failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The trial court ultimately dismissed the petition, concluding that it was untimely filed under Va. Code 8.01-654(A)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tolling provision of Va. Code 8.01-229(D) was applicable to the limitations period of section 8.01-654(A)(2), and therefore, it was error to conclude that Defendant’s petition for habeas corpus was untimely; but (2) because the allegedly withheld evidence was not material, Defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the error. View "Hicks v. Dir., Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of aggravated sexual battery. Defendant appealed, asserting that the circuit court erred when it allowed the Commonwealth to cross-examine him about whether a prior felony conviction involved lying, cheating or stealing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that even if the testimony was erroneously admitted, the error was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, assuming, without deciding, that the circuit court erred when it allowed the Commonwealth to ask Defendant whether one of his felony convictions involved lying, cheating or stealing, Defendant received a fair trial because the alleged error, at most, had only a slight effect on the jury. View "Shifflett v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether quetiapine, which is a Schedule VI controlled substance, is a “controlled substance subject to abuse” within the meaning of Va. Code 18.2-247(B)(ii). Defendant was charged with distribution of an imitation Schedule I or II controlled substance for distributing quetiapine and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Defendant filed a motion to strike, arguing that he could only be convicted of a misdemeanor for selling a Schedule VI drug because the substance was already a controlled substance. The trial court denied the motion to strike and found Defendant guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that (1) Defendant distributed an imitation controlled substance, (2) the substance was in a form such that it could be mistaken for a Schedule I or II controlled substance, and (3) Defendant made an implied representation that the substance was a Schedule I or II controlled substance. View "Powell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant, a divorced mother of three minor children, was prosecuted under Va. Code 22.1-254 and -263 for failing to ensure that her children arrived at school in a timely manner. The circuit court convicted Defendant of three Class 3 misdemeanors, one per child. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 22.1-254, which requires compulsory school attendance, should not be applied to prosecute tardiness when a child was otherwise enrolled in and regularly attending school. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant’s convictions, holding that section 22.1-254(A) cannot be construed in a manner that encompasses tardiness. View "Blake v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of three counts of “expos[ing] his . . . sexual or genital part” to a minor child in violation of Va. Code 18.2-370(A)(1). Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court had applied an improper definition of the term “expose.” The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that “expose” means not only to lay bare to view but to feel or touch, and therefore, because Defendant “made known” his bare penis to the victim’s touch, he physically and tactilely exposed his genital part to the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in concluding that the term “expose” under section 18.2-370(A)(1) includes tactile exposure, as exposure is limited to a visual display where the child saw, or could have seen, the uncovered genitalia; and (2) the evidence in this case was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction under one count of the indictment. View "Farhoumand v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape and capital murder in the commission of abduction with intent to defile. Defendant was sentenced to death on each conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences. Here the Supreme Court considered Defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court dismissed the petition, holding (1) the Commonwealth did not commit Brady violations or present false testimony or allow it to go uncorrected; (2) Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel; and (3) the remainder of Defendant’s claims were either barred or without merit. View "Lawlor v. Warden" on Justia Law