Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants, alleging claims for tortious interference with a contract, tortious interference with business expectancy, and business conspiracy. The district court (1) dismissed the business conspiracy claim for failure to allege an unlawful act or purpose, and (2) dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining two tort claims as barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Va. Code Ann. 8.01-248, thus rejecting Plaintiff’s contention that his tortious interference claims constituted an injury to his property, which would be subject to a five-year statute of limitations under Va. Code Ann. 8.01-243(B). Plaintiff appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fourth Circuit entered an order of certification requesting the Virginia Supreme Court to answer two questions of law. The Supreme Court answered by holding (1) causes of action for tortious interference with a contract and tortious interference with business expectancy qualify as the requisite unlawful act to proceed on a business conspiracy claim under Va. Code Ann. 18.2-499 and -500; and (2) the five-year statute of limitations in section 8.01-243(B) applies to claims of tortious interference with a contract and tortious interference with business expectancy because both claims involve injury to property rights. View "Dunlap v. Cottman Transmissions Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Victoria Coalson and Michael Stemke (together, Plaintiffs) were injured in an accident caused by Victor Canchola, who was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs each filed lawsuits against Canchola. A jury awarded Coalson $5,600 in compensatory damages and Stemke $14,000 in compensatory damages against Canchola. Plaintiffs were each awarded $100,000 each in punitive damages. Canchola filed a motion for remittitur of both punitive damages awards, arguing that the awards were excessive under Virginia law and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The circuit court concluded that Coalson’s award was arbitrarily made and remitted Coalson’s punitive damages to $50,000. Coalson appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury verdict awarding Coalson $100,000 in punitive damages, holding that the circuit court erred in granting Canchola’s motion for remittitur because Coalson’s punitive damages award was not excessive under Virginia law, nor did it offend Canchola’s due process rights. View "Coalson v. Canchola" on Justia Law

The Byrd Theatre Foundation, a non-profit corporation, owned the Byrd Theatre, a historic landmark that housed a Wurlitzer theater pipe organ installed in 1928. David Barnett was injured when he was performing repairs to the organ and a wooden plank he stepped on gave way, causing him to fall four feet. Barnett sued the Foundation. Prior to trial, the Foundation filed a plea of charitable immunity, asserting that Barnett was a beneficiary of the Foundation at the time of his accident. The circuit court concluded that Barnett was not the Foundation’s beneficiary at the time of his accident. After a trial, the jury rendered a verdict against the Foundation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the Foundation’s plea of charitable immunity, as Barnett was not in a “beneficial relationship” with the charity for purposes of charitable immunity. View "Byrd Theatre Found. v. Barnett" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an assistant principal, filed an action against a local newspaper and and the author of the article at issue in this case, alleging libel, libel per se, and libel per quod, asserting that the article published by the newspaper damaged his reputation by falsely implying that he had “engaged in unethical conduct by obtaining preferential treatment for his son.” Defendants filed a demurrer denying that the article created such an implication. The circuit court overruled the demurrer. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. Thereafter, the circuit court granted Defendants’ motions to strike, entered a defense verdict, and dismissed the action with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as a matter of law, the article was not reasonably capable of the defamatory meaning Plaintiff ascribed to it; and (2) accordingly, the circuit court erred by overruling Defendants’ demurrer, but the error was supplanted by the court’s final judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Webb v. Virginian-Pilot Media Cos., LLC" on Justia Law

Landowner filed a complaint against Western Virginia Water Authority (the Authority) after the Authority’s sewer line burst on his property and caused extensive damage, including the collapse of a ten-foot high retaining wall running along the rear of the property. The Authority filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that operating and maintaining the sewer line was a governmental function and, therefore, the doctrine of sovereign immunity precluded liability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in holding that the Authority was entitled to sovereign immunity because the maintenance and operation of the sanitary sewer system was a proprietary function. Remanded. View "Robertson v. W. Va. Water Auth." on Justia Law

Dr. Smith, a trauma surgeon, and Dr. Cashion, an anesthesiologist, provided emergency care to a critically injured patient. After the patient died during the surgery, Smith, in the presence of other medical personnel, criticized Cashion and repeatedly stated that Cashion "euthanized" the patient. Cashion filed an action against Smith and Smith's employer (collectively, Defendants) for defamation. The circuit court (1) sustained Defendants' demurrers and pleas in bar as to the non-euthanasia statements, ruling that they were non-actionable expressions of opinion; and (2) granted summary judgment to Defendants on the euthanasia statements, concluding that the qualified privilege applied to Smith's statements. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's rulings that Smith's statements enjoyed a qualified privilege; but (2) reversed the circuit court's ruling that Smith's non-euthanasia statements were non-actionable expressions of opinion. Remanded. View "Cashion v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are the estranged great grandchildren of Elsie and legatees to one half of her residuary estate under a will dated 2004 and admitted to probate following Elsie's death in 2010. The defendants are Audrey, Elsie's sister and legatee to the remaining half of her residuary estate, and Elsie’s former neighbors, Toni, Bruce, and Mike. Elsie's will nominated Toni as executrix; Toni and Audrey took possession of significant assets from Elsie during Elsie’s life. Toni and Bruce began providing assistance to Elsie and her husband in 2004 under a contract providing that Toni and Bruce would be paid $500 per week and would receive $8000 for assistance given in the past. The agreement provided that Toni and Bruce would be paid from her estate, rather than during her lifetime. The trial court found that that Toni, while acting as an agent under the power of attorney, did not arrange for Elsie’s assets to pass at death to the defendant, that the assets in question were retitled by Elsie personally. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Toni was in a confidential relationship with Elsie and the burden was on the defendants to rebut the presumption that the transactions were the result of undue influence. View "Ayers v. Shaffer" on Justia Law

Steven Funkhouser's three-year-old twins were playing in their parents' 2001 Ford Windstar when a fire erupted in the passenger compartment of the van. One of the twins died as a result of third-degree burns she received. Funkhouser, as administrator of his daughter's estate, brought a products liability action against For Motor Company and Obaugh Ford (collectively, Ford). Funkhouser sought to introduce evidence of seven other Ford Windstar fires that occurred prior to the Funkhouser fire that were parked and not in operation. The court excluded the evidence and ruled that Funkhouser's expert witnesses could not rely on the excluded evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because none of the seven prior fires were the same or substantially similar to the Funkhouser fire, the evidence was properly excluded for failing the substantial similarity test; and (2) an expert cannot offer opinion testimony based on evidence that fails the substantial similarity test, and accordingly, the trial court did not err in precluding Funkhouser's experts from relying on the evidence of the seven other Windstar fires as a basis for their opinions. View "Funkhouser v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

James Lokey passed away due to complications related to mesothelioma. Lokey had served as a state trooper, where his duties included observing vehicle inspections wherein mechanics used compressed air to blow out brake debris to allow for visual inspection of the brakes. Walter Boomer, the administrator of Lokey's estate, filed wrongful death actions against Honeywell International, Inc., the successor-in-interest to Bendix, and Ford Motor Company, alleging that Lokey's mesothelioma was a result of exposure to asbestos in dust from Bendix brakes installed in Ford and other vehicles. After a jury trial, the trial court found in favor of the estate as to negligence and awarded damages in the amount of $282,685. Ford and Honeywell appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to causation; and (2) there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Defendants' failure to warn was the proximate cause of Lokey's mesothelioma. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer" on Justia Law

Rubert Minton suffered injuries as a result of developing mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos while working on Exxon Mobile Corporation (Exxon) ships during his employment at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company (Shipyard). Minton filed suit against Exxon under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for failure to warn Minton of, and protect him from, the dangers associated with asbestos. The jury found in favor of Minton and awarded him compensatory damages, medical expenses, and punitive damages. Exxon appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court erred in refusing to admit relevant evidence regarding the Shipyard's knowledge of the danger of asbestos exposure and its ability to remedy the danger; and (2) the award of $12,500,000 in punitive damages was inappropriately granted because punitive damages are a remedy prohibited by the terms of LHWCA. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Minton" on Justia Law