Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Andrews, a senior property manager of a public housing complex, challenged the termination of her employment with the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA) through RRHA’s grievance procedure. A hearing officer ordered her reinstatement snf advised that, under the terms of RRHA’s Grievance Policy, “[e]ither party may . . . appeal the decision to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia.” The circuit court reversed that decision as “‘contradictory to law’” under Code 2.2-3006. The Supreme Court of Virginia reinstated the hearing officer’s decision, holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear RRHA’s appeal. Either party may appeal a hearing officer’s decision to a circuit court for review on grounds that it is “contradictory to law,” Code 2.2-3006(B), but no such right is available when the challenge to the decision presents a question whether it is“consistent with policy,” RRHA did not make a prima facie showing for invoking judicial review of the hearing officer’s decision under Code 2.2-3006(B) because the substance of RRHA’s appeal challenged only the hearing officer’s interpretation and application of RRHA’s policies. View "Andrews v. Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Johnston worked at William E. Wood & Associates, a real estate services firm, for 17 years. She was an at-will employee. Johnston’s employer terminated her without any advance notice. She sued, alleging that she was wrongfully discharged and that her employer breached an implied term of her employment contract. The trial court dismissed, holding that Virginia does not recognize either cause of action. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, noting its 1906 holding that when an employment contract does not specify a time period for its duration, “either party is ordinarily at liberty to terminate it at-will on giving reasonable notice of his intention to do so.” Reasonable notice simply means effectual notice that employment has been terminated. View "Johnston v. Wood & Assocs" on Justia Law

Scott Harvard was a former senior executive officer of Shore Bank and Hampton Roads Bankshares (HRB). During the 2008 financial crisis, HRB elected to participate in the federal Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). The TARP agreement required HRB to comply with the limits on executive compensation set forth in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) and its implementing regulations. In 2009, Harvard terminated his employment. Thereafter, Harvard filed a breach of contract action against Shore Bank and HRB alleging that HRB breached the parties’ employment agreement by refusing to make a “golden parachute payment” pursuant to the agreement. HRB filed a plea in bar, arguing that the prohibition on golden parachute payments in EESA section 111, as implemented by the June Rule, barred it from paying Harvard pursuant to the employment agreement. The circuit court rejected HRB’s argument and awarded Harvard $655,495 plus interest. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the award of damages in favor of Harvard, holding that EESA section 111, as implemented by the June Rule, prohibited the golden parachute payment under the circumstances of this case. View "Hampton Roads Bankshares, Inc. v. Harvard" on Justia Law

In 1992, Plaintiff was convicted of a felony drug offense. In 2006, Plaintiff applied to the Fairfax County School Board for a teaching position and disclosed her prior conviction on her application. The Board subsequently hired Plaintiff as a special education teacher. In 2012, the school system’s Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources determined that, pursuant to Va. Code 22.1-296.1(A), Plaintiff’s 2006 hiring had been in error because her conviction made her ineligible for employment by the Board. The Board subsequently filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that section 22.1-296.1(A) made Plaintiff ineligible for hire. The circuit court entered an order declaring that the Board lacked authority to hire Plaintiff under section 22.1-296.1(A). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board lacked authority to make the contract, and therefore, the contract was void ab initio. View "Butler v. Fairfax County School Board" on Justia Law

Two weeks after Preston McKellar announced that he would be retiring as a structural welder for Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, McKeller was injured during the course of his employment. Two weeks later, McKeller retired as scheduled. McKeller filed a claim against Northrop Grumman seeking medical benefits and temporary total disability compensation. A deputy commissioner with the Virginia Worker’s Compensation Commission awarded medical benefits as well as temporary total disability benefits. The Commission affirmed the award of medical benefits but denied the claim for temporary total disability benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that McKellar’s retirement, rather than his injury, caused his loss of compensation because the record supported the Commission’s finding that McKellar intended to retire and not seek other employment income. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deputy commissioner correctly found that McKeller was entitled to temporary total disability compensation because he was totally disabled and lacked all earning capacity. View "McKellar v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding" on Justia Law

Draper Paving, the subcontractor for a road project, employed Richard Slone as a dump truck driver and assigned him to work on the project. Slone died from injuries he received in an accident while working on the project. At the time of the accident, Draper Paving had taken out a motor vehicle insurance policy with Selective Insurance Company of America. Karen Slone Bratton and Selective Insurance filed separate declaratory judgment actions seeking to determine whether Slone fell within the scope of the Selective Insurance policy’s coverage. The circuit court concluded that Bratton was not entitled to insurance proceeds from Selective Insurance because Slone did not fall within the scope of the policy at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Slone was occupying both a dump truck and company pickup truck - both covered autos - at the time of the accident under the Selective Insurance policy. Because the policy’s coverage limit for each covered auto applied independently to multiple covered autos involved in the same accident, Bratton was entitled to proceeds under the Selective Insurance policy for both the dump truck and the company pickup truck. Remanded. View "Bratton v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority (ARHA) before being discharged for violating ARHA’s “absenteeism and tardiness policies.” Plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court claiming that she had been improperly discharged. The circuit court denied Plaintiff’s request for reinstatement and her claim for money damages but held that Plaintiff was entitled to have her claims arbitrated under ARHA’s grievance procedure. The Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment in favor of ARHA, holding that the circuit court misapplied Va. Code 15.2-1507(A)(7)(b) and erred in ordering ARHA to arbitrate Plaintiff’s grievance. View "Alexandria Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Walker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a sheriff’s deputy, was terminated after he reported to the sheriff alleged irregularities in several criminal cases. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that his termination was impermissible retaliation in violation of Va. Code 15.2-1512.4, which protects the right of “any local employee” to express opinions to elected officials on matters of public concern. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, ruling that Plaintiff was not a local employee for the purposes of section 15.2-1512.4. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a sheriff’s deputy, who is not an employee of the sheriff, is not a local employee for purposes of section 15.2-1512.4. View "Roop v. Whitt" on Justia Law

O. Ryland Tate, who was employed as a firefighter for the City of Danville, suffered a heart attack, did not return to work, and retired six months later. The City gave Tate the equivalent of his full wages in the form of sick leave pay. After his retirement, Tate used the balance of his accrued sick leave to obtain credit towards his retirement. The City subsequently paid indemnity benefits to Tate for his six-month period of disability pursuant to a Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission award. The City then filed this action against Tate seeking recovery of his sick leave pay, arguing that Tate was not entitled to receive both sick leave pay and workers’ compensation indemnity benefits for the same disability period. The circuit court dismissed the City’s complaint, concluding that the court did not have jurisdiction to decide the City’s claim because the City did not ask the Commission for a credit against the workers’ compensation award for the amounts the City paid Tate for sick leave. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City did not have the authority to recover sick leave pay from Tate on the basis that he had also received workers’ compensation for the same disability period. View "City of Danville v. Tate" on Justia Law

The Fairfax County School Board suspended Plaintiff, a food and nutrition services manager at Twain Middle School, without pay for three days for allegedly violating Fairfax County Public Schools regulations. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Va. Code 22.1-315(A) requires school boards to conduct a hearing prior to suspending an employee without pay. The circuit court granted the school board’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the statute does not require a school board to hold a hearing prior to suspending a non-teaching employee without pay for fewer than five days. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its interpretation of the statute. View "Payne v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd." on Justia Law