Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A grand jury indicted Smith for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Two days later, Smith applied for the purchase of a semi-automatic pistol. Smith answered that he was not under indictment for a felony on the form prepared by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives of the United States Department of Justice (the ATF form). The record contained no evidence that Smith, when executing the ATF form, was aware that the grand jury had returned an indictment against him. Smith was indicted for making a false statement on a firearm purchase form, and the circuit court ultimately found Smith guilty. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, vacated the conviction, and dismissed the indictment, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of "willfully and intentionally making a materially false statement" on a form executed in connection with the purchase of a firearm because there was no evidence to support a finding that Smith knew that he had been indicted when he signed the ATF form. View "Smith v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Calvin Bowman was found guilty of robbery, abduction, and two counts of use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The court of appeals and Supreme Court affirmed. Bowman subsequently filed petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Bowman's claim that the Commonwealth failed to correct false testimony of its witness was barred because this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial and on appeal; (2) evidence of the lack of Bowman's DNA on a piece of evidence did not prejudice him under the Strickland v. Washington standard; (3) the lack of evidence on a particular piece of clothing recovered from Bowman when he was arrested did not prejudice him under the Strickland standard; and (4) the introduction of evidence by Bowman's expert that confirmed the existence of his fingerprints at the scene of the crime but provided the opportunity for a different explanation did not prejudice him under the Strickland standard. View "Bowman v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant James Bevel was convicted in a jury trial for having sexual relations with his daughter. Bevel's counsel filed a notice of appeal, after which Bevel died. Counsel filed a motion to abate conviction ab initio, which the circuit court denied after finding that the Commonwealth had established good cause for not abating Bevel's conviction. The court of appeals affirmed. Later, the court of appeals entered an order in the merits appeal dismissing the appeal as moot. At issue was whether to abate a conviction ab initio when the defendant has died while his appeal was pending or to dismiss the appeal and leave the conviction intact. The Supreme Court (1) held that the question of whether a criminal conviction necessarily will abate upon the death of the defendant while an appeal is pending or whether there should be a good cause exception in that policy is appropriately decided by the legislature, not the courts; (2) vacated the judgment of the court of appeals applying the abatement doctrine; and (3) affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in the merits appeal, under the specific facts of this case, holding that Bevel's death rendered the appeal of his conviction moot. View "Bevel v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant Jerry Anderson was found guilty of fellatio by force and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. The court of appeals denied his appeal. At issue was whether prior consistent statements made by the complaining witness were properly admitted in evidence to rehabilitate the witness after her impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in admitting the victim's prior consistent statements and any error by the circuit court in admitting parts of the prior consistent statements that were overly repetitious was harmless under the circumstances; and (2) Defendant had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice was reached. View "Anderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A jury found Dustin Turner guilty of abduction with intent to defile and first-degree felony murder. Billy Brown, the other person implicated in the crime, later confessed in a signed affidavit that he alone killed the victim. Based on this recantation, Turner filed a petition for a writ of actual innocence based on non-biological evidence. After remanding the matter to the circuit court to further develop the facts, the court of appeals granted Turner's request for a writ of actual innocence and vacated his convictions. Subsequently, the court of appeals granted the Commonwealth's petition for a rehearing and dismissed Turner's petition for a writ of actual innocence. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in dismissing Turner's petition and in denying his request to vacate his convictions because Turner did not meet his evidentiary burden of providing that no rational trier of fact could find Turner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of abduction with intent to defile as nothing in Brown's recantation or the circuit court's factual findings had any bearing on the question presented in the petition. View "Turner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

James Proffitt was convicted of a felony sexual offense involving a minor and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The circuit court, shortly thereafter, appointed Melissa Doud as Proffitt's guardian and conservator. Doud then brought an action against the county, the sheriff, the sheriff's deputies and jailors, and the Commonwealth, alleging Proffitt suffered serious injuries during his incarceration at the county jail due to the negligence of the sheriff's deputies. Doud's theory of recovery against the Commonwealth was based entirely on respondeat superior. The circuit dismissed the action. At issue on appeal was whether the Commonwealth's express waiver of sovereign immunity for damage caused by the negligent act of any employee acting within the scope of his employment rendered the Commonwealth liable in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth was not waived with respect to Doud's tort claim because the sheriff was not an "employee" of the Commonwealth within the definitions contained in the Virginia Tort Claims Act. View "Doud v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Leslie Todd gave birth to a female child while incarcerated. Lucretia Copeland eventually became the baby's primary physical custodian. Approximately two years later, Copeland filed a petition to adopt the child without the consent of Todd pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 63.2-1202(H). The circuit court granted Copeland's petition, holding that Todd failed to maintain contact with the child for a period of six months prior to the filing of the petition as required by section 63.2-1202(H), and, in the alternative, that Todd had withheld her consent contrary to the child's best interests under Va. Code Ann. 63.2-1203 and -1205. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reinstated the final decree of adoption, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in reversing the circuit court's holding that Todd's consent to the adoption was not necessary under section 36.2-1202(H), but (2) the court of appeals erred in its judgment that the circuit court violated Todd's constitutional rights under sections 63.2-1203 and -1205 as the circuit court gave adequate consideration to Todd's due process rights and Todd's equal protection rights were not violated. View "Copeland v. Todd" on Justia Law

Derek Bell was declared by a jury in circuit court to be a sexually violent predator and was civilly committed to the custody of the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services for appropriate treatment. After Bell's first annual review, the circuit court found that Bell remained a sexually violent predator but that he satisfied the criteria for conditional release from the custody of the Department set forth under Va. Code Ann. 37.2-912. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the judgment of the circuit court was without evidence to support it as Bell had not satisfied the first criterion set forth in section 37.2-912(A) and continued to need secure inpatient treatment. Final judgment entered in favor of the Commonwealth. View "Commonwealth v. Bell" on Justia Law

These appeals arose out of two cases brought after Mother was shot and killed by her only child, Clayton Lynn. Mother's will identified Lynn as the sole beneficiary of her estate. Lynn's daughters (Granddaughters) filed separate actions seeking declaratory judgment that Lynn be declared a "slayer" for the purposes of the Slayer Statute and that the Granddaughters be declared the sole heirs of Mother's estate. The circuit court consolidated the two actions and held that Mother's mother was the sole and rightful heir to Mother's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of Mother's murder controlled the distribution of Mother's estate in this case, and as a result, the trial court was correct in concluding that under the laws of intestate succession at the time of Mother's death, as modified by the Slayer Statute in effect, Mother's estate passed to the next living person who was neither the slayer nor making a claim through the slayer; and (2) the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of Mother's murder neither implicated nor violated Virginia's prohibition against corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate. View "Bell v. Casper" on Justia Law

Geoffrey Sanders was convicted by a jury of forcible sodomy, rape, object sexual penetration, and taking indecent liberties with a child. During the trial, the circuit court allowed the commonwealth's medical expert, a doctor, to rely on the results of a laboratory report as the basis of her opinion that the victim had a sexually transmitted infection. Sanders appealed, arguing that this portion of the expert's testimony violated his right to confront witnesses against him as guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The court of appeals found the laboratory report in this instance was not testimonial for purposes of Sixth Amendment confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the laboratory report was for medical treatment purposes as it was created to permit the doctor to medically diagnose and treat the victim for sexually transmitted infections and was thus non-testimonial; and (2) a laboratory technician under these circumstances would not have reason to believe the results of his or her testing would be used in later trial and thus the report and the expert's testimony as to its content were not subject to exclusion under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. View "Sanders v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law