Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An employee of the general contractor on a construction site was allegedly injured by the negligent act of the employee of a subcontractor who carried no workers' compensation insurance. Plaintiff, the injured party, brought a common-law action against Defendants, the uninsured subcontractor and its employee, the alleged tortfeasor. The Defendants filed a plea in bar, asserting that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act was Plaintiff's sole remedy. The circuit court held that Defendants' failure to carry workers' compensation insurance deprived them of the protections afforded by the Act because they were not participants in the statutory workers' compensation system. The court denied the plea in bar, permitting the action to go forward, but certified the case for an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from and entered final judgment dismissing the case, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendants' plea in bar because Defendants were entitled to the exclusivity protection provided by the Act notwithstanding their lack of workers' compensation insurance. View "David White Crane Serv. v. Howell" on Justia Law

Kivalina, a native community located on an Alaskan barrier island, filed a lawsuit (Complaint) in a California district court against The AES Corporation, a Virginia-based energy company, and numerous other defendants for allegedly damaging the community by causing global warming through emission of greenhouse gases. Steadfast Insurance, which provided commercial general liability (CGL) to AES, provided AES a defense under a reservation of rights. Later AES filed a declaratory judgment action, claiming it did not owe AES a defense or indemnity coverage in the underlying suit. The circuit court granted Steadfast's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Complaint did not allege an "occurrence" as that term was defined in AES's contracts of insurance with Steadfast, and that Steadfast, therefore, did not owe AES a defense or liability coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kivalina did not allege that its property damage was the result of a fortuitous event or accident, but rather that its damages were the natural and probable consequence of AES's intentional actions, and such loss was not covered under the relevant CGL policies. View "AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Barabara Rutter filed a wrongful death action in June 2000 against Oakwood, a living center, Prism Rehab, a company providing physical therapy services, and the president and employee of Prism Rehab. Dixon and Prism Rehab filed a notice of bankruptcy stay, and in October 2000 the circuit court entered a bankruptcy stay order. At issue was whether the order dismissed the action or only removed the action from the circuit court's docket. Oakwood argued the order served to discontinue Rutter's action in October 2003 pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-335(B) because, as of that date, the action had been inactive for three years. The circuit court entered an order in 2009 stating that because Rutter had not re-filed her action before 2003, the case was dismissed. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the statute does not allow the prospective discontinuance of an action and that the 2000 order merely removed Rutter's action from the docket. However, because the 2009 order only adjudicated Rutter's claim against Oakwood, that order was not final for purposes of the appeal. The Court held it had no jurisdiction over the appeal, and dismissed the case without prejudice. View "Rutter v. Oakwood Living Centers" on Justia Law

In 2005, Southwest Emergency Physicians, Inc. (SWEP) and Alldredge entered into a contract under which SWEP's physician-employees staffed Lewis-Gale's emergency department. The contract provided that it could be terminated by either party without cause. In 2008, Alldredge became involved with some signatories to a letter addressed to the Lewis-Gale administration voicing work-related concerns. Certain Lewis-Gale administrators expressed concern that Alldredge had become involved in the hospital's personnel matters, and SWEP later terminated Alldredge's employment. Alldredge sued Lewis-Gale for tortious interference with her employment contract with SWEP, and the circuit court found in favor of Alldredge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the administrators' statements of intimidation and animus toward Allredge did not rise as a matter of law to the level of "improper methods"- such as fraud, deceit, or defamation - necessary to establish a cause of action for tortious interference with contract expectancy when a contract is terminable at will. View "Lewis-Gale Medical Center v. Alldredge" on Justia Law

In 2004, Campbell was involved in a motor vehicle collision with Kocher. In 2005, Campbell filed for bankruptcy and received a notice of discharge a year later. In 2006, Campbell filed two personal injury actions against Kocher and took nonsuits on both of them. In 2008, Campbell filed his third complaint on the same cause of action. Earlier in 2008 the bankruptcy court reopened Campbell's bankruptcy case, and in the proceeding Campbell listed the personal injury claim as an asset and claimed it as exempt property. In 2009 the court held the cause of action to be exempt. During trial for the personal injury action, Kocher filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting lack of standing and the statute of limitations. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed, holding that (1) Campbell's cause of action became a part of the bankruptcy estate in 2005 and remained an asset of the estate until it was exempted in 2009, and therefore all three complaints were filed when Campbell lacked standing; and (2) because the complaints were legal nullities, they had no tolling effect on the two-year statute of limitation. View "Kocher v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In December, 2002, Appellee Alyssa Chalifoux saw her family physician after experiencing headaches and other symptoms on the right side of her face. The doctor referred Appellee for an MRI with Appellant Radiology Associates of Richmond. Between 2002 and 2005, Appellee received an MRI approximately every six months, and each time, the reviewing radiologist reported no abnormalities. On her last MRI in October, 2005, the radiologist detected an abnormality in Appellee's right sinus. In his report, the radiologist commented that the abnormality "probably ha[d] been the cause of the patient's clinical symptoms and in retrospect is visible on the previous exams dating to [December, 2002]." Appellee filed suit, alleging that Appellants negligently read and interpreted various radiological studies that would have shown the tumor in her sinus as early as December, 2002. In their answer to the complaint, Appellants asserted that the suit was time-barred by the statute of limitations, and and that the "continuing treatment rule" does not apply because the care she received was episodic. The parties produced competing experts; the court sustained Appellant's plea of the statute of limitations, denied Appellee's motion for reconsideration, and dismissed the case. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that Appellee's treatment over the course of three years created a physician-patient relationship to defeat the assertion that the repeated visits were episodic. The Court held that the circuit court erred by ruling that the statue of limitations had run, and for not applying the continuing treatment rule to Appellee's case. The Court reversed the lower court's dismissal and remanded it for further proceedings.

On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the circuit court erred in its interpretation of a management agreement between Condominium Services, Inc. (CSI) and First Owners' Association of Forty Six Hundred Condominium, Inc. (FOA). FOA filed a complaint alleging CSI breached the terms of the management agreement and had wrongfully converted FOA's funds. CSI filed a counterclaim and amended counterclaim for breach of contract. The circuit court sustained FOA's demurrers to the counterclaim and amended counterclaim. FOA's claims proceeded to a jury trial; the jury returned a verdict in favor of FOA on both its claims . CSI sought to strike the jury verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court denied the motion and CSI appealed. On review, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's holding and affirmed the judgment in favor of FOA.

Dunn, McCormack & MacPherson (Dunn), a Virginia law firm, served as legal counsel to the Fairfax County Redevelopment and Housing Authority for thirty years. Dunn worked for the Authority on an at-will contract for legal representation, which was terminated in September, 2005. Dunn filed a complaint against the County Board of Supervisors, alleging that the Chairman of the Board tortiously interfered with Dunn's contract with the Authority. The circuit court sustained the Board's demurrer, holding that Dunn's complaint failed to state sufficient facts to support a cause of action for intentional interference with a contract. Dunn amended its complaint, but ultimately failed to convince the court to rule in its favor. On appeal, the Supreme Court found the record clearly demonstrated that the circuit court sustained the County's demurrer for failing to "adequately state a prima facie cause of action" and affirmed the lower court's decision.

Appellant John Gordon suffered a compensible injury by accident while working at Appellee Ford Motor Company's production plant in 2000. Based on this injury, the Workers' Compensation Commission entered a series of awards of compensation to Appellant for various periods of temporary total and temporary partial disability. The last of these awards was in 2003 for temporary partial disability. In 2006, Appellant was temporarily laid off from his position at Ford because the plant was shut down. Appellant filed a change-in-condition application seeking temporary total disability benefits based on lost wages caused by the plant shut down. Ford defended against the 2006 application for benefits, by arguing that the twenty-four month tolling provision in Code §65.2-708 (C) could be triggered only once, when Appellant returned to work in a light duty position in 2000. The commission rejected Ford's argument and awarded Appellant the benefits he requested. On appeal, the full commission held that Appellant's change-in-condition was time barred based on the tolling provision in the code. A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the commission; Ford moved for a hearing en banc, and the court again reversed the commission. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the tolling provision runs anew under each successive award of compensation for a particular compensable injury, and is triggered on the last day for which compensation was paid. "Consequently. . . the statute of limitations was tolled through April 20, 2005 and that [Appellant's] change-in-condition application. . . was not time-barred under the statute."

While sitting in the driver's seat of his parked truck talking with a customer on his cell phone, Appellee Michael Lewis was approached by a ten-year-old child and asked for a ride home. Appellee did not know the child, but offered to give him a ride. As the child got into the truck, Cedrick Williams, who knew neither the child nor Appellee, came from him home and approached the truck, yelling for the child to get out of the truck. Williams called 911, reporting that he witnessed an attempted abduction. Appellant Officer Brian Kei obtained an arrest warrant for Appellee based solely on the report by Williams. Appellee was held for 41 days in jail. After the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney spoke with the child and verified Appellee's version of the incident, charges against Appellee were dropped nolle prosequi. On petition, the circuit court expunged the record of Appellee's arrest, but the police website, as well as several news station websites still reported the incident, quoting arresting officer Kei with statements that proved to be unfounded. Appellee brought suit alleging malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and defamation against Kei; the court entered an order sustaining a demurrer to all claims against Kei. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of the demurrer on all counts except defamation, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim.