Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was whether the circuit court erred when it held that Defendant was not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence for the period he was detained in a Virginia jail awaiting trial. At that time, he was a West Virginia prisoner receiving credit toward his West Virginia sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it held Defendant was not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence; and (2) the court erred in recharacterizing Defendant's pleading without providing him notice and the opportunity to be heard, but the error was harmless because Defendant was not required to challenge the recharacterization on the appeal, and he was not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence. View "Dorr v. Clark" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted in the district court of a felony third offense, DUI after being twice convicted of the same offense within ten years. The circuit court subsequently granted Appellant's motion to dismiss the second DUI case for denial of Appellant's right to a speedy trial. Appellant then filed a petition in the court of appeals for a writ of actual innocence with respect to his felony conviction, contending he was innocent of the felony because one of the requisite predicate misdemeanor convictions had been dismissed with prejudice. A court of appeals panel remanded the case for resentencing on the lesser-included offense of DUI, second conviction. The court of appeals thereafter granted the Commonwealth's petition for a rehearing en banc. The court of appeals, with ten judges sitting en banc, dismissed the writ of actual innocence without opinion by an equally-divided court and withdrew the previous order by the panel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the panel's judgment could only have been withdrawn and thus reversed by a majority of the judges sitting in the court en banc. Remanded with direction to reinstate the judgment of the panel. View "Conley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of three counts of robbery and three counts of use or display of a firearm in committing those felonies. The circuit court ran the firearm sentences consecutively based upon what it interpreted as court of appeals precedent. Appellant appealed, arguing that neither the language of the use or display of a firearm statute, Va. Code Ann. 18.2-53.1, nor the language of the mandatory minimum sentencing statute prohibited the sentences imposed for such firearm charges from being run concurrently with each other. The court of appeals denied Appellant's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) multiple sentences imposed pursuant to Code 18.2-53.1 may be run concurrently; and (2) to the extent that the holding in Bullock v. Commonwealth was inconsistent with the holding here, that portion of the court of appeals' decision was reversed. Remanded for resentencing. View "Brown v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-308.2(A). Defendant appealed, arguing that he should have been convicted of only one continuous possession. The court of appeals upheld all three possession convictions, holding that each of the convictions was based on "distinguishable incidents." At issue on appeal was whether evidence of the possession of one firearm on three separate occasions can constitute three separate charges for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the incidents at issue constituted distinct acts or occurrences, each reflecting an enhanced danger to the public, and convictions for the three separate charges on the facts of this case were therefore valid under Code 18.2-308.2(A). View "Baker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an Alford plea of guilty to an indictment charging him with grand larceny. Before the sentencing order became final, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court ultimately denied the motion. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus, claiming that he had been denied he effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel had failed to base his motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the specific grounds of mistake, fear, misunderstanding, and misrepresentation. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court granted Defendant the writ. In granting the writ, the court relied on Justus v. Commonwealth. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the writ, holding (1) the circuit court applied an inapplicable standard in granting the writ, and (2) there was no evidence to support a conclusion that Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel or that manifest injustice occurred. View "Johnson v. Anis" on Justia Law

These appeals presented the same question of law and were therefore considered together. The question presented involved the interplay between the Constitution of Virginia and Va. Code 18.2-308.2, relating to jurisdiction of the circuit courts to restore rights to ship, transport, possess or receive firearms to a person who has lost those rights by suffering a felony conviction. The question arose where the convicted person's political disabilities had subsequently been restored by the Governor. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments in both cases and remanded, holding (1) firearm rights may only be restored to a convicted felon by a permit issued by a circuit court; (2) the Fairfax County circuit court erred in ruling that the first defendant's petition must be denied because the Governor had not given him a full restoration of rights; and (3) the Buchanan County circuit court of erred in ruling that the second defendant's petition must be denied because the Governor, by excepting firearm rights from his order removing political disabilities, had placed a condition on the defendant's right to possess firearms that precluded the court from considering the defendant's petition. View "Gallagher v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of abduction with intent to defile and commission of a subsequent violent sexual assault and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress testimony of the police officers regarding their surveillance of Defendant on the evening of the attack. Defendant argued that the officers, without first obtaining a search warrant, unlawfully installed a GPS device on his vehicle and traced his movements through use of the device, and therefore, the officers' testimony was fruit of the poisonous tree of an unlawful search. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Before the appeal to the Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones, which held that the government's placement of a GPS tracking device on a vehicle and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the installation of the GPS device on Defendant's van, without a valid search warrant, constituted an unconstitutional search; but (2) the admission of the officers' testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Foltz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Charles Gleason, Jr. received two death sentences following pleas of guilty to capital murder in the killings of two fellow inmates, Harvey Grey Watson and Aaron Cooper. Although Defendant was found competent to waive appeal and did so, the Supreme Court conducted the required statutory review and affirmed the judgments of the circuit court, holding (1) the death sentences were not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and (2) the sentences were not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. View "Gleason v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for aggravated malicious wounding and use of a firearm during an aggravated malicious wounding. During trial, the Commonwealth moved that the court declare a witness who claimed memory loss unavailable and admit the transcript of his preliminary hearing testimony. The court, relying on the court of appeals' decision in Jones v. Commonwealth, found the witness unavailable. Because the court ruled that the transcript was inadmissible, the court allowed Defendant's counsel at the hearing to testify about the witness's testimony. Defendant thereafter was convicted of both charges. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in declaring the witness unavailable, and the error was not harmless. Remanded. View "Turner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of, inter alia, use of a firearm while committing burglary and participation in a criminal street gang. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that the circuit court did not err by finding the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of gang participation. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Defendant's convictions for gang participation and for use of a firearm in the commission of burglary, holding (1) the circuit court erred in admitting certain evidence offered to support the conviction of criminal street gang participation, and therefore, the Commonwealth failed to prove an essential element of the crime; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for use of a firearm in commission of burglary. View "Rushing v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law