Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Scott and Martha Giordano were married and later separated. Scott was subsequently killed while working as an insulator in a building. Martha filed a claim for benefits with the Workers' Compensation Commission. The deputy commissioner determined that Martha was not a dependent of Scott and, therefore, was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Subsequently, Martha, as personal representative Scott's estate, filed a wrongful death claim against Defendants, Scott's employer, the employer's subcontractors, and a supplier of a product used in the construction process (Builder's Supply). The circuit court sustained Defendants' pleas in bar, concluding that the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act barred Martha's action. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in holding that the exclusivity provision barred a non-dependent individual who was not eligible to collect benefits under the Act from bringing an action in tort; but (2) the court erred in holding that this provision of the Act barred an action in tort against Builder's Supply, as mere delivery of product was not within the trade, business or occupation of Scott's employer. View "Giordano v. McBar Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Matthew Thorpe was the owner of a self-storage facility and operated a side business that installed residential porch railings. While installing metal sheets on the roof of a customer's building, Thorpe fell through a skylight to his death. His widow, Alissa Thorpe, filed with the Workers' Compensation Commission a claim for worker's compensation benefits. The deputy commissioner (1) found Alissa was entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, and (2) awarded $48 payable weekly for 500 weeks. The Commission agreed with the deputy commissioner, and the court of appeals affirmed. Alissa appealed, arguing that the court of appeals erred in holding that $48 was Thorpe's average weekly wage applicable to the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the deputy commissioner did not err in determining Thorpe's average weekly wage. View "Thorpe v. Ted Bowling Constr." on Justia Law

During the course of his employment as a police officer for the Town of Abingdon, Kevin Christy suffered injuries from an automobile accident. Christy was insured under an automobile liability insurance policy issued by Mercury Casualty Company (Mercury). Christy submitted a claim to Mercury for payment of the portion of his medical expenses not paid by the Town's workers' compensation carrier. Mercury denied the claim, asserting that an exclusion in the policy barred Christy from receiving any payment for medical expenses because a portion of those expenses had been paid by workers' compensation benefits. Christy filed a warrant in debt against Mercury seeking contract damages. The district court entered judgment in favor of Christy. The circuit court reversed, concluding that, based on the unambiguous language of the exclusion, payment of workers' compensation triggered the exclusion and precluded payment by Mercury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of the exclusion was clear and that the exclusion permitted Mercury to deny coverage for any expenses that would have been subject to workers' compensation coverage without regard to whether all of those expenses were actually paid by the workers' compensation carrier. View "Christy v. Mercury Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer's sheep and wool business, Cestari. Employer failed to maintain workers' compensation insurance for Cestari. Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer and Cestari, as well as a complaint against Employer and Cestari, seeking damages for negligence. The workers' compensation commissioner determined that Employee was entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Finding that Employee had pursued his workers' compensation claim to a final order and that he had a remedy for collection of his workers' compensation award against Cestari and/or the Uninsured Employers' Fund, the circuit court dismissed Employee's civil complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employee had received the recovery he sought under the Workers' Compensation Act, and thus, the circuit court did not err in ruling that Employee could not pursue an action at law against Employer after obtaining a final collectible award of workers' compensation benefits. View "Redifer v. Chester" on Justia Law

Hugh Britt, an employee of CP&O, LLC, was fatally injured while loading and unloading cargo at the Norfolk International Terminals (NIT) when a straddle carrier that Orion Parker, a stevedore employed by VIT, was operating ran into the side of the container being pulled by the hustler operated by Britt. Virgil Moore, as administrator of Britt's estate, filed a wrongful death action against Parker and Virginia International Terminals (VIT), asserting negligence and premises liability claims. VIT and Parker filed a plea in bar seeking the dismissal of the action on the basis that the Virginia Port Authority (VPA) serves as the statutory employer of the CP&O and VIT employees loading and unloading vessels at NIT, and therefore, Moore's claims were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act (Act). The circuit court determined that the parties were statutory employees of the VPA and sustained the plea in bar. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in its ruling that the parties were statutory employees of the VPA and therefore subject to the exclusivity provisions of the Act. View "Moore v. Va. Int'l Terminals" on Justia Law

Linda Eberhardt, an employee of the Fairfax County School Board and a member of the Fairfax County Employees' Retirement Systems (FCERS), was injured during the course of her employment. Eberhardt applied for service-connected disability retirement benefits. The FCERS Board of Trustees denied Eberhardt's application for service-connected disability retirement benefits but awarded ordinary disability retirement benefits. Eberhardt appealed under Va. Code Ann. 51.1-823. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal because section 51.1-823 applied only to police officers' retirement systems in counties with the urban executive form of government. The court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly ruled that section 51.1-823 did not confer jurisdiction upon it to hear Eberhardt's appeal because the word "board" as used in section 51.1-823 did not encompass the board of any retirement system created by a county having an urban executive form of government. View "Eberhardt v. Fairfax County Employees' Ret. Sys. Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law

Employee of a pest control company signed an employment agreement containing a provision stating that he would not engage in similar business within two years after he ceased employment. After resigning and within the two-year period set forth in the provision, Employee became employed by another pest control company. Employer filed a complaint asserting that Employee's subsequent employment violated the provision. Employee filed a plea in bar, asserting that the provision was overbroad and therefore unenforceable. The circuit court granted the plea in bar and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in ruling the provision was unenforceable. View "Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer" on Justia Law

James Proffitt was convicted of a felony sexual offense involving a minor and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The circuit court, shortly thereafter, appointed Melissa Doud as Proffitt's guardian and conservator. Doud then brought an action against the county, the sheriff, the sheriff's deputies and jailors, and the Commonwealth, alleging Proffitt suffered serious injuries during his incarceration at the county jail due to the negligence of the sheriff's deputies. Doud's theory of recovery against the Commonwealth was based entirely on respondeat superior. The circuit dismissed the action. At issue on appeal was whether the Commonwealth's express waiver of sovereign immunity for damage caused by the negligent act of any employee acting within the scope of his employment rendered the Commonwealth liable in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth was not waived with respect to Doud's tort claim because the sheriff was not an "employee" of the Commonwealth within the definitions contained in the Virginia Tort Claims Act. View "Doud v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

An employee of the general contractor on a construction site was allegedly injured by the negligent act of the employee of a subcontractor who carried no workers' compensation insurance. Plaintiff, the injured party, brought a common-law action against Defendants, the uninsured subcontractor and its employee, the alleged tortfeasor. The Defendants filed a plea in bar, asserting that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act was Plaintiff's sole remedy. The circuit court held that Defendants' failure to carry workers' compensation insurance deprived them of the protections afforded by the Act because they were not participants in the statutory workers' compensation system. The court denied the plea in bar, permitting the action to go forward, but certified the case for an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from and entered final judgment dismissing the case, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendants' plea in bar because Defendants were entitled to the exclusivity protection provided by the Act notwithstanding their lack of workers' compensation insurance. View "David White Crane Serv. v. Howell" on Justia Law

After Roger Hudspeth's employment with the Bank of the Commonwealth was terminated, Hudspeth filed a complaint against the Bank, alleging the Bank failed to pay him compensation owed for his employment. The Bank filed a motion to stay and compel arbitration before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), arguing (1) the Bank was a "customer" as defined by the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (Customer Code), (2) Hudspeth was an associated person of a "member," and (3) because the dispute was between a customer and an associated person of a member, arbitration was mandatory under the Customer Code. The circuit court denied the Bank's motion, concluding that the Bank was not a customer under the Customer Code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Customer Code was susceptible to an interpretation under which the Bank could be considered a customer, and (2) because under the Federal Arbitration Act any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, the circuit court erred when it denied the Bank's motion in this case. Remanded. View "Bank of the Commonwealth v. Hudspeth" on Justia Law