Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee filed a complaint against Corporation seeking damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and wrongful termination. Previous to the suit, Corporation offered Employee a severance package that Employee rejected because it would have taken away any rights to a claim for a change in control. A jury found for Employee on all counts except for wrongful termination. The trial court awarded damages and attorney's fees to Employee. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding the circuit court did not err when it (1) refused to hold, as a matter of law, that Employee failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a change in control occurred; (2) instructed the jury to construe any ambiguities in the contracts against the drafter; (3) submitted Employee's alternative theory of mandatory severance benefits to the jury; (4) submitted Employee's claim for unjust enrichment to the jury; (5) admitted the testimony of Employee's damages expert; and (6) awarded Employee attorneys' fees and expenses for breach of the severance agreement. However, the trial court erred in determining that the severance agreement entitled Employee to recover his legal fees for claims that were not related to breach of the severance agreement. View "Online Res. Corp. v. Lawlor" on Justia Law

Rubert Minton suffered injuries as a result of developing mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos while working on Exxon Mobile Corporation (Exxon) ships during his employment at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company (Shipyard). Minton filed suit against Exxon under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for failure to warn Minton of, and protect him from, the dangers associated with asbestos. The jury found in favor of Minton and awarded him compensatory damages, medical expenses, and punitive damages. Exxon appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court erred in refusing to admit relevant evidence regarding the Shipyard's knowledge of the danger of asbestos exposure and its ability to remedy the danger; and (2) the award of $12,500,000 in punitive damages was inappropriately granted because punitive damages are a remedy prohibited by the terms of LHWCA. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Minton" on Justia Law

Nurse was fired by Doctor, her supervisor, after she refused his sexual advances. Nurse sued Doctor and her Employer, asserting claims for gender discrimination against Employer and wrongful discharge against Doctor and Employer. Defendants moved to dismiss. The U.S. district court granted the motion as to Doctor, concluding that wrongful discharge claims by an employee are cognizable only against the employer and not against supervisors or co-employees in their individual capacity. On appeal, the U.S. court of appeals certified to the Virginia Supreme Court the question of whether Nurse's wrongful discharge claim was cognizable against Doctor. The Supreme Court concluded that Virginia recognizes a common law tort claim of wrongful discharge in violation of established public policy against an individual who was not the plaintiff's actual employer but who was the actor in violation of public policy, as a supervisor or manager, and who participated in the wrongful firing of the plaintiff. View "VanBuren v. Grubb" on Justia Law

This appeal from an order dismissing an action for wrongful death presented the question whether the decedent, who was serving on active duty with the armed forces of the United States at the time of his injury, was covered by the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act. If his injury, which was the subject of this action, came within the purview of the Act, an award under the Act would have been his estate's exclusive remedy, barring this action. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the decedent never acquired the right to seek compensation under the Act, and therefore, the circuit court erred in dismissing the action. View "Gibbs v. Newport News Shipbuildng & Drydock Co." on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, Plaintiff sued Employer under the Jones Act for an injury to his back sustained in the course of his employment with Employer as a crew member aboard a commercial fishing vessel. Plaintiff's ultimate negligence liability theory at trial was that Employer breached its duty of care by not obtaining an MRI as part of his pre-employment physical. The trial court awarded damages to Plaintiff upon a jury verdict. The Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment in favor of Employer, holding that, as a matter of law, there was no evidence of causation presented in the trial of Plaintiff's negligence claim against Employer under the Jones Act. View "Omega Protein, Inc. v. Forrest" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the circuit court erred in allowing Plaintiff to take a nonsuit as a matter of right pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 8.01-380(B) based on its determination that Plaintiff's prior voluntary dismissal in federal court was not a nonsuit under section 8.01-380. In Virginia, a plaintiff may take only one nonsuit as a matter of right. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in finding that Plaintiff was permitted to take a nonsuit as a matter of right pursuant to section 8.01-380(B), holding (1) Va. Code Ann. 8.01-229(E)(3) does not confirm or suggest that a voluntary dismissal taken pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) is a nonsuit for purposes of section 8.01-380; and (2) Plaintiff's prior voluntary dismissal in federal court was not substantially equivalent to Virginia's nonsuit in this regard. View "Inova Health Care Servs. v. Kebaish" on Justia Law

Seaman filed this action to recover maintenance and cure and compensatory and punitive damages from his former employer (Employer), claiming that he suffered PTSD and depression as a result of being gang-raped by uniformed Korean police officers while he was on shore leave from Employer's ship docked in Korea. The jury awarded Seaman $20,000,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages. The circuit court granted Employer's motion for partial summary judgment precluding Seaman's denial of maintenance and cure, set aside the punitive damages award, and remitted the compensatory damages award to $2,000,000. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on all issues relating to the seaworthiness and Jones Act claims regarding Employer's actions after Seaman returned to the ship, and Seaman's claim for maintenance and cure benefits, holding (1) the circuit court erred by not ordering a new trial after concluding that the maintenance and cure claim for compensatory and punitive damages should not have been submitted to the jury; and (2) the circuit court erred in refusing the instruction proffered by Employer quoting the circuit court's pre-trial ruling on the Jones Act and seaworthiness claims, and the refusal was not harmless. View "Hale v. Maersk Line Ltd." on Justia Law

Kesha Napper, one of Kastle Systems' employees, slipped during work hours in the lobby of the building owned by Kastle. Napper filed suit alleging negligence against the janitorial services companies who cleaned the building and the property management company (Defendants). Defendants filed a plea in bar, arguing that because Napper had been receiving workers' compensation benefits in connection with her injury, Napper's claims were barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. The trial court sustained Defendants' plea in bar and dismissed Napper's complaint with prejudice, finding that Napper and Defendants were statutory co-employees for purposes of the workers' compensation scheme. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in sustaining Defendants' plea in bar because Napper's action against Defendants was not barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision in the Act, as, (1) under Floyd v. Mitchell, Defendants were other parties as contemplated by the Act and strangers to Kastle's particular business of operating a call center; and (2) thus, Defendants and Napper were not statutory fellow employees. Remanded. View "Napper v. ABM Janitorial Servs." on Justia Law

After his employment was terminated at Horizon House, Michael Ford filed a complaint against the three corporate employers vested with the authority to fire him, including the Horizon House homeowners association. James Mansfield served as counsel to Horizon House. Ford sent a demand letter and a draft complaint marked "for settlement purposes only" to numerous individuals and entities. Ford then filed a complaint, substantially similar to the draft complaint, in the U.S. district court against several defendants, including Mansfield. Mansfield subsequently filed a complaint against Ford and others (Defendants), alleging that he was defamed by statements made about him in the draft complaint. The circuit court sustained Defendants' demurrers, ruling that the allegations made in the draft complaint, sent before the lawsuit was filed, were privileged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that absolute privilege attached to the draft complaint. View "Mansfield v. Bernabei" on Justia Law

Employee suffered an injury during the course of his employment. Employer agreed to voluntarily pay workers' compensation benefits, and the Workers Compensation Commission issued an award order approving the agreements between Employee and Employer. Employer then filed an application with the Commission seeking to suspend Employee's benefits under the order for unjustifiably refusing to participate in vocational rehabilitation. The Commission denied the application. The court of appeals reversed. At issue on appeal was whether Employee should be permitted to offer evidence that his refusal to accept vocational rehabilitation services was justified because of a disabling injury that arose out of the same industrial accident for which he was awarded benefits, but which was not expressly designated in the award as a compensable injury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that Employee was precluded from asserting that his refusal of vocational rehabilitation was justified. Remanded for an evidentiary proceeding so Employee could show his refusal was justified in light of his disabling injury. View "Ilg v. United Parcel Serv." on Justia Law