Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Scott Surovell filed a verified petition for writ of mandamus requesting documents pertaining to various aspects of executions conducted in Virginia from the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) through the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (“VFOIA”). After a hearing, the circuit court ordered VDOC to produce some of the requested documents. VDOC appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in requiring production of the documents at issue, whether in redacted form or in full. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ordering VDOC to produce the requested documents at issue and to redact current and prior execution manuals, holding (1) the circuit court must make a de novo determination of the propriety of withholding the documents at issue to such an extent such disclosure would jeopardize security, but in doing so, the circuit court must accord “substantial weight” to VDOC’s determinations; (2) because the Court was unable to decipher what weight the circuit court afforded VDOC’s expert testimony, the matter must be remanded to the circuit court to apply the standard articulated herein to the facts; and (3) the circuit court erred to the extent it ordered redaction because VDOC is not required to redact exempt documents. View "Dep’t of Corr. v. Surovell" on Justia Law

The State Corporation Commission issued to Virginia Electric and Power Company certificates of public convenience and necessity authorizing the construction of electric transmission facilities. BASF Corporation appealed, challenging the approval of the transmission line’s route across an environmental remediation site on its property along the James River. James City County, Save the James Alliance Trust, and James River Association (collectively, JCC) also appealed, challenging the approval of an overhead transmission line that will cross the James River and a switching station that will be located in James City County. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission did not err in its construction or application of Va. Code 56-46.1’s requirements that the power company reasonably minimize adverse environmental impacts on the area concerned, and the Commission’s findings were not contrary to the evidence or without evidentiary support; and (2) the Commission erred in concluding that the switching station was a “transmission line” under Va. Code 56-46.1(F) and therefore not subject to local zoning ordinances. Remanded as to the JCC appellants. View "BASF Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n" on Justia Law

A county code compliance investigator issued Appellant a notice of violation regarding her property. The county zoning administrator then determined that Appellant had committed a violation. The Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) upheld that violation determination. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari to seek judicial review of the BZA’s final decision. Appellant, however, did not name the Board of Supervisors or any other party. The circuit court granted the zoning administrator’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Appellant failed to add the Board of Supervisors as a party to the proceeding within the thirty-day statutory period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that compliance with the styling requirement in Va. Code 15.2-2314 is required to trigger the circuit court’s active jurisdiction, and no waiver to the thirty-day filing requirement occurred in this case. View "Frace v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Commissioner of Revenue of Arlington County (“County”) audited Nielsen for several of the previous tax years. Determining that Nielsen failed to pay sufficient tax on its business license, the County issued an additional tax assessment on Nielsen for the 2007 tax year. Nielsen appealed. The Virginia Tax Commissioner (“Commissioner”) concluded that the County had used an incorrect methodology in the 2007 tax year assessment and instead permitted a payroll percentage methodology to be used to calculate the deduction to the county tax on Nielsen’s business license. The County and the Commissioner appealed. The circuit court reversed the Commissioner’s decision and reinstated the County’s assessment, concluding that the Commissioner’s methodology for calculating the relevant tax deduction was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious in its application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commissioner’s ruling was not contrary to law or arbitrary and capricious in application. Remanded. View "Nielsen County v. Bd. of Arlington County" on Justia Law

She-Sha Cafe and Hookah Lounge is a hookah bar that serves food in areas where smoking occurs. In 2010, the Montgomery County Health Department charged She-Sha with two violations of the Virginia Indoor Clean Air Act (VICAA), which prohibits smoking in restaurants. The Virginia Department of Health upheld the violations, concluding that She-Sha was correctly labeled as a restaurant and that none of the exceptions in the VICAA applied. The State Health Commissioner and the circuit court upheld the violations. A panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that She-Sha was not exempt from regulation as a “retail tobacco store” because it was not operating exclusively as such. The full Court of Appeals overruled the panel, concluding that She-Sha, as a restaurant, was exempt from VICAA because it was also a retail tobacco store. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that She-Sha was not exempt from regulation under the VICAA because it was not exclusively a retail tobacco store. View "Va. Dep't of Health v. Kepa, Inc." on Justia Law

O. Ryland Tate, who was employed as a firefighter for the City of Danville, suffered a heart attack, did not return to work, and retired six months later. The City gave Tate the equivalent of his full wages in the form of sick leave pay. After his retirement, Tate used the balance of his accrued sick leave to obtain credit towards his retirement. The City subsequently paid indemnity benefits to Tate for his six-month period of disability pursuant to a Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission award. The City then filed this action against Tate seeking recovery of his sick leave pay, arguing that Tate was not entitled to receive both sick leave pay and workers’ compensation indemnity benefits for the same disability period. The circuit court dismissed the City’s complaint, concluding that the court did not have jurisdiction to decide the City’s claim because the City did not ask the Commission for a credit against the workers’ compensation award for the amounts the City paid Tate for sick leave. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City did not have the authority to recover sick leave pay from Tate on the basis that he had also received workers’ compensation for the same disability period. View "City of Danville v. Tate" on Justia Law

The Fairfax County School Board suspended Plaintiff, a food and nutrition services manager at Twain Middle School, without pay for three days for allegedly violating Fairfax County Public Schools regulations. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Va. Code 22.1-315(A) requires school boards to conduct a hearing prior to suspending an employee without pay. The circuit court granted the school board’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the statute does not require a school board to hold a hearing prior to suspending a non-teaching employee without pay for fewer than five days. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its interpretation of the statute. View "Payne v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Mother and Father (“Parents”) were the parents of twin girls. Mother was a member of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation (“Tribe”), Father was not a member of any tribe, and the children were either members of, or eligible to be members of, the Tribe. The Dinwiddie Department of Social Services (DDSS) filed petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (“J&DR court”) denied the petitions. The DDSS appealed. The Tribe and Parents sought to transfer the case to tribal court. The trial court held that good cause existed not to transfer the proceeding to tribal court and denied the motion to transfer. The court then terminated Parents’ parental rights. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision on the motion to transfer, vacated the award terminating Parents' parental rights, and remanded. In so doing, the court rejected the traditional “best interests of the child” test in favor of a more limited test involving a substantial risk of harm to a child arising from the transfer to a tribal court. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded in light of the standards articulated by the court of appeals in Thompson v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Family Servs. View "Dinwiddie Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Nunnally" on Justia Law

In 2012, Dominion Virginia Power filed an application with the State Corporation Commission seeking approval of a power station and transmission interconnection facilities associated with the generation plant. Dominion’s application also sought approval of a rate adjustment clause (RAC) to recover the costs of the power station and the associated transmission infrastructure. As part of the RAC, Dominion sought an enhancement on its general rate of return on common equity (ROE) for a certain period and proposed applying the enhanced ROE to the costs of the power station and associated transmission infrastructure. The Commission approved the power station and associated transmission infrastructure and allowed Dominion to recover an enhanced ROE for the transmission infrastructure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission properly interpreted Va. Code 56-585.1(A)(6) to allow Dominion to recover an enhanced ROE for the transmission infrastructure associated with the power station and included in the subsection (A)(6) RAC for that facility. View "Attorney Gen. v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Chincoteague Inn constructed a floating platform secured alongside its building to be used as part of the Inn’s restaurant. The platform was situated partially over state-owned submerged lands. In an enforcement action, the Virginia Marine Resources Commission directed removal of a portion of the platform. The circuit court set aside the Commission’s decision and dismissed with prejudice the Commission’s enforcement action, finding that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to require removal of the floating platform. A panel of the court of appeals reversed, holding that under the facts of this case, federal maritime law did not preempt the Commission’s authority to order the removal of the floating platform over state-owned submerged lands. The court of appeals then granted the Inn’s petition for a rehearing en banc, vacated the panel opinion, and affirmed the circuit court’s determination that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over the floating platform. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in interpreting the scope of the Commission’s authority under Va. Code Ann. 28.2-1203(A); and (2) because the court of appeals’ en banc opinion did not address the issue of federal preemption, that issue remained outstanding. Remanded. View "Va. Marine Res. Comm’n v. Chincoteague Inn" on Justia Law