Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this complaint brought over the actions of City of Charlottesville regarding Lee Park, the Supreme Court reversed and vacated the judgment, orders, and all forms of relief granted by the circuit court to Plaintiffs, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the City's actions were prohibited by Va. Code 15.2-1812.In 2017, the City council approved resolutions to remove a statue of Robert E. Lee (Lee Statute) in Lee Park, to rename and redesign Lee Park, and to support the renaming, redesign, and transformation of Jackson Park. The City subsequently approved a resolution to remove a statue of Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson in Jackson park. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that the City's actions violated section 15.2-1812. The circuit court subsequently entered several orders and ultimately enjoined the City from removing the statues and awarded Plaintiffs attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.2-1812 did not apply to the statues. View "City of Charlottesville v. Payne" on Justia Law

In this appeal brought by the landowner in a condemnation proceeding the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in all respects, holding that the circuit court did not err.After a trial, the circuit court entered a final order confirming the award entered by the Commissioner of Highways of $107,131 for the take and setting aside the award for damages to the residue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit ten-year-old site plans into evidence; and (2) did not err in deciding to strike the testimony of the owner of the property concerning damage to the residue of the property. As to Appellant's remaining assignment of error, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of invited error foreclosed relief on the claim that the trial court "put the parties on terms." View "Palmyra Associates, LLC v. Commissioner of Highways" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court concluding that the Fairfax County Police Department's automated license plate recognition (ALPR) satisfied the definition of an "information system" under the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act (Data Act), Va. Code 2.2-3800 through -3809, holding that the ALPR system does not constitute an "information system" within the meaning of the Data Act.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the ALPR system did not satisfy the statutory definition of an "information system" because it did not contain "the name, personal number, or other identifying particulars of a data subject," and therefore, the Police Department's passive use of the ALPR system was lawful under the Data Act; and (2) the resolution of this case favorably to the Police Department foreclosed the recovery of attorneys' fees. View "Neal v. Fairfax County Police" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court determining that the Board of County Supervisors of Prince William County, Virginia had the authority to dissolve the corporate status of Dumfries-Triangle Rescue Squad, Inc. (DTRS), holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the Board had the power to dissolve the corporate status of DTRS .The Board filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asserting that the Board had the authority to dissolve DTRS's corporate status under Code 32.1-111.4:7(D). The circuit court determined that DTRS was subject to the corporate dissolution authority of the Board pursuant to section 32.1-111.4:7(D) and appointed a receiver to wind up DTRS's corporate affairs, as requested by the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because DTRS was not incorporated pursuant to section 32.1-111.4:7, the Board could not rely on that authority to dissolve its corporate status; and (2) DTRS was not the type of entity that was subject to dissolution under that section. View "Dumfries-Triangle Rescue Squad v. Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission finding that Claimant suffered a compensable injury to her right shoulder, holding that the court of appeals erred in applying the legal standard for determining whether Claimant suffered a compensable "injury by accident" to her shoulder.Claimant, a math teacher, slipped on a puddle on her classroom floor and fell on her right side. Claimant filed claims for an award of benefits by the Commission, claiming that the fall injured her right shoulder. The Commission ruled that Claimant established a compensable injury by accident to her shoulder. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the court of appeals erred in applying the standard for determining whether Claimant had suffered an injury by accident to her shoulder. View "Alexandria City Public Schools v. Handel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed an order of the State Corporation Commission denying Walmart's petitions filed pursuant to Va. Code 56-577(A)(4) seeking the Commission's permission to combine the electric-energy demand of separate Walmart locations to qualify to buy electricity from sources other than the incumbent public utilities regulated by the Commission, holding that the Commission exercised its delegated discretion in a manner consistent with its statutory authority.On appeal, Walmart conceded that the Commission was given the discretion under section 56-577(A)(4) to grant or deny Walmart's request but that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously and erred as a matter of law in denying its petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission interpreted section 56-577(A)(4) correctly; (2) there was no error in the Commission's fact-finding; and (3) the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Walmart's motion to reconsider. View "Wal-Mart Stores East, LP v. State Corporation Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying a request for declaratory and injunctive relief to bar enforcement of the Franklin County School Board's policy requiring parents to provide a birth certificate and proof of residence in the county for any child who is homeschooled, holding that the policy was contrary to the Homeschool Statute, Va. Code 22.1-254.1.In denying declaratory and injunctive relief the circuit court found that the board's policy was not contrary to the Code, was not ultra vires, and addressed the "valid public policy of ensuring the children monitored by [the Board] are between the ages of five (5) and eighteen (18) and are residents of Franklin County." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board did not have authority to adopt the policy pursuant to section 22.1-78 because that statute only allows school boards to adopt regulations for the supervision of public schools, not home instruction. View "Sosebee v. Franklin County School Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from a decision of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) holding that short-term rentals were not authorized by Fairfax County zoning ordinances, holding that this case was moot.The Ratcliffs owned a home in Fairfax County that they made available as a short-term rental. After the decisions of the BZA and circuit court, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County filed a petition for appeal with the Supreme Court. The Ratcliffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot because they had sold the home. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot because there was no live controversy. The Court then ordered that the circuit court's judgment be vacated, holding that vacatur of the lower court judgment was appropriate. View "Fairfax Board of Supervisors v. Ratcliff" on Justia Law

In this land use case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining a demurrer and dismissing a landowner's appeal from the decision of the city council, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting a motion craving oyer of the legislative record upon which the city council's decision was based and in thereafter sustaining a demurrer.Plaintiff, who owned a house in the historic district of the City of Alexandria, submitted a plan to install a Victorian metal "wicket and spear" fence pierced by two gates. The Board of Architectural Review (BAR) approved a certificate of appropriateness as to the materials and fence design but with the condition that the width of the double gate not exceed six feet. The City Council affirmed the BAR's decision. Plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. In response, the City filed a demurrer and a motion craving oyer of the legislative record that had been before the city council when it made its decision. The court granted the motion craving oyer and then sustained the demurrer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting the motion craving oyer of the legislative record in Plaintiff's appeal or in sustaining the demurrer. View "Byrne v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court upholding the town council's approval of the developers' conditional zoning application, holding that a local government may accept a conditional proffer from a property owner as part of a rezoning application that alters a minimum mixed-use requirement of a zoning district below that specified in the local zoning ordinance.Ten property owners filed an application with the Warrenton Planning Commission to rezone thirty-one acres of land within Warrenton from industrial to industrial planned unit development (I-PUD). The developers' proffer statement included mixed land use percentages that did not comport with the target of the town's zoning ordinance percentages. The town council approved the rezoning. Several residents jointly filed a complaint challenging the approval of the rezoning. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of the town council and the developers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly interpreted the language of the ordinance to be in accord with the authorizing statutes and the definitional section of Va. Code 15.2-2201. View "Rowland v. Town Council of Warrenton" on Justia Law