Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Police officers asked D'Angelo Brooks for permission to search his house for a weapon after someone reported shots fired. Brooks consented. During the search an officer opened a bag, in which he found cash and cocaine. The officer then asked Brooks if this was his cash and drugs, to which Brooks responded affirmatively. Prior to trial Brooks moved to suppress the cocaine as being beyond the scope of his consent to search and his statement as being fruit of the poisonous tree. The court denied the motion to suppress and found Brooks guilty of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals denied Brooks' petition for appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) the appellate court did not err when it upheld the denial of the motion to suppress the cocaine and Brooks' statement to the officer afterwards because the search of the bag was objectively reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) Brooks' statement was not obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because a reasonable person in Brooks situation would not have believed he was in custody, and therefore no Miranda warning was needed. View "Brooks v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee Winston Burton was convicted for abduction in violation of state law. The victim brought her car to Appellee for service. Appellee asked the victim for "help" while he examined the car; after five to ten minutes, the victim began to feel uncomfortable, and exited the car. As she stepped away, she saw Appellee squatting down near the rear wheel with his hand in his unzipped pants. The victim told Appellee she needed to leave, but Appellee stepped in front of her "kind of block[ing]" her way to the car. She repeated that she needed to leave, and Appellee stepped aside. Appellee was indicted for abduction and found guilty after a jury trial. Appellee challenged his conviction to the appellate court which affirmed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court agreed to review the record, and found the evidence at trial insufficient to prove that Appellee intended to deprive the victim of her personal liberty. The Court held that it was clear from the record that Appellee's intent was to deceive the victim into positioning herself in the car in such a way that he could gain sexual gratification by observing her; however briefly detained, the Court found Appellee's actions were made in pursuit of the gratification not with the intent to deprive the victim of her personal liberty. The Court vacated the lower court's conviction and dismissed the indictment.

Petitioner Marquis Byrd was indicted for first-degree murder, aggravated malicious wounding of another, and for the use of a firearm in both offenses. At a jury trial, he was convicted of second-degree murder and the unlawful wounding of another and use of a firearm in the murder; Petitioner was acquitted of the firearm charge in the wounding case. At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, defense counsel made a motion to strike, which the court denied. At the close of all evidence, defense counsel failed to renew the motion. Petitioner's trial counsel was given leave to withdraw from the case with respect to sentencing; substitute counsel filed a motion to set aside the verdict, but did not argue it and therefore never obtained a ruling. Petitioner was sentenced to 33 years' imprisonment for the three offenses. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal on grounds that the sufficiency of evidence had not been preserved by either a renewal of the motion to strike or the motion to set aside the verdict. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court, alleging he had been denied his right to effective assistance of counsel at both trial and sentencing. The Supreme Court, in applying Strickland, found that if counsel had performed without any professional errors and petitioner's direct appeal had been available for review, there would be "no reasonable probability that a different result would have been reached." The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

While sitting in the driver's seat of his parked truck talking with a customer on his cell phone, Appellee Michael Lewis was approached by a ten-year-old child and asked for a ride home. Appellee did not know the child, but offered to give him a ride. As the child got into the truck, Cedrick Williams, who knew neither the child nor Appellee, came from him home and approached the truck, yelling for the child to get out of the truck. Williams called 911, reporting that he witnessed an attempted abduction. Appellant Officer Brian Kei obtained an arrest warrant for Appellee based solely on the report by Williams. Appellee was held for 41 days in jail. After the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney spoke with the child and verified Appellee's version of the incident, charges against Appellee were dropped nolle prosequi. On petition, the circuit court expunged the record of Appellee's arrest, but the police website, as well as several news station websites still reported the incident, quoting arresting officer Kei with statements that proved to be unfounded. Appellee brought suit alleging malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and defamation against Kei; the court entered an order sustaining a demurrer to all claims against Kei. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of the demurrer on all counts except defamation, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim.

Appellee Shawn Necaise was arrested on warrants charging felonious disregard of a police officer's signal to stop, and feloniously assaulting an officer engaged in public duties. The court records show the charges were reduced to misdemeanors. Represented by counsel, Appellee plead guilty to both charges; the Commonwealth took nolle prosequi to other pending misdemeanors. The court accepted the pleas, found him guilty of both, and imposed fines and suspended jail time. Two years later, Appellee filed a petition in the circuit court seeking expungement of all police and court records pertaining to the two felony charges and the misdemeanors that had been dismissed nolle prosequi. The court ordered the expungement with regard to the charges disposed of by nolle prosequi, but denied the expungement pertaining to the two felonies. On appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that because the misdemeanors to which Appellee was convicted were lesser included offenses of the felonies with which he was originally charged, all of the elements of the offenses were subsumed within the felony charges and formed the sole bases for the misdemeanor convictions. "The record as it stands contains a true account of the events that actually occurred and creates no injustice to either party." The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

Petitioner Corey Smith was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by Richmond police officers for a broken tail light. The officers asked the driver and Petitioner for identification, and processed that information using the police database known as "PISTOL" (Police Information System Totally On Line), which was accessed through a computer in the police patrol car. PISTOL returned an "alert" stating that Petitioner was "probably armed and a narcotics seller/user." On receiving the alert, the officers asked Petitioner out of the car and conducted a pat down search of his person. The officer detected a gun in Petitioner's pocket. Petitioner was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of state law. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the pat down, arguing that the search, based solely on the information in PISTOL was unreasonable and a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion; Petitioner entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Petitioner asserted that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The appellate court concluded that "in the absence of some contemporaneous indication that the individual might be carrying a weapon, the facts do not provide reasonable suspicion to believe he may presently be armed and dangerous" and overturned the lower court's conviction. On review, the Supreme Court holds that the record supports the conclusion of the trial court, that the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk, and affirmed the conviction.