Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) operated a gas-fired electric general station located in the City of Richmond. The City assessed tax for natural gas consumed at the station. VEPCO challenged the assessments, arguing that it was not subject to the tax. The Tax Commissioner affirmed the City’s decision that VEPCO was subject to the tax. VEPCO appealed, arguing that it was not subject to the tax because its consumption was outside the scope of Va. Code Ann. 58.1-3814(H). The circuit court concluded that VEPCO was not subject to the tax because it consumed natural gas at the station to generate electricity, rather than to furnish heat or light. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its interpretation of section 58.1-3814(H). View "City of Richmond v. Va. Elec. & Power Co." on Justia Law

Andrews, a senior property manager of a public housing complex, challenged the termination of her employment with the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA) through RRHA’s grievance procedure. A hearing officer ordered her reinstatement snf advised that, under the terms of RRHA’s Grievance Policy, “[e]ither party may . . . appeal the decision to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia.” The circuit court reversed that decision as “‘contradictory to law’” under Code 2.2-3006. The Supreme Court of Virginia reinstated the hearing officer’s decision, holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear RRHA’s appeal. Either party may appeal a hearing officer’s decision to a circuit court for review on grounds that it is “contradictory to law,” Code 2.2-3006(B), but no such right is available when the challenge to the decision presents a question whether it is“consistent with policy,” RRHA did not make a prima facie showing for invoking judicial review of the hearing officer’s decision under Code 2.2-3006(B) because the substance of RRHA’s appeal challenged only the hearing officer’s interpretation and application of RRHA’s policies. View "Andrews v. Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Pike underwent complex surgery at Virginia Commonwealth University Medical Center to reconstruct the back of his mouth and was taken, for recovery, to the Surgical Trauma Intensive Care Unit. Unit patients are often in very critical condition and each nurse is responsible for two patients at most. Following a surgery such as Pike’s, it is important to keep the patient’s head stable to enable blood to flow. Pike's doctors did not write any orders specifically governing the position of his head or neck. A surgeon at the hospital testified that he would rely on the skill and expertise of the nurse to position the patient’s head. Five days after the surgery, Pike was found in a position that would cause “venous compromise.” The staff was instructed to avoid this practice. That afternoon, Pike’s physician found Pike again in that position, his face and neck massively swollen. Pike had to undergo further surgery, which was not successful. Pike's malpractice complaint was dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity. Pike argued that Hagaman, a registered nurse, was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, noting that Hagaman’s discretion was cabined by physicians’ orders, that she could not refuse to accept a particular patient, that the hospital “had a high degree of control over Hagaman," who was supervised by senior staff, and that she was subject to hospital policies. The hospital pays her wages and determines her schedule. View "Pike v. Hagaman" on Justia Law

EMAC, LLC filed a declaratory judgment action against the County of Hanover and the Board of Supervisors of the County of Hanover (collectively, Defendants) challenging the Board’s decision to deny EMAC’s application for an extension of a conditional use permit. The circuit court granted Defendants’ demurrer and motion to dismiss, concluding (1) EMAC was required to prove that the existing zoning ordinance was unreasonable as applied to its property and that it failed to allege any facts to satisfy this requirement; and (2) the Board’s decision denying EMAC’s extension request was supported by a rational basis and was fairly debatable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in ruling upon Defendants’ demurrer and motion to dismiss, the court properly interpreted the allegations in the amended complaint and the exhibits attached to it; (2) the circuit court erred in finding that EMAC was required to allege that the existing zoning ordinance was unreasonable as applied to its land in order to state a cause of action; but (3) the circuit court did not err in sustaining the demurrer on the ground that EMAC’s extension request was supported by a rational basis and was fairly debatable. View "EMAC, LLC v. County of Hanover" on Justia Law

Two weeks after Preston McKellar announced that he would be retiring as a structural welder for Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, McKeller was injured during the course of his employment. Two weeks later, McKeller retired as scheduled. McKeller filed a claim against Northrop Grumman seeking medical benefits and temporary total disability compensation. A deputy commissioner with the Virginia Worker’s Compensation Commission awarded medical benefits as well as temporary total disability benefits. The Commission affirmed the award of medical benefits but denied the claim for temporary total disability benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that McKellar’s retirement, rather than his injury, caused his loss of compensation because the record supported the Commission’s finding that McKellar intended to retire and not seek other employment income. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deputy commissioner correctly found that McKeller was entitled to temporary total disability compensation because he was totally disabled and lacked all earning capacity. View "McKellar v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding" on Justia Law

Scott Surovell filed a verified petition for writ of mandamus requesting documents pertaining to various aspects of executions conducted in Virginia from the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) through the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (“VFOIA”). After a hearing, the circuit court ordered VDOC to produce some of the requested documents. VDOC appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in requiring production of the documents at issue, whether in redacted form or in full. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ordering VDOC to produce the requested documents at issue and to redact current and prior execution manuals, holding (1) the circuit court must make a de novo determination of the propriety of withholding the documents at issue to such an extent such disclosure would jeopardize security, but in doing so, the circuit court must accord “substantial weight” to VDOC’s determinations; (2) because the Court was unable to decipher what weight the circuit court afforded VDOC’s expert testimony, the matter must be remanded to the circuit court to apply the standard articulated herein to the facts; and (3) the circuit court erred to the extent it ordered redaction because VDOC is not required to redact exempt documents. View "Dep’t of Corr. v. Surovell" on Justia Law

The State Corporation Commission issued to Virginia Electric and Power Company certificates of public convenience and necessity authorizing the construction of electric transmission facilities. BASF Corporation appealed, challenging the approval of the transmission line’s route across an environmental remediation site on its property along the James River. James City County, Save the James Alliance Trust, and James River Association (collectively, JCC) also appealed, challenging the approval of an overhead transmission line that will cross the James River and a switching station that will be located in James City County. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission did not err in its construction or application of Va. Code 56-46.1’s requirements that the power company reasonably minimize adverse environmental impacts on the area concerned, and the Commission’s findings were not contrary to the evidence or without evidentiary support; and (2) the Commission erred in concluding that the switching station was a “transmission line” under Va. Code 56-46.1(F) and therefore not subject to local zoning ordinances. Remanded as to the JCC appellants. View "BASF Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n" on Justia Law

A county code compliance investigator issued Appellant a notice of violation regarding her property. The county zoning administrator then determined that Appellant had committed a violation. The Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) upheld that violation determination. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari to seek judicial review of the BZA’s final decision. Appellant, however, did not name the Board of Supervisors or any other party. The circuit court granted the zoning administrator’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Appellant failed to add the Board of Supervisors as a party to the proceeding within the thirty-day statutory period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that compliance with the styling requirement in Va. Code 15.2-2314 is required to trigger the circuit court’s active jurisdiction, and no waiver to the thirty-day filing requirement occurred in this case. View "Frace v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Commissioner of Revenue of Arlington County (“County”) audited Nielsen for several of the previous tax years. Determining that Nielsen failed to pay sufficient tax on its business license, the County issued an additional tax assessment on Nielsen for the 2007 tax year. Nielsen appealed. The Virginia Tax Commissioner (“Commissioner”) concluded that the County had used an incorrect methodology in the 2007 tax year assessment and instead permitted a payroll percentage methodology to be used to calculate the deduction to the county tax on Nielsen’s business license. The County and the Commissioner appealed. The circuit court reversed the Commissioner’s decision and reinstated the County’s assessment, concluding that the Commissioner’s methodology for calculating the relevant tax deduction was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious in its application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commissioner’s ruling was not contrary to law or arbitrary and capricious in application. Remanded. View "Nielsen County v. Bd. of Arlington County" on Justia Law

She-Sha Cafe and Hookah Lounge is a hookah bar that serves food in areas where smoking occurs. In 2010, the Montgomery County Health Department charged She-Sha with two violations of the Virginia Indoor Clean Air Act (VICAA), which prohibits smoking in restaurants. The Virginia Department of Health upheld the violations, concluding that She-Sha was correctly labeled as a restaurant and that none of the exceptions in the VICAA applied. The State Health Commissioner and the circuit court upheld the violations. A panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that She-Sha was not exempt from regulation as a “retail tobacco store” because it was not operating exclusively as such. The full Court of Appeals overruled the panel, concluding that She-Sha, as a restaurant, was exempt from VICAA because it was also a retail tobacco store. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that She-Sha was not exempt from regulation under the VICAA because it was not exclusively a retail tobacco store. View "Va. Dep't of Health v. Kepa, Inc." on Justia Law