Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sycamore Cross Solar LLC applied for certificates of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) to construct and operate a solar facility in Isle of Wight County and Surry County, Virginia. The project aimed to generate up to 240 megawatts of power and included transmission lines and associated facilities. The West Virginia & Appalachian Laborers’ District Council (WVALDC) participated in the case, arguing that the State Corporation Commission (Commission) failed to consider the benefits to specific groups as required by the Virginia Clean Economy Act (VCEA) and did not impose a local hiring condition.The Commission conducted an evidentiary hearing where Sycamore, WVALDC, and Commission staff presented their cases. Sycamore's witness testified about the project's economic benefits and commitment to local hiring, though no firm commitment was made. The Hearing Examiner recommended issuing the CPCNs without a local hiring condition but suggested notifying WVALDC about hiring timelines. The Commission adopted the Hearing Examiner's findings but declined the notification requirement, leading WVALDC to seek reconsideration.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Court held that the VCEA only required the Commission to consider the benefits to specified groups, not make specific findings. The Commission's consideration of the evidence and its decision not to impose a hiring-related condition were within its discretion. The Court found no abuse of discretion, as the Commission reasonably concluded that the statutory requirements were met without the need for additional hiring conditions. View "WVALDC v. State Corporation Commission" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between H. Cliff Page and the Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority (PRHA). Page owned a building in Portsmouth that shared a common wall with a building owned by PRHA. In 2014, PRHA demolished its building after the City of Portsmouth declared it an unlawful nuisance. Page claimed that the demolition was negligently performed and damaged his building. PRHA responded with a plea in bar, raising the defense of sovereign immunity.The circuit court held a hearing on the plea in bar and ruled in favor of PRHA, holding that sovereign immunity barred Page’s claim. The court found that the demolition of the property was implemented under the City of Portsmouth’s plan to address blight in the Downtown Portsmouth Historic District. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s ruling, stating that PRHA’s immunity should be the same as that of the City of Portsmouth.However, the Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that sovereign immunity does not shield PRHA from tort liability under the circumstances of this case. The court found that PRHA was acting in its proprietary capacity, similar to a private landowner, when it demolished the building. The court concluded that PRHA's obedience to the City’s Notice of Emergency Demolition was not an exercise of governmental discretion but a ministerial legal duty to perform a proprietary function. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Page v. Portsmouth Redevelopment & Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The case involves Montalla, LLC ("Montalla") and the Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Transportation ("VDOT"), and the Comptroller of Virginia (collectively the "Commonwealth"). Montalla filed a five-count complaint against the Commonwealth related to several contracts VDOT had entered into for construction inspection services. The circuit court dismissed the entire complaint, ruling that sovereign immunity barred all five counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, concluding that Counts I-III of the complaint were barred by sovereign immunity and that Counts IV-V were barred by the entry of a settlement agreement entered into by the pertinent parties.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the first three counts of the complaint were barred by sovereign immunity and that the last two counts were barred by the entry of a settlement agreement. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the settlement agreement was enforceable and that Montalla had not sufficiently alleged duress or repudiation to set it aside.The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar Montalla's claims based on valid contracts. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the settlement agreement, including the release of claims contained therein, was enforceable at this stage of the proceedings. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Montalla, LLC v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia was asked to interpret Code § 19.2-306.1, a statute enacted in 2021 that addresses the range of punishment a court may impose upon the revocation of a suspended sentence. The defendant, Emily Katherine Delaune, was convicted of three drug offenses in 2019 and was sentenced to six years of incarceration, with four years suspended. After her release, she violated the terms of her probation by using drugs and absconding from supervision. The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach revoked Delaune's suspended sentence based on these violations and ordered her to serve 60 days of active incarceration.Delaune appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing that under Code § 19.2-306.1, the circuit court was prohibited from imposing more than 14 days of active incarceration based on her technical violations. The Attorney General asserted that Code § 19.2-306.1 did not retroactively apply to Delaune’s probation violations.The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the parties had implicitly agreed to proceed under Code § 19.2-306.1 during the probation revocation hearing, and that the Attorney General was bound by this agreement. The Supreme Court of Virginia also agreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Code § 19.2-306.1, stating that the circuit court could not impose a term of active incarceration based on Delaune’s drug use, which constituted a first technical violation under the statute, and could impose a maximum of 14 days of active incarceration for Delaune’s absconding violation, which was automatically classified as a second technical violation under the statute. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the circuit court erred when it ordered Delaune to serve 60 days of active incarceration. View "Commonwealth v. Delaune" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the State Corporation Commission dismissing Verizon Virginia LLC's petition for a declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition pursuant to Va. Code 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821.Verizon, a telecommunications company, filed a petition for a declaratory judgment with the Commission requesting a declaration that either Capital Beltway Express LLC (CBE) or The Lane Construction Corporation was responsible for costs pursuant to section 33.2-1815(B) to relocate some of Verizon's utility facilities, as required by the Virginia Department of Transportation in the underlying project to extend portions of the I-495 express lanes. The Commission dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Verizon appealed, arguing that sections 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821 granted the Commission jurisdiction to resolve which party was responsible for the costs of the utility relocations necessitated by the project. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition. View "Verizon Virginia LLC v. SCC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus and issued the writ directed to the Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections ordering that Petitioner be released from custody, holding that Petitioner was entitled to relief on his claim that he was wrongfully denied earned sentence credits on his convictions for attempted murder that, if awarded, would result in his immediate release from incarceration.In his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner argued that he was wrongfully denied earned sentence credits on his convictions for attempted aggravated murder. Specifically, Petitioner argued that the Virginia Department of Corrections misinterpreted Va. Code 53.1-202.3(A) and, as a result, miscalculated his release date. The Supreme Court agreed, granted Petitioner's petition, and ordered that Petitioner be released from custody, holding that Petitioner established that he was entitled to relief. View "Prease v. Clarke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that Defendants, five members of the Prince William County Board of Supervisors, knowingly and willfully violated the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA), holding that the circuit court erred by granting Defendants' motion to strike.Plaintiffs, residents of Prince William County, filed a petition for mandamus and injunctive alleging that Defendants violated VFOIA by attending a meeting as defined by VFOIA without complying with statutory requirements. At the conclusion of Plaintiffs' evidence the circuit court granted Defendants' motion to strike on the grounds that the gathering did not constitute a meeting under VFOIA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting the motion to strike. View "Gloss v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court entering summary judgment favor of Eastern Shore Community Services Board (ESCSB) and holding that Oreze Healthcare LLC's conveyance of real property to a third party prohibited Oreze from pursuing its breach of contract claim against ESCSB, holding that ESCSB was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.ESCSB and Oreze entered into a commercial lease agreement under which ESCSB agreed to lease the four buildings comprising an assisted living facility whose license had been suspended and to provide interim care to its residents until a permanent solution was reached. When water damaged the buildings and no remedy was reached before ESCSB terminated the lease Oreze brought this complaint for breach of contract. While the lawsuit was pending, Oreze conveyed the property to a third party by general warranty deed. The circuit court granted summary judgment for ESCSB, ruling that Oreze failed to reserve its claims in the deed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deed did not extinguish or transfer Oreze's right to sue ESCSB for property damage arising from an alleged breach of the lease. View "Oreze Healthcare v. Eastern Shore Community Services Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA), Va. Code 2.2-3700 et seq., requires that public bodies permit members of the public to be physically present in the room where an open meeting occurs, holding that the trial court did not err.Plaintiff brought this action against the Board, a Board member, and superintendent of schools alleging that Defendants violated VFOIA's open meeting provisions by excluding her from a meeting room where a Board open meeting took place. The trial court granted judgment for Plaintiff and awarded her attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in concluding that the Board violated VFOIA by denying Plaintiff entry into the meeting room; and (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her remaining allegations of error. View "Suffolk City School Bd. v. Wahlstrom" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Residents' claims against the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing Residents' complaint.Residents brought this action seeking declaratory relief and to enjoin the Board from adopting an updated zoning ordinance via electronic meeting. In the alternatively, if the Board adopted the ordinance via an electronic meeting, Residents sought a declaration that any action by the Board or approval concerning the ordinance was void ab initio. The circuit court denied relief, finding, among other things, that Residents' claims were moot and that the Board had the authority to adopt the ordinance in an electronic meeting. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in concluding that the Board's adoption of the ordinance mooted Residents' declaratory judgment claim; (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing Residents' complaint as premature; and (3) the Board adopted the ordinance in a manner that violated the open meeting provisions of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, Va. Code 2.2-3700 et seq. View "Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law