Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted upon a charge of knowingly and intentionally possessing or transporting a firearm after having previously been convicted of a violent felony in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-308.2(A). At a jury trial, the trial court admitted one prior conviction for robbery and four prior convictions for burglary, each of which was a violent felony. Defendant objected to the evidence, arguing that the phrase "previously convicted of a violent felony" in section 18.2-308.2(A) limited the Commonwealth to adducing evidence of only one prior conviction for a violent felony. The circuit court overruled the objection, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because section 18.2-308.2(A) establishes the elements of the offense rather than a rule of evidence by which the elements may be proven, the statute does not limit the Commonwealth's prerogative to meet its burden of proof using whatever available evidence it chooses.View "Boone v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Jordan was charged with carjacking, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, eluding police, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At trial, Arrowood, who was 13 at the time of the incident, testified that as he sat in a truck outside a convenience store, Jordan pointed "a gun" at his head and told him to get out of the truck. Arrowood stated that he was familiar with handguns because his father was in the military, and that this appeared to be a silver semiautomatic pistol. Arrowood admitted on cross-examination that he could not say for certain that the object was not a toy gun. Jordan was apprehended by police shortly after the incident, but no weapon was recovered. He was convicted on all counts. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected an appeal to the conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Jordan concedes that he is a convicted felon. The evidence was sufficient to support Jordan's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. View "Jordan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2008 Prieto was convicted of a 1988 capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape, Code § 18.2-31(5); capital murder of more than one person as part of the same act or transaction, Code § 18.2-31(7); rape, Code § 18.2-61; two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of murder, Code § 18.2-53.1; and grand larceny, Code § 18.2-95, and was sentenced to death for each of the capital murder convictions and 20 years' imprisonment for the remaining convictions. Following a remand, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the sentences and subsequently denied a petition for habeas corpus that claimed denial of effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed bring up Prieto's claimed mental retardation and failed to thoroughly investigate and review scientific evidence including DNA found in the victim’s vagina, hair found on the body, and anal swabs. The court also rejected a claims that Prieto was denied the right to a jury "of the state and district" where the crimes were committed, because a juror who did not reside in Virginia was seated at his first trial and that another juror intentionally withheld information during voir dire regarding sexual assaults the juror had suffered. View "Prieto v. Warden " on Justia Law

Carolyn Osman had three sons, all of whom were the beneficiaries of Carolyn's estate and various trusts. Carolyn died in 2009 as a result of her son Michael's actions. Her cause of death was strangulation and blunt force trauma to the head. Michael was found not guilty of first-degree murder for reason of insanity. The executors of Carolyn's estate and co-trustees of the trusts subsequently filed a request for declaratory judgment in the circuit court asking the court to declare that Michael was a "slayer" under Va. Code 55-401. The circuit court found that although Michael was found not guilty by reason of insanity, he was a slayer under section 55-401 and could not share in the proceeds from his mother's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in holding that Michael was a slayer under section 55-401, and that as a result, Michael could not inherit his share of his mother's estate.View "Osman v. Osman" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned an underlying criminal case against Lillian Callender and Michael Stoffa. Following bench trials, Callender and Stoffa were found guilty of felony neglect and second-degree murder. Prior to Callender's sentencing and Stoffa's trial, Daily Press requested permission to review the file related to Callender's trial. The clerk of the circuit court denied the request, and the circuit court entered an order sealing the entire Callender file from public inspection until the conclusion of Callender's and Stoffa's cases. The circuit court later rescinded the order and allowed the attorneys for Callender and the Commonwealth to withdraw the original exhibits from the Callender file to be used in Stoffa's trial. Daily Press requested that photocopies of the withdrawn exhibits remain in the public file, but the court directed that photocopies of the original exhibits be placed in the file under seal. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court, holding that the order violated the public's constitutional and statutory right of access to criminal proceedings. View "Daily Press, Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2009, Alexander Nobles pled guilty to driving while intoxicated (DWI) before Judge Thomas Kelley in district court. The case was continued until 2011. At the 2011 hearing, Judge Kelley found Nobles guilty of reckless driving and fined him $250. The Commonwealth objected to Judge Kelley's decision to find Nobles guilty of reckless driving instead of finding him guilty and sentencing him for DWI. Theophani Stamos, the chief deputy Commonwealth's attorney, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling Judge Kelley to sentence Nobles on the charge of DWI. The circuit court issued the writ. Judge Kelley appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court and dismissed the petition, holding that the circuit court erred in issuing the writ ordering Judge Kelley to sentence Nobles on the charge of DWI, as the 2011 order had become final, and Judge Kelley consequently lost jurisdiction to modify the order.View "Kelley v. Stamos" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of robbery and use of a firearm. Less than a month after Defendant was released from prison on probation, Defendant was arrested on a new robbery charge. After a revocation hearing, the circuit court found that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, revoked the probation, and entered an order requiring Defendant to serve the remaining eighteen years and four months of his original sentence. After a rehearing, the court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the judgment violated his constitutional right to confront his accusers and the rule against hearsay. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting testimonial hearsay evidence in this probation revocation proceeding, as the evidence comported with the constitutional requirements for admitting the testimonial hearsay evidence and denying Defendant his confrontation rights for "good cause."View "Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Alison Dressner was issued a summons for possession of marijuana. The Commonwealth amended the charge to possession of marijuana. Dressner was then arraigned on the amended charge, and entered a guilty plea to that charge. Dressner subsequently filed a petition for expungement of police and court records pertaining to the possession of marijuana charge. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in concluding that expungement of the possession of marijuana charge would distort the record, as the possession of marijuana charge was necessarily "otherwise dismissed"; and (2) Dressner satisfied the requirements of the expungement statute, where she demonstrated the existence of manifest injustice with the continued existence of information relating to the marijuana charge, and was entitled to have the police and court records relating to the marijuana charge expunged.View "Dressner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on and convicted of one count of capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape, and one count of capital murder in the commission of abduction with the intent to defile. The sentencing court imposed two sentences of death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not commit prejudicial error in (a) limiting questioning during voir dire, (b) excluding evidence during the penalty phase of trial, and (c) instructing the jury; (2) the evidence was sufficient to prove the elements of the offenses charged and the aggravating factors required for imposition of a sentence of death; (3) the imposition of the death penalty was constitutional and met the relevant statutory factors; and (4) the sentences of death were not imposed under mistake and were not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. View "Lawlor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Respondent was convicted of aggravated sexual battery. Subsequently, Respondent was determined to be a sexually violent predator and ordered committed to the custody of the Department of Behavioral Health and Development Services. The circuit court later held an annual assessment hearing of Respondent's status that was conducted by two-way electronic video and audio communications pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 37.2-910(A). At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found that Respondent remained a sexually violent predator and ruled that he should remain in secure inpatient treatment. Respondent appealed, arguing because he was not physically present at the hearing his due process and statutory rights were violated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the provision in Code 37.2-910(A) for conducting annual assessment hearings under the Sexually Violent Predator Act by video conference was neither unconstitutional facially nor unconstitutional as applied in Respondent's case; and (2) the circuit court correctly found that Respondent remained a sexually violent predator in need of secure inpatient treatment. View "Shellman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law