Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a divorced mother of three minor children, was prosecuted under Va. Code 22.1-254 and -263 for failing to ensure that her children arrived at school in a timely manner. The circuit court convicted Defendant of three Class 3 misdemeanors, one per child. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 22.1-254, which requires compulsory school attendance, should not be applied to prosecute tardiness when a child was otherwise enrolled in and regularly attending school. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant’s convictions, holding that section 22.1-254(A) cannot be construed in a manner that encompasses tardiness. View "Blake v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of three counts of “expos[ing] his . . . sexual or genital part” to a minor child in violation of Va. Code 18.2-370(A)(1). Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court had applied an improper definition of the term “expose.” The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that “expose” means not only to lay bare to view but to feel or touch, and therefore, because Defendant “made known” his bare penis to the victim’s touch, he physically and tactilely exposed his genital part to the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in concluding that the term “expose” under section 18.2-370(A)(1) includes tactile exposure, as exposure is limited to a visual display where the child saw, or could have seen, the uncovered genitalia; and (2) the evidence in this case was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction under one count of the indictment. View "Farhoumand v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape and capital murder in the commission of abduction with intent to defile. Defendant was sentenced to death on each conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences. Here the Supreme Court considered Defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court dismissed the petition, holding (1) the Commonwealth did not commit Brady violations or present false testimony or allow it to go uncorrected; (2) Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel; and (3) the remainder of Defendant’s claims were either barred or without merit. View "Lawlor v. Warden" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of statutory burglary in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-91. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the Commonwealth established only that he went into a crawl space underneath a dwelling house and failed to prove that he actually broke into and entered the actual house. The court of appeals upheld the conviction, concluding that the crawl space in this case constituted part of the dwelling house. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the crawl space was structurally part of the dwelling house, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction of statutory burglary. View "Grimes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of counterfeit currency in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-173 after being found with eighteen twenty-dollar bills on his person that were counterfeit. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence, as the Commonwealth failed to prove that he possessed the bills, that he knew they were forged, or that he had the intent to utter or employ them as true. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circumstances were sufficient to support an inference that Defendant possessed the bills, knew the bills to be counterfeit, and had the requisite intent to utter the counterfeit money in his possession. View "Hawkins v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-266. The arresting officer found Defendant sleeping in the driver’s seat of his vehicle, which was parked in his private driveway, with the key in the ignition. The jury returned a guilty verdict. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction because he was not “operating” the vehicle “on a highway.” The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was in actual physical control of his vehicle, and therefore, under prior case law, the evidence was sufficient to conclude that he was an operator of the vehicle; and (2) section 18.2-266 contains no “on a highway” requirement for the operation of motor vehicles. View "Sarafin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Twelve years after he pled guilty to capital murder in exchange for a sentence of life without the possibility of parole Appellant filed a motion to vacate his sentence. Appellant, who was seventeen years old when he committed the murder, argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama applied retroactively to his case. The circuit denied the motion without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing scheme applicable to Appellant’s conviction was not a mandatory life without the possibility of parole scheme; and (2) therefore, even if Miller applied retroactively, it was not applicable to the Virginia sentencing statutes at issue in this case. View "Jones v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a trial, the circuit court found Defendant guilty of possessing heroin with the intent to distribute. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court violated Sixth Amendment rights by denying him a continuance on the day of trial for the purported purpose of substituting court appointed counsel with retained counsel of his choice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s continuance request was deficient as a matter of law because Defendant established no factual predicate for seeking substitution of other counsel in place of his court appointed counsel under the authority of the Sixth Amendment; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a continuance and in proceeding to trial with Defendant being represented by his court appointed attorney. View "Brown v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of rape, four counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of aggravated sexual battery for offenses committed against his stepdaughter. As a condition of Defendant’s probation, the court ordered that Defendant submit to warrantless, suspicionless searches of his person, property, residence, and vehicle at any time by any probation or law enforcement officer. Defendant challenged this probation condition on appeal. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the condition was reasonable under the facts of this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the probation condition at issue was not reasonable in light of the offenses for which Defendant was convicted, his background, and the surrounding circumstances. View "Murry v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several crimes associated with the robbery of a victim and the invasion of his home. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing his proffered jury instruction, which should be given if a witness whose testimony is at issue is an accomplice and if his or her testimony is uncorroborated. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s refusal of the proposed jury instruction, concluding that the testimony at issue had been corroborated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the witness here was an accomplice and his testimony was not corroborated, and therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing Defendant’s proffered jury instruction. Remanded. View "Via v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law