Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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Employee was injured while working for Employer's sheep and wool business, Cestari. Employer failed to maintain workers' compensation insurance for Cestari. Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer and Cestari, as well as a complaint against Employer and Cestari, seeking damages for negligence. The workers' compensation commissioner determined that Employee was entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Finding that Employee had pursued his workers' compensation claim to a final order and that he had a remedy for collection of his workers' compensation award against Cestari and/or the Uninsured Employers' Fund, the circuit court dismissed Employee's civil complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employee had received the recovery he sought under the Workers' Compensation Act, and thus, the circuit court did not err in ruling that Employee could not pursue an action at law against Employer after obtaining a final collectible award of workers' compensation benefits. View "Redifer v. Chester" on Justia Law

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Hugh Britt, an employee of CP&O, LLC, was fatally injured while loading and unloading cargo at the Norfolk International Terminals (NIT) when a straddle carrier that Orion Parker, a stevedore employed by VIT, was operating ran into the side of the container being pulled by the hustler operated by Britt. Virgil Moore, as administrator of Britt's estate, filed a wrongful death action against Parker and Virginia International Terminals (VIT), asserting negligence and premises liability claims. VIT and Parker filed a plea in bar seeking the dismissal of the action on the basis that the Virginia Port Authority (VPA) serves as the statutory employer of the CP&O and VIT employees loading and unloading vessels at NIT, and therefore, Moore's claims were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act (Act). The circuit court determined that the parties were statutory employees of the VPA and sustained the plea in bar. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in its ruling that the parties were statutory employees of the VPA and therefore subject to the exclusivity provisions of the Act. View "Moore v. Va. Int'l Terminals" on Justia Law

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Linda Eberhardt, an employee of the Fairfax County School Board and a member of the Fairfax County Employees' Retirement Systems (FCERS), was injured during the course of her employment. Eberhardt applied for service-connected disability retirement benefits. The FCERS Board of Trustees denied Eberhardt's application for service-connected disability retirement benefits but awarded ordinary disability retirement benefits. Eberhardt appealed under Va. Code Ann. 51.1-823. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal because section 51.1-823 applied only to police officers' retirement systems in counties with the urban executive form of government. The court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly ruled that section 51.1-823 did not confer jurisdiction upon it to hear Eberhardt's appeal because the word "board" as used in section 51.1-823 did not encompass the board of any retirement system created by a county having an urban executive form of government. View "Eberhardt v. Fairfax County Employees' Ret. Sys. Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law

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Employee of a pest control company signed an employment agreement containing a provision stating that he would not engage in similar business within two years after he ceased employment. After resigning and within the two-year period set forth in the provision, Employee became employed by another pest control company. Employer filed a complaint asserting that Employee's subsequent employment violated the provision. Employee filed a plea in bar, asserting that the provision was overbroad and therefore unenforceable. The circuit court granted the plea in bar and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in ruling the provision was unenforceable. View "Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer" on Justia Law

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James Proffitt was convicted of a felony sexual offense involving a minor and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The circuit court, shortly thereafter, appointed Melissa Doud as Proffitt's guardian and conservator. Doud then brought an action against the county, the sheriff, the sheriff's deputies and jailors, and the Commonwealth, alleging Proffitt suffered serious injuries during his incarceration at the county jail due to the negligence of the sheriff's deputies. Doud's theory of recovery against the Commonwealth was based entirely on respondeat superior. The circuit dismissed the action. At issue on appeal was whether the Commonwealth's express waiver of sovereign immunity for damage caused by the negligent act of any employee acting within the scope of his employment rendered the Commonwealth liable in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth was not waived with respect to Doud's tort claim because the sheriff was not an "employee" of the Commonwealth within the definitions contained in the Virginia Tort Claims Act. View "Doud v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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An employee of the general contractor on a construction site was allegedly injured by the negligent act of the employee of a subcontractor who carried no workers' compensation insurance. Plaintiff, the injured party, brought a common-law action against Defendants, the uninsured subcontractor and its employee, the alleged tortfeasor. The Defendants filed a plea in bar, asserting that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act was Plaintiff's sole remedy. The circuit court held that Defendants' failure to carry workers' compensation insurance deprived them of the protections afforded by the Act because they were not participants in the statutory workers' compensation system. The court denied the plea in bar, permitting the action to go forward, but certified the case for an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from and entered final judgment dismissing the case, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendants' plea in bar because Defendants were entitled to the exclusivity protection provided by the Act notwithstanding their lack of workers' compensation insurance. View "David White Crane Serv. v. Howell" on Justia Law

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After Roger Hudspeth's employment with the Bank of the Commonwealth was terminated, Hudspeth filed a complaint against the Bank, alleging the Bank failed to pay him compensation owed for his employment. The Bank filed a motion to stay and compel arbitration before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), arguing (1) the Bank was a "customer" as defined by the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (Customer Code), (2) Hudspeth was an associated person of a "member," and (3) because the dispute was between a customer and an associated person of a member, arbitration was mandatory under the Customer Code. The circuit court denied the Bank's motion, concluding that the Bank was not a customer under the Customer Code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Customer Code was susceptible to an interpretation under which the Bank could be considered a customer, and (2) because under the Federal Arbitration Act any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, the circuit court erred when it denied the Bank's motion in this case. Remanded. View "Bank of the Commonwealth v. Hudspeth" on Justia Law

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In 2005, Southwest Emergency Physicians, Inc. (SWEP) and Alldredge entered into a contract under which SWEP's physician-employees staffed Lewis-Gale's emergency department. The contract provided that it could be terminated by either party without cause. In 2008, Alldredge became involved with some signatories to a letter addressed to the Lewis-Gale administration voicing work-related concerns. Certain Lewis-Gale administrators expressed concern that Alldredge had become involved in the hospital's personnel matters, and SWEP later terminated Alldredge's employment. Alldredge sued Lewis-Gale for tortious interference with her employment contract with SWEP, and the circuit court found in favor of Alldredge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the administrators' statements of intimidation and animus toward Allredge did not rise as a matter of law to the level of "improper methods"- such as fraud, deceit, or defamation - necessary to establish a cause of action for tortious interference with contract expectancy when a contract is terminable at will. View "Lewis-Gale Medical Center v. Alldredge" on Justia Law

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Robert Bennett signed a one-year employment agreement with Sage. That summer, Bennett communicated to Sage that he would require an increase of almost triple his salary or he would transition out of the company. When Sage did not meet his demands, Bennett continued working for Sage but pursued other employment opportunities. Bennett's employment was terminated that fall. Bennett filed a complaint against Sage seeking severance payments. During trial, the circuit court granted Sage's motion to amend its pleadings to include a defense of repudiation and submitted the issue of repudiation to the jury. The jury ruled against Bennett, and Bennett appealed. At issue was whether a party may repudiate his contractual duties after performance has commenced. The Supreme Court held that (1) repudiation may apply to a contract that has been partially performed when future obligations under the contract are repudiated, and (2) the circuit court properly rejected Bennett's argument that he did not repudiate the contract as a matter of law. Based on the evidence, the jury was entitled to conclude that Bennett's communications while he attempted to transition out of the company constituted a repudiation of his future obligations under the contract. View "Bennett v. Sage Payment Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

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Prior to November, 2006, Grievant Tammy Estep worked for the Virginia Department of Corrections (DOC) as a Superintendent of the Central Virginia Correctional Unit. She had consistently been given good performance reviews until November 13th, when she was involuntarily demoted to a lower position. She filed a grievance that ultimately came before a hearing officer. The officer found the demotion was unwarranted, and ordered the DOC to reinstate Estep to a comparable position as either a Superintendent or Assistant Warden, and that she be reimbursed for any lost pay as a result of the demotion. Estep's former position had been filled; in an attempt to comply with the hearing officer's order, the DOC transferred Estep to a different location, and into a newly-created position with the same rate of pay, but different duties, responsibilities and authority. Estep brought suit at the circuit court seeking implementation of the hearing officer's order. The court held that the DOC failed to implement the hearing officer's order, and ordered Estep be reinstated to her old position since the DOC could not find an adequate substitute. The DOC appealed. The Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the matter, and found that the record supported the circuit court's decision to reinstate Estep to her former position.