Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this action challenging the Supreme Court's sealing of the record of the disciplinary action against Judge Adrianne L. Bennett by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission the Supreme Court unsealed certain filings in the case but concluded that the Commission's records attached to a mandamus petition should remain under seal.At issue was the order of the Supreme Court disposing of Judge Bennett's petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition in connection with this matter, which the Supreme Court ordered sealed along with all other documents of the proceedings. The publisher of a news entity asked the Supreme Court to unseal the order sealing the proceedings regarding Judge Bennett's mandamus petition and filed a petition to vacate the sealing order. The Supreme Court unsealed the remainder of the filings in this case but held that the records of the Commission attached to the mandamus petition should remain under seal, holding that Judge Bennett had a statutory right to keep that information confidential. View "In re Honorable Bennett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ordered that Kurt J. Pomrenke be removed immediately from the office of Judge of the Twenty-Eighth Juvenile and Domestic Relations Judicial District, concluding that Judge Pomrenke’s conduct was of sufficient gravity to require that the court remove him from office.The Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission of Virginia charged Judge Pomrenke with engaging in misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice while serving as a juvenile and domestic relations district court judge. After a hearing, the Commission filed a formal complaint against Judge Pomrenke asserting that its charges were of sufficient gravity to constitute the basis for retirement, censure, or removal. The Supreme Court held that Judge Pomrenke’s violations of the Canons of Judicial Conduct for the Commonwealth of Virginia were grave and substantial and of sufficient gravity to warrant removal. View "Judicial Inquiry & Review Commission v. Pomrenke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed the case filed by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission against Rudolph Bumgardner, III, Senior Judge of the Court of Appeals and Humes J. Franklin, Jr., Retired Judge of the Twenty-Fifth Judicial Circuit. The Commission asserted the Judge Bumgardner and Judge Franklin violated the Canons of Judicial Conduct as set out in Part 6, Section III of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia and that the violations were “of sufficient gravity to constitute the basis for censure or removal” by the Supreme Court. Upon consideration of the entire record, the Supreme Court held that there was not clear and convincing evidence showing that the judges violated the specified Canons as charged. View "Judicial Inquiry & Review Commission v. Bumgardner" on Justia Law

Client entered into a written representation agreement with Attorney for legal services. An attorney-in-fact for Client later filed a confession of judgment against Client in the amount of $9,460.07, with interest at eighteen percent from a certain date. Attorney subsequently filed a garnishment suggestion against Client in an effort to enforce the judgment. Client moved the court to enter an order declaring the confessed judgment void nunc pro tunc because of failure to serve it on her as required by Va. Code 8.01-438. Attorney moved to suffer a voluntary nonsuit. The court (1) granted the nonsuit, (2) quashed the confessed judgment nunc pro tunc, (3) ordered payment to Client of all sums held by the clerk by reason of the garnishment, and (4) awarded sanctions to be paid by Attorney to Client as reasonable expenses she incurred by reason of the garnishment proceedings. Attorney appealed the order granting sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Attorney breached his duty imposed upon him by section 8.01-438, and that breach resulted in harm to Client, justifying sanctions. View "Westlake Legal Group v. Flynn" on Justia Law

In 2003, Dumville met with attorney Thorsen to prepare her will. Thorsen understood that Dumville wanted a will that would, upon her death, convey all of her property to her mother if her mother survived her, and, if her mother predeceased her, to the Richmond Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). Dumville was 43 and lived with three cats, which she desired to go to the RSPCA upon her death. Thorsen prepared, and Dumville executed, the will. She died in 2008, her mother having predeceased her. Thorsen, as co-executor of the estate, notified the RSPCA that it was the sole beneficiary of Dumville’s estate. Thorsen was informed that, in the opinion of the title insurance company, the will left only the tangible estate, not real estate, to the RSPCA. Thorsen brought suit in a collateral proceeding to correct this “scrivener’s error” based on Dumville’s clear original intent. The court found the language unambiguously limited the RSPCA bequest to tangible personal property, while the intangible estate passed intestate to Dumville’s heirs at law. The RSPCA received $72,015.60, but the bequest, less expenses, would have totaled $675,425.50 absent the error. RSPCA sued Thorsen for negligence, as a third-party beneficiary of his contract with Dumville. The court found for the RSPCA. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed: RSPCA was a clearly and definitely identified third-party beneficiary. View "Thorsen v. Richmond Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals" on Justia Law

Two attorneys (together, “defense counsel”) were sanctioned $200 each during the course of their representation of Client, who was the defendant in a wrongful death suit. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting that defense counsels’ “misconduct” in submitting a jury instruction with an error tainted the jury. The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that counsel’s representation was not a deliberate act to mislead the court. The court, however, concluded that counsels’ inadvertence rose to the level of a sanctionable act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in sanctioning defense counsel for a mutual mistake when the error was inadvertent and, upon its discovery, was timely noted. View "Ragland v. Soggin" on Justia Law

Two attorneys (together, “defense counsel”) were sanctioned $200 each during the course of their representation of Client, who was the defendant in a wrongful death suit. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting that defense counsels’ “misconduct” in submitting a jury instruction with an error tainted the jury. The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that counsel’s representation was not a deliberate act to mislead the court. The court, however, concluded that counsels’ inadvertence rose to the level of a sanctionable act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in sanctioning defense counsel for a mutual mistake when the error was inadvertent and, upon its discovery, was timely noted. View "Ragland v. Soggin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a compliant against Defendants in order to enforce a mechanics lien. Wells Fargo was named in the complaint because it was the trustee and secured party of certain property. Wells Fargo filed a motion for leave to file answer out of time and requested its fees and costs incurred with regard to the motion. The trial court granted Wells Fargo’s motion and ordered Plaintiff’s counsel to reimburse Wells Fargo’s counsel $1200 for fees and costs incurred regarding the motion for leave to file answer out of time. The trial court also granted Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against Defendants. In its final order, the trial court stated that the mechanics lien had been released and that it had issued the $1200 sanctions award against Plaintiff’s counsel for its failure to voluntarily extend the time in which Wells Fargo might file its answer. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding sanctions, as Plaintiff’s counsel did not engage in behavior that could be characterized as unprofessional, an ethics violation or behavior that is subject to statutory sanctions. View "Env’t Specialist, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

The Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission filed the present complaint against Jacqueline Waymack, judge of the sixth judicial district, pursuant to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Commission asserted that its charges against Judge Waymack for allegedly violating the Canons of Judicial Conduct were well founded in fact and that the violations were of sufficient gravity to constitute the basis for censure or removal by the Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that there was not clear and convincing evidence that Judge Waymack engaged in either "misconduct" or "conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice" under Va. Const. art. VI, 10. View "Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Waymack" on Justia Law

After his employment was terminated at Horizon House, Michael Ford filed a complaint against the three corporate employers vested with the authority to fire him, including the Horizon House homeowners association. James Mansfield served as counsel to Horizon House. Ford sent a demand letter and a draft complaint marked "for settlement purposes only" to numerous individuals and entities. Ford then filed a complaint, substantially similar to the draft complaint, in the U.S. district court against several defendants, including Mansfield. Mansfield subsequently filed a complaint against Ford and others (Defendants), alleging that he was defamed by statements made about him in the draft complaint. The circuit court sustained Defendants' demurrers, ruling that the allegations made in the draft complaint, sent before the lawsuit was filed, were privileged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that absolute privilege attached to the draft complaint. View "Mansfield v. Bernabei" on Justia Law