Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a sheriff’s deputy, was terminated after he reported to the sheriff alleged irregularities in several criminal cases. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that his termination was impermissible retaliation in violation of Va. Code 15.2-1512.4, which protects the right of “any local employee” to express opinions to elected officials on matters of public concern. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, ruling that Plaintiff was not a local employee for the purposes of section 15.2-1512.4. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a sheriff’s deputy, who is not an employee of the sheriff, is not a local employee for purposes of section 15.2-1512.4. View "Roop v. Whitt" on Justia Law

O. Ryland Tate, who was employed as a firefighter for the City of Danville, suffered a heart attack, did not return to work, and retired six months later. The City gave Tate the equivalent of his full wages in the form of sick leave pay. After his retirement, Tate used the balance of his accrued sick leave to obtain credit towards his retirement. The City subsequently paid indemnity benefits to Tate for his six-month period of disability pursuant to a Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission award. The City then filed this action against Tate seeking recovery of his sick leave pay, arguing that Tate was not entitled to receive both sick leave pay and workers’ compensation indemnity benefits for the same disability period. The circuit court dismissed the City’s complaint, concluding that the court did not have jurisdiction to decide the City’s claim because the City did not ask the Commission for a credit against the workers’ compensation award for the amounts the City paid Tate for sick leave. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City did not have the authority to recover sick leave pay from Tate on the basis that he had also received workers’ compensation for the same disability period. View "City of Danville v. Tate" on Justia Law

The Fairfax County School Board suspended Plaintiff, a food and nutrition services manager at Twain Middle School, without pay for three days for allegedly violating Fairfax County Public Schools regulations. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Va. Code 22.1-315(A) requires school boards to conduct a hearing prior to suspending an employee without pay. The circuit court granted the school board’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the statute does not require a school board to hold a hearing prior to suspending a non-teaching employee without pay for fewer than five days. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its interpretation of the statute. View "Payne v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Loudoun County’s Board of Supervisors required the Loudoun County Sheriff’s Office to implement three employment practices to reduce the hours that would be considered overtime. The Board also raised the number of hours constituting the law-enforcement employees’ regularly scheduled work hours. Certain law-enforcement employees, including deputies who worked on patrol, filed suit against the County, the Sheriff’s Office, and the Sheriff, alleging that Defendants violated state and federal law by wrongfully calculating and underpaying overtime hours. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Defendants on the patrol deputies’ claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) two of the employment practices adopted by the Sheriff’s Office violated the Virginia Gap Pay Act; and (2) the remaining employment practice neither violated the Act nor violated the employees’ contractual employment rights. View "Bailey v. County of Loudoun" on Justia Law

Patricia Kohn, the wife of John Kohn and the administrator of her husband’s estate, filed a wrongful death complaint against several officers and instructors associated with the Norfolk Police Department and the Norfolk Police Academy, alleging that John died as a result of multiple blows to the head inflicted during his training to become a City of Norfolk police officer. Defendants filed a plea in bar asserting that Plaintiff’s action was barred by the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the plea in bar and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in holding that the exclusivity provision of the Act barred this action. View "Kohn v. Marquis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were former employees by Verizon Virginia, Inc. Plaintiffs sued Verizon and the Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO District 2 after Plaintiffs accepted an “Enhanced Income Security Plan” based on the assurances that they would not be terminated but were nonetheless terminated. Defendants filed notices of removal to the federal district court, arguing that Plaintiffs’ state-law claims were completely preempted by section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The district court concluded that Plaintiffs’ state-law claims were not completely preempted and there was no federal jurisdiction. On remand, the circuit court agreed with Defendants on the complete preemption issue and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred by dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of jurisdiction, even if they were completely preempted; and (2) Plaintiffs’ claims were not completely preempted. View "Anthony v. Verizon Va., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the City of Alexandria from 2008 until 2011, when the City terminated his employment. Plaintiff sued the City, alleging that the City unlawfully retaliated and discriminated against him by terminating his employment in response to complaints he made about a director of the department in which Plaintiff worked. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages of $104,096 in back pay. The circuit court subsequently granted Plaintiff’s motion to include liquidated damages to the back pay award, which doubled the award. Plaintiff then filed a motion for additional relief, including reinstatement or, in the alternative, an award of front-pay, and an award for his loss of pension benefits. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of an award of reinstatement, front pay, or pension compensation, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Plaintiff was made whole through his other awards against the City and that Plaintiff’s claim for pension compensation was “subject to too much speculation.” View "Lewis v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

Ubaldo Rodriguez was an employee the general contractor hired by Leesburg Business Park, LLC (LBP) to construct warehouse buildings on a parcel of undeveloped land owned by LBP. Ubaldo suffered fatal injuries in the course of employment. Cecilia Rodriguez, Ubaldo’s widow and the administrator of his estate, filed a wrongful death action against LBP. LBP filed a plea in bar, which the circuit court granted on the grounds that Cecilia’s claim was barred because Ubaldo was the statutory co-employee of LBP. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, LBP moved to reconsider its plea in bar, arguing that it was Ubaldo’s statutory employer and that Cecilia’s recovery was limited to Workers’ Compensation benefits only. The circuit court sustained the plea in bar and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ubaldo’s work at the time of the accident was not part of LBP’s “trade, business, or occupation,” and therefore, LBP was not Ubaldo’s statutory employer at the time of the accident under Va. Code Ann. 65.2-302(A). Remanded. View "Rodriguez v. Leesburg Bus. Park, LLC " on Justia Law

Malyevac and ADI entered into an agreement under which Malyevac sold ADI's computer products and services to its customers. The agreement contained noncompete, non-solicitation, non-disclosure, and return of confidential information provisions. A few months after entering into the agreement, Malyevac resigned. ADI filed a complaint, alleging that Malyevac was violating the agreement by performing work and services and selling products in direct competition with ADI, by engaging in other prohibited activities, and by failing to return confidential information. Malyevac claimed that the provisions were overbroad and unenforceable. The trial court sustained a demurrer without granting ADI leave to amend its complaint. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the merits of the claim cannot be determined on a motion for dismissal. View "Assurance Data, Inc. v. Malyevac" on Justia Law

In 2007, Schuiling hired Harris as his full-time, live-in housecleaner. Harris signed an arbitration agreement, a one-page, pre-printed form prepared for Schuling’s auto business, stating that disputes “shall be resolved exclusively by arbitration administered by the National Arbitration Forum under its code of procedure then in effect.” In 2011, Harris sued Schuiling, alleging multiple torts, statutory violations, and breach of contract. Schuiling moved to enforce arbitration under Code § 8.01-581.02(A), stating that the National Arbitration Forum was no longer available and requesting the court to appoint a substitute arbitrator under Code § 8.01-581.03. Harris argued that unavailability of the named arbitrator, coupled with the agreement’s failure to provide for a substitute arbitrator, rendered the agreement unenforceable. The circuit court agreed with Harris and denied the motion to compel arbitration. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed. Relying on the intention of the parties as expressed in the language of the agreement, the court concluded that NAF’s designation as arbitrator was not integral and was severable in order to give effect to the arbitration requirement, the sole purpose of the agreement. View "Schuiling v. Harris" on Justia Law