Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant made a conditional plea of guilty to charges of cocaine distribution and unlawful possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, claiming that police officers unlawfully entered his apartment and seized his weapons and drugs. The court of appeals denied Defendant’s petition for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantees entry by the policy officers into Defendant’s apartment, and the trial court did not thus err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "Evans v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Based on an anonymous tip implicating Defendant, Defendant was arrested and charged with abduction, robbery, and statutory burglary. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for retrial, concluding that the trial court erred by admitting a police officer to testify as to the specific content of the anonymous tip that implicated Defendant in violation of Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment in reversing Defendant’s convictions but on narrower, non-constitutional grounds, holding that the officer’s testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay, and its admission was not harmless under non-constitutional principles. View "Commonwealth v. Swann" on Justia Law

Joseph Tuggle, who lived in a residential group home for men with intellectual disabilities, died after suffering second and third degree burns on his body that were left untreated. Richard Wagoner, the president and owner of the corporation that owned the group home, was subsequently charged with abuse or neglect of an incapacitated adult. Wagoner moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove his actions were a proximate cause of Tuggle’s death. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the Commonwealth had presented sufficient evidence of proximate cause. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court applied the correct decisional standard in ruling on Defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court and court of appeals erred in considering the loss of a substantial possibility of survival as the basis for deciding the motion to set aside the verdict; (2) there was sufficient evidence of proximate cause to support the jury’s verdict; but (3) there was sufficient evidence of proximate cause to support the jury’s verdict. View "Wagoner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of distributing child pornography. The court of appeals upheld the convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove distribution because the peer-to-peer software he used to access and download child pornography automatically placed the files into a shared folder accessible to other users of the software. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Defendant reproduced by any means, including by computer, sold, gave away, electronically transmitted, or distributed child pornography in violation of Va. Code 18.2-374.1:1(C)(i). View "Kelley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was arrested on warrants charging him with several crimes. The general district court admitted Appellant to bail. The Commonwealth appealed the bail decision. The circuit court admitted Appellant to bail pending trial, setting his bond at $60,000. The Commonwealth again appealed the bail decision. The Court of Appeals revoked the circuit court’s order setting bond and ordered Appellant’s incarceration pending trial, concluding that Appellant failed to rebut the statutory presumption against bail in the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals did not err in its appellate review of the circuit court’s decision. View "Shannon v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant, a native of Ethiopia, pleaded guilty to petit larceny. At no time did Appellant’s court-appointed attorney advise Appellant of the collateral consequences of the plea and sentence upon his immigration status. Appellant was subsequently informed that he was subject to removal as a result of his conviction. Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The circuit court sustained the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the petition, concluding that Appellant was not prejudiced from his counsel’s failure to advise him of the adverse consequences on his immigration status of accepting the plea agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court applied an incorrect standard for determining whether prejudice resulted from the attorney’s failure to advise Appellant of the negative consequences of accepting the plea agreement. View "Zemene v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of Internet solicitation of a minor. The parties agreed that Defendant was accused of soliciting oral sex from a minor and that oral sex between an adult and a minor is an act forbidden by Virginia’s anti-sodomy law, Va. Code 18.2-361(A). After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 18.2-361(A) was facially unconstitutional in light of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that section 18.2-361(A) was constitutional as applied to Defendant because the Lawrence decision did not prevent a state from criminalizing sodomy between an adult and a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 18.2-361(A) is not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant in this instance; and (2) it is proper to prohibit those applications of the statute that are unconstitutional and leaving the constitutional applications of the statute to be enforced. View "Toghill v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of murder, robbery, use of a firearm in the commission of robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the prosecution suppressed or failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The trial court ultimately dismissed the petition, concluding that it was untimely filed under Va. Code 8.01-654(A)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tolling provision of Va. Code 8.01-229(D) was applicable to the limitations period of section 8.01-654(A)(2), and therefore, it was error to conclude that Defendant’s petition for habeas corpus was untimely; but (2) because the allegedly withheld evidence was not material, Defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the error. View "Hicks v. Dir., Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of aggravated sexual battery. Defendant appealed, asserting that the circuit court erred when it allowed the Commonwealth to cross-examine him about whether a prior felony conviction involved lying, cheating or stealing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that even if the testimony was erroneously admitted, the error was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, assuming, without deciding, that the circuit court erred when it allowed the Commonwealth to ask Defendant whether one of his felony convictions involved lying, cheating or stealing, Defendant received a fair trial because the alleged error, at most, had only a slight effect on the jury. View "Shifflett v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether quetiapine, which is a Schedule VI controlled substance, is a “controlled substance subject to abuse” within the meaning of Va. Code 18.2-247(B)(ii). Defendant was charged with distribution of an imitation Schedule I or II controlled substance for distributing quetiapine and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Defendant filed a motion to strike, arguing that he could only be convicted of a misdemeanor for selling a Schedule VI drug because the substance was already a controlled substance. The trial court denied the motion to strike and found Defendant guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that (1) Defendant distributed an imitation controlled substance, (2) the substance was in a form such that it could be mistaken for a Schedule I or II controlled substance, and (3) Defendant made an implied representation that the substance was a Schedule I or II controlled substance. View "Powell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law