Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

During the course of his employment as a police officer for the Town of Abingdon, Kevin Christy suffered injuries from an automobile accident. Christy was insured under an automobile liability insurance policy issued by Mercury Casualty Company (Mercury). Christy submitted a claim to Mercury for payment of the portion of his medical expenses not paid by the Town's workers' compensation carrier. Mercury denied the claim, asserting that an exclusion in the policy barred Christy from receiving any payment for medical expenses because a portion of those expenses had been paid by workers' compensation benefits. Christy filed a warrant in debt against Mercury seeking contract damages. The district court entered judgment in favor of Christy. The circuit court reversed, concluding that, based on the unambiguous language of the exclusion, payment of workers' compensation triggered the exclusion and precluded payment by Mercury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of the exclusion was clear and that the exclusion permitted Mercury to deny coverage for any expenses that would have been subject to workers' compensation coverage without regard to whether all of those expenses were actually paid by the workers' compensation carrier. View "Christy v. Mercury Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer's sheep and wool business, Cestari. Employer failed to maintain workers' compensation insurance for Cestari. Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer and Cestari, as well as a complaint against Employer and Cestari, seeking damages for negligence. The workers' compensation commissioner determined that Employee was entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Finding that Employee had pursued his workers' compensation claim to a final order and that he had a remedy for collection of his workers' compensation award against Cestari and/or the Uninsured Employers' Fund, the circuit court dismissed Employee's civil complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employee had received the recovery he sought under the Workers' Compensation Act, and thus, the circuit court did not err in ruling that Employee could not pursue an action at law against Employer after obtaining a final collectible award of workers' compensation benefits. View "Redifer v. Chester" on Justia Law

Judy Maretta, as the named beneficiary of a Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) policy, received FEGLI benefits upon the death of her ex-husband. Jacqueline Hillman, the widow of the deceased, filed an action against Maretta, claiming that pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 20-111.1(D), Maretta was liable to her for the death benefits received. Maretta claimed that the state law was preempted by 5 U.S.C. 8705 and 8705 because the state statutes granted FEGLI benefits to someone other than the named beneficiary in violation of FEGLIA's terms. The circuit court concluded that section 20-111.1(D) was not preempted by FEGLIA and entered judgment against Maretta. The Supreme Court reversed and entered judgment for Maretta, holding that because Congress intended for FEGLI benefits to be paid and to belong to a designated beneficiary, FEGLIA preempts section 20-111.1(D). View "Maretta v. Hillman" on Justia Law

An employee of the general contractor on a construction site was allegedly injured by the negligent act of the employee of a subcontractor who carried no workers' compensation insurance. Plaintiff, the injured party, brought a common-law action against Defendants, the uninsured subcontractor and its employee, the alleged tortfeasor. The Defendants filed a plea in bar, asserting that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act was Plaintiff's sole remedy. The circuit court held that Defendants' failure to carry workers' compensation insurance deprived them of the protections afforded by the Act because they were not participants in the statutory workers' compensation system. The court denied the plea in bar, permitting the action to go forward, but certified the case for an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from and entered final judgment dismissing the case, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendants' plea in bar because Defendants were entitled to the exclusivity protection provided by the Act notwithstanding their lack of workers' compensation insurance. View "David White Crane Serv. v. Howell" on Justia Law

Kivalina, a native community located on an Alaskan barrier island, filed a lawsuit (Complaint) in a California district court against The AES Corporation, a Virginia-based energy company, and numerous other defendants for allegedly damaging the community by causing global warming through emission of greenhouse gases. Steadfast Insurance, which provided commercial general liability (CGL) to AES, provided AES a defense under a reservation of rights. Later AES filed a declaratory judgment action, claiming it did not owe AES a defense or indemnity coverage in the underlying suit. The circuit court granted Steadfast's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Complaint did not allege an "occurrence" as that term was defined in AES's contracts of insurance with Steadfast, and that Steadfast, therefore, did not owe AES a defense or liability coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kivalina did not allege that its property damage was the result of a fortuitous event or accident, but rather that its damages were the natural and probable consequence of AES's intentional actions, and such loss was not covered under the relevant CGL policies. View "AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2002, Pauline Dabney was attacked by two pit bull dogs owned by Elease Otey, who had recently died. Otey held an insurance policy issued by Augusta Mutual Insurance Company that contained a condition requiring the insured to give written notice of an accident "as soon as is practical." In 2003, Dabney filed a personal injury action against the administrator of Otey's estate. Although a letter was sent to Augusta in 2004 notifying the insurance company of Dabney's lawsuit, Augusta did not receive it. The circuit court held in favor of Augusta, ruling as a matter of law that Augusta did not receive notice of Dabney's claim before 2005, and therefore notice of the accident and claim was untimely under the terms of the policy. The Supreme Court held that (1) the circuit court did not err in barring the jury from considering whether Augusta discovered the claim in early 2005 when Dabney's amended complaint only alleged that the insurer discovered the claim in 2004; and (2) given the extenuating circumstances in this case, whether the notice was timely was a question of fact upon which reasonable minds could disagree. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Dabney v. Augusta Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Bataa Baasanjav rented an automobile from Appellant Enterprise Leasing Company (Enterprise). Baasanjav declined to purchase supplemental liability insurance for the rental. The lease agreement contained an indemnification provision in which the renter would have financial responsibility to Enterprise for any losses associated with the rental. Baasanjav was insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by Appellee Farmers Insurance for his own automobile. The Farmers policy would pay for "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay. . .because of injury to or destruction of property. . .arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the owned vehicle." Under the terms of the policy, "owned vehicle" included the rental. Baasanjav was involved in an accident with another driver while driving the Enterprise rental. The parties stipulated Baasanjav was liable for damages to the other driver's car; Enterprise paid the damages to the other driver. Enterprise sought indemnification from Baasanjav; Baasanjav refused. Farmers filed a complaint for declaratory relief asking the court to determine whether Enterprise had a right to recover from Farmers or Bassanjav or both, under the terms of the Farmers policy and the Enterprise lease agreement. The circuit court ruled that Farmers is liable to Enterprise for the amount paid to the other driver; Farmers appealed. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

In 1999, Thomas Laffey was injured when his car was hit by a car owned by Sharon Bass. Sharon's daughter Krystal was the car's primary user; Steven Parent was driving the car at the time of the accident. Sharon had a family automobile insurance policy issued by Appellee Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), which listed the car. The policy insured Sharon, or any resident in her household, or any other person using the car with permission of the named insured, provided his actual use of the car was within the scope of such permission. Steven's mother Annie also had an automobile insurance policy with GEICO. Annie's policy covered bodily injury for those it insured while they operated a car owned by another. After the accident, Laffey presented claims to GEICO under Sharon's and Annie's policies. The claims were denied on the ground that Steven lacked permission to operated the car at the time of the accident. Laffey also submitted a claim to his own automobile insurer, Appellant United Services Automobile Association (USAA), and filed a motion for judgment alleging Steven had been negligent in his operation of the car. GEICO filed a declaratory judgment action against USAA, Annie, Steven, Sharon, Krystal and Laffey seeking a determination that it was not obligated to pay for the accident. The court held that Steven was entitled to coverage under both Sharon's and Annie's policies. GEICO appealed. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's holding and entered final judgment in favor of GEICO.