Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Derek Bell was declared by a jury in circuit court to be a sexually violent predator and was civilly committed to the custody of the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services for appropriate treatment. After Bell's first annual review, the circuit court found that Bell remained a sexually violent predator but that he satisfied the criteria for conditional release from the custody of the Department set forth under Va. Code Ann. 37.2-912. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the judgment of the circuit court was without evidence to support it as Bell had not satisfied the first criterion set forth in section 37.2-912(A) and continued to need secure inpatient treatment. Final judgment entered in favor of the Commonwealth. View "Commonwealth v. Bell" on Justia Law

These appeals arose out of two cases brought after Mother was shot and killed by her only child, Clayton Lynn. Mother's will identified Lynn as the sole beneficiary of her estate. Lynn's daughters (Granddaughters) filed separate actions seeking declaratory judgment that Lynn be declared a "slayer" for the purposes of the Slayer Statute and that the Granddaughters be declared the sole heirs of Mother's estate. The circuit court consolidated the two actions and held that Mother's mother was the sole and rightful heir to Mother's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of Mother's murder controlled the distribution of Mother's estate in this case, and as a result, the trial court was correct in concluding that under the laws of intestate succession at the time of Mother's death, as modified by the Slayer Statute in effect, Mother's estate passed to the next living person who was neither the slayer nor making a claim through the slayer; and (2) the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of Mother's murder neither implicated nor violated Virginia's prohibition against corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate. View "Bell v. Casper" on Justia Law

Geoffrey Sanders was convicted by a jury of forcible sodomy, rape, object sexual penetration, and taking indecent liberties with a child. During the trial, the circuit court allowed the commonwealth's medical expert, a doctor, to rely on the results of a laboratory report as the basis of her opinion that the victim had a sexually transmitted infection. Sanders appealed, arguing that this portion of the expert's testimony violated his right to confront witnesses against him as guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The court of appeals found the laboratory report in this instance was not testimonial for purposes of Sixth Amendment confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the laboratory report was for medical treatment purposes as it was created to permit the doctor to medically diagnose and treat the victim for sexually transmitted infections and was thus non-testimonial; and (2) a laboratory technician under these circumstances would not have reason to believe the results of his or her testing would be used in later trial and thus the report and the expert's testimony as to its content were not subject to exclusion under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. View "Sanders v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Harry Kelso was convicted in the Circuit Court of Hanover County of three counts of causing a juvenile to assist in the distribution of marijuana to a third party in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-255(A)(ii). Kelso appealed, arguing that venue in Hanover County was improper because he did not undertake any action relating to the sale of marijuana there. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed. Although Kelso's distribution of marijuana to the juvenile occurred solely in another county, the juvenile distributed the marijuana he received from Kelso to a third party in Hanover County. Because one of the acts which must occur for a violation of 18.2-255(A)(ii) is the juvenile's assistance in the distribution of the contraband to a third party, the Court held that the place where that act occurred is an appropriate venue for prosecution. View "Kelso v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2005, David Eastlack was charged with malicious wounding. The circuit court found Eastlack not guilty by reason of insanity. In 2009, Eastlack filed a petition in the circuit court seeking expungement of the police and court records pertaining to the malicious wounding charge pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 19.2-392.2. The court denied the petition. Eastlack appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eastlack failed to establish the existence of one of the three criteria listed in the statute as a prerequisite to his right to seek expungement. As Eastlack did not meet the other criteria, the Court confined its analysis to whether Eastlack was acquitted of his crime. Because a person found not guilty by reason of insanity has restraints upon his liberty and is not free to resume his life in the community as he would be if he had been acquitted in the usual sense, the Court held the term 'acquitted' in the statute does not include acquittals by reason of insanity. View "Eastlack v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

David McNeal was convicted in a bench trial in the circuit court for failing to return rented personal property within ten days after expiration of the rental period in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-118. At trial, the store manager of the rental business testified that she rented an aluminum brake to McNeal on September 18, 2008, and after two or three months elapsed without McNeal returning the brake, she contacted the sheriff's office. On cross-examination, the store manager testified that the deputy returned the brake on September 19, 2008. The circuit court concluded that, considering all the evidence, the equipment was gone for two or three months on a week's rental, and thus the evidence was sufficient for a finding of guilt. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the conflicting evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain McNeal's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated McNeal's conviction, holding that the circuit court's judgment finding McNeal guilty was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. The Court concluded that the circuit court was entitled to consider all the evidence and to resolve the conflict in the evidence as it did. View "Commonwealth v. McNeal" on Justia Law

Police officers asked D'Angelo Brooks for permission to search his house for a weapon after someone reported shots fired. Brooks consented. During the search an officer opened a bag, in which he found cash and cocaine. The officer then asked Brooks if this was his cash and drugs, to which Brooks responded affirmatively. Prior to trial Brooks moved to suppress the cocaine as being beyond the scope of his consent to search and his statement as being fruit of the poisonous tree. The court denied the motion to suppress and found Brooks guilty of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals denied Brooks' petition for appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) the appellate court did not err when it upheld the denial of the motion to suppress the cocaine and Brooks' statement to the officer afterwards because the search of the bag was objectively reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) Brooks' statement was not obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because a reasonable person in Brooks situation would not have believed he was in custody, and therefore no Miranda warning was needed. View "Brooks v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee Winston Burton was convicted for abduction in violation of state law. The victim brought her car to Appellee for service. Appellee asked the victim for "help" while he examined the car; after five to ten minutes, the victim began to feel uncomfortable, and exited the car. As she stepped away, she saw Appellee squatting down near the rear wheel with his hand in his unzipped pants. The victim told Appellee she needed to leave, but Appellee stepped in front of her "kind of block[ing]" her way to the car. She repeated that she needed to leave, and Appellee stepped aside. Appellee was indicted for abduction and found guilty after a jury trial. Appellee challenged his conviction to the appellate court which affirmed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court agreed to review the record, and found the evidence at trial insufficient to prove that Appellee intended to deprive the victim of her personal liberty. The Court held that it was clear from the record that Appellee's intent was to deceive the victim into positioning herself in the car in such a way that he could gain sexual gratification by observing her; however briefly detained, the Court found Appellee's actions were made in pursuit of the gratification not with the intent to deprive the victim of her personal liberty. The Court vacated the lower court's conviction and dismissed the indictment.

Petitioner Marquis Byrd was indicted for first-degree murder, aggravated malicious wounding of another, and for the use of a firearm in both offenses. At a jury trial, he was convicted of second-degree murder and the unlawful wounding of another and use of a firearm in the murder; Petitioner was acquitted of the firearm charge in the wounding case. At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, defense counsel made a motion to strike, which the court denied. At the close of all evidence, defense counsel failed to renew the motion. Petitioner's trial counsel was given leave to withdraw from the case with respect to sentencing; substitute counsel filed a motion to set aside the verdict, but did not argue it and therefore never obtained a ruling. Petitioner was sentenced to 33 years' imprisonment for the three offenses. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal on grounds that the sufficiency of evidence had not been preserved by either a renewal of the motion to strike or the motion to set aside the verdict. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court, alleging he had been denied his right to effective assistance of counsel at both trial and sentencing. The Supreme Court, in applying Strickland, found that if counsel had performed without any professional errors and petitioner's direct appeal had been available for review, there would be "no reasonable probability that a different result would have been reached." The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

While sitting in the driver's seat of his parked truck talking with a customer on his cell phone, Appellee Michael Lewis was approached by a ten-year-old child and asked for a ride home. Appellee did not know the child, but offered to give him a ride. As the child got into the truck, Cedrick Williams, who knew neither the child nor Appellee, came from him home and approached the truck, yelling for the child to get out of the truck. Williams called 911, reporting that he witnessed an attempted abduction. Appellant Officer Brian Kei obtained an arrest warrant for Appellee based solely on the report by Williams. Appellee was held for 41 days in jail. After the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney spoke with the child and verified Appellee's version of the incident, charges against Appellee were dropped nolle prosequi. On petition, the circuit court expunged the record of Appellee's arrest, but the police website, as well as several news station websites still reported the incident, quoting arresting officer Kei with statements that proved to be unfounded. Appellee brought suit alleging malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and defamation against Kei; the court entered an order sustaining a demurrer to all claims against Kei. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of the demurrer on all counts except defamation, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim.