Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jennifer Ploutis’ home was insured under a policy issued by Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company when water pipes in the home burst, damaging the home and certain contents. When the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the cost of certain repairs, Ploutis filed a complaint for breach of contract against Allstate. Upon the request of Ploutis, the action was nonsuited. Well after two years after the damage was sustained, Ploutis filed the present action. Allstate filed a demurrer asserting that Ploutis failed to comply with the conditions precedent under the policy by bringing the action within two years “after the inception of loss or damage.” The circuit court overruled the demurrer, concluding that the limitations period was tolled pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-229(E)(3), which tolls the “statute of limitations” with respect to nonsuited actions. Judgment was entered in favor of Ploutis. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and entered final judgment for Allstate, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that section 8.01-229(E)(3) applies to the contractual period of limitations for filing an action under Allstate’s policy. View "Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ploutis" on Justia Law

Draper Paving, the subcontractor for a road project, employed Richard Slone as a dump truck driver and assigned him to work on the project. Slone died from injuries he received in an accident while working on the project. At the time of the accident, Draper Paving had taken out a motor vehicle insurance policy with Selective Insurance Company of America. Karen Slone Bratton and Selective Insurance filed separate declaratory judgment actions seeking to determine whether Slone fell within the scope of the Selective Insurance policy’s coverage. The circuit court concluded that Bratton was not entitled to insurance proceeds from Selective Insurance because Slone did not fall within the scope of the policy at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Slone was occupying both a dump truck and company pickup truck - both covered autos - at the time of the accident under the Selective Insurance policy. Because the policy’s coverage limit for each covered auto applied independently to multiple covered autos involved in the same accident, Bratton was entitled to proceeds under the Selective Insurance policy for both the dump truck and the company pickup truck. Remanded. View "Bratton v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Vu Vo filed a lawsuit against Christopher Bartolomucci seeking damages for injuries he sustained in a vehicle collision. Bartolomucci filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish that his vehicle he was driving at the time of the collision fell within the scope of the Federal Insurance Company’s insurance policy issued to Bartolomucci’s law firm. The circuit court allowed Bartolomucci’s suit to continue on the theory that he was covered by the policy. After a jury trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Federal Insurance, holding that the policy did not cover Bartolomucci’s use of the vehicle at the time of the collision. At issue on appeal was the scope and application of the policy, which provided coverage for Bartolomucci’s vehicle only when that vehicle was “used in” the law firm’s business or personal affairs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the policy did not cover Bartolomucci’s use of the vehicle at the time of the collision because a morning commute by a law firm partner from home to work does not constitute “use” of the partner’s vehicle “in” a law firm’s business or personal affairs. View "Bartolomucci v. Federal Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Doctors Company (TDC), a professional liability insurance company, sought a determination that its coverage of policyholder Women's Healthcare Associates (WHA) did not apply to a pending breach of contract action relating to WHA's participation in the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (the Birth Injury Fund). The Davidson family filed the underlying breach of contract action against WHA, alleging that they entered into an express contract with WHA partly in reliance on WHA's participation in the Birth Injury Fund, and WHA materially breached the contract by failing to pay into the fund as represented to the Davidsons. The circuit court ruled against TDC and in favor of WHA and the Davidsons, finding that the policy covered the claim alleged by the Davidsons in their complaint against WHA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the underlying action was covered by the insurance policy; and (2) therefore, TDC must both defend and indemnify WHA in the underling breach of contract action. View "The Doctors Co. v. Women's Healthcare Assocs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought coverage under his homeowners' insurance policy issued by Insurer for damages allegedly caused by sheets of drywall manufactured in China that were installed in his home during its construction. Insurer denied Plaintiff's claim and brought an action in the U.S. district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff's homeowners policy did not provide coverage for such losses. The district court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the policy did not provide coverage for the damages allegedly caused by the drywall because of certain policy exclusions. The U.S. court of appeals certified to the Virginia Supreme Court the question of whether the policy exclusions were applicable to Plaintiff's claimed losses. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that the policy unambiguously excluded from coverage damage caused by the Chinese drywall installed in Plaintiff's residence. View "TravCo Insurance Co. v. Ward" on Justia Law

In this appeal the Supreme Court determined that the circuit court erred in extending summary judgment entered against a defendant motorist to likewise bind the underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance carrier. The Court reversed, holding that despite the UIM carrier's reliance on the defendant and her liability insurer to mount a defense, the UIM insurance carrier retained its own right to defendant in the event that the interests of the UIM insurance carrier and the defendant or her liability insurer diverged, and the circuit court erred in determining otherwise. Remanded to allow the UIM carrier to present a defense. View "Transp. Ins. Co. v. Womack" on Justia Law

PBM Nutritionals filed a declaratory judgment action against three insurance companies (collectively the Insurers) seeking insurance coverage for its loss resulting from infiltration of filter elements into the infant formula it manufactured between January 22 and January 30, 2009. The Insurers claimed that the insurance policies' "Pollution Exclusion Endorsements" excluded coverage for PBM's infant formula loss because the formula was "contaminated." The circuit court entered judgment for the Insurers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did no err in finding that the Insurers were not liable to provide insurance coverage for PBM's loss of infant formula product. View "PBM Nutritionals, LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

On May 21, 2008, Lisa Laws and Carmen Tinker (Plaintiffs) each filed a complaint against Calvin McIlroy, Jr. (McIlroy) and Calvin McIlroy, Sr. for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on June 8, 2007. GEICO and State Farm, the potential uninsured/underinsured motorist carriers were served with a copy of Laws' complaint, and State Farm was served with a copy of Tinker's complaint. Plaintiffs then filed orders of nonsuit. Plaintiffs filed second, identical lawsuits in the circuit court on January 19, 2010 before the nonsuit orders were entered by the court on February 4, 2010. McIlroy filed motions to dismiss the complaints, arguing that both cases were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Additionally, GEICO filed a plea in bar and State Farm filed a motion to dismiss, raising the same arguments made by McIlroy in his motions. The circuit court dismissed the actions with prejudice, concluding that Plaintiffs' complaints were not timely filed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it granted the motions to dismiss and the plea in bar, as the court erroneously interpreted the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. View "Laws v. McIlroy" on Justia Law

Mary Arnold, who was injured in an automobile collision, brought a negligence action against the other driver, Jonathan Wallace, who was uninsured. Travelers Insurance Company, Arnold's carrier, defended the suit pursuant to its uninsured motorist coverage. The jury awarded a verdict for Arnold in the amount of $9,134. Arnold appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in admitting medical records under the business records exception, as there was established a sufficient foundation for the admission of the evidence; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in finding an expert physician qualified to testify when her partner previously had been retained by the opposing counsel. View "Arnold v. Wallace" on Justia Law

The AES Corporation paid premiums to Steadfast Insurance Company for commercial general liability (CGL) policies. In February 2008, the village and city of Kivalina, a community located on an Alaskan barrier island, filed a lawsuit (the Complaint) in the U.S. district court against AES and other defendants for allegedly damaging the village by causing global warming through emission of greenhouse gases. Steadfast provided AES a defense under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment action, claiming that it did not owe AES a defense or indemnity regarding the Complaint. The circuit court granted Steadfast's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Complaint did not allege property damage caused by an "occurrence" as that term was defined in AES's contracts of insurance with Steadfast. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kivalina did not allege that its property damage was the result of a fortuitous event or accident, and therefore, such a loss was not covered under the relevant CGL policies. View "AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co." on Justia Law