Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, maliciously shooting into an occupied vehicle, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and reckless handling of a firearm, a misdemeanor. After a trial on the misdemeanor charge and a preliminary hearing on the felonies, the general district court dismissed the misdemeanor reckless handling of a firearm charge and refused to certify Defendant’s felony charges to the circuit court for lack of probable cause. The Commonwealth subsequently obtained direct indictments charging Defendant with first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the charges. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions and dismissed the indictments, holding that the Commonwealth was collaterally estopped from prosecuting Defendant for murder or attempted murder after Defendant’s acquittal of reckless handling of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant’s misdemeanor acquittal and subsequent felony convictions were based on the same issue of ultimate fact, the felony convictions were barred by the prohibition of double jeopardy. View "Commonwealth v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty in the District Court of Stafford County to petit larceny and three misdemeanor tampering charges. After Petitioner’s sentences expired, Petitioner was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities. In a Notice to Appear, the ICE charged that Petitioner was subject to removal because his petit larceny conviction subjected Petitioner to removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A). While in federal custody, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Stafford County, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because the attorney representing him in the petit larceny case incorrectly informed him that his guilty plea would not have negative immigration consequences. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the petition because Petitioner was not in custody pursuant to the challenge conviction and because the petition was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a Virginia circuit court does not have jurisdiction to provide habeas corpus relief to a petitioner being detained by federal authorities because of immigration issues arising as a consequence of a state conviction after the sentence for the state conviction has expired. View "Escamilla v. Superintendent, Rappahannock Reg’l Jail" on Justia Law

Defendant made a conditional plea of guilty to charges of cocaine distribution and unlawful possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, claiming that police officers unlawfully entered his apartment and seized his weapons and drugs. The court of appeals denied Defendant’s petition for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that both probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantees entry by the policy officers into Defendant’s apartment, and the trial court did not thus err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "Evans v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Based on an anonymous tip implicating Defendant, Defendant was arrested and charged with abduction, robbery, and statutory burglary. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for retrial, concluding that the trial court erred by admitting a police officer to testify as to the specific content of the anonymous tip that implicated Defendant in violation of Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment in reversing Defendant’s convictions but on narrower, non-constitutional grounds, holding that the officer’s testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay, and its admission was not harmless under non-constitutional principles. View "Commonwealth v. Swann" on Justia Law

Joseph Tuggle, who lived in a residential group home for men with intellectual disabilities, died after suffering second and third degree burns on his body that were left untreated. Richard Wagoner, the president and owner of the corporation that owned the group home, was subsequently charged with abuse or neglect of an incapacitated adult. Wagoner moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove his actions were a proximate cause of Tuggle’s death. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the Commonwealth had presented sufficient evidence of proximate cause. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court applied the correct decisional standard in ruling on Defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court and court of appeals erred in considering the loss of a substantial possibility of survival as the basis for deciding the motion to set aside the verdict; (2) there was sufficient evidence of proximate cause to support the jury’s verdict; but (3) there was sufficient evidence of proximate cause to support the jury’s verdict. View "Wagoner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of distributing child pornography. The court of appeals upheld the convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove distribution because the peer-to-peer software he used to access and download child pornography automatically placed the files into a shared folder accessible to other users of the software. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Defendant reproduced by any means, including by computer, sold, gave away, electronically transmitted, or distributed child pornography in violation of Va. Code 18.2-374.1:1(C)(i). View "Kelley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was arrested on warrants charging him with several crimes. The general district court admitted Appellant to bail. The Commonwealth appealed the bail decision. The circuit court admitted Appellant to bail pending trial, setting his bond at $60,000. The Commonwealth again appealed the bail decision. The Court of Appeals revoked the circuit court’s order setting bond and ordered Appellant’s incarceration pending trial, concluding that Appellant failed to rebut the statutory presumption against bail in the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals did not err in its appellate review of the circuit court’s decision. View "Shannon v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant, a native of Ethiopia, pleaded guilty to petit larceny. At no time did Appellant’s court-appointed attorney advise Appellant of the collateral consequences of the plea and sentence upon his immigration status. Appellant was subsequently informed that he was subject to removal as a result of his conviction. Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The circuit court sustained the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the petition, concluding that Appellant was not prejudiced from his counsel’s failure to advise him of the adverse consequences on his immigration status of accepting the plea agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court applied an incorrect standard for determining whether prejudice resulted from the attorney’s failure to advise Appellant of the negative consequences of accepting the plea agreement. View "Zemene v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on charges of Internet solicitation of a minor. The parties agreed that Defendant was accused of soliciting oral sex from a minor and that oral sex between an adult and a minor is an act forbidden by Virginia’s anti-sodomy law, Va. Code 18.2-361(A). After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 18.2-361(A) was facially unconstitutional in light of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that section 18.2-361(A) was constitutional as applied to Defendant because the Lawrence decision did not prevent a state from criminalizing sodomy between an adult and a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 18.2-361(A) is not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant in this instance; and (2) it is proper to prohibit those applications of the statute that are unconstitutional and leaving the constitutional applications of the statute to be enforced. View "Toghill v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of murder, robbery, use of a firearm in the commission of robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the prosecution suppressed or failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The trial court ultimately dismissed the petition, concluding that it was untimely filed under Va. Code 8.01-654(A)(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tolling provision of Va. Code 8.01-229(D) was applicable to the limitations period of section 8.01-654(A)(2), and therefore, it was error to conclude that Defendant’s petition for habeas corpus was untimely; but (2) because the allegedly withheld evidence was not material, Defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the error. View "Hicks v. Dir., Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law