Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On November 10, 2014, a traffic accident occurred at the intersection of Wellington Road and Market Place Avenue involving vehicles driven by Sharon Elizabeth Furr and Janaia Spurlock. Tamara Al-Saray, a passenger in Spurlock's vehicle, suffered significant injuries, including a traumatic brain injury. Spurlock attempted a left turn with a solid green light, requiring her to yield to oncoming traffic. Furr, traveling westbound at the speed limit, collided with Spurlock's vehicle. Al-Saray filed claims against both drivers for negligence but later nonsuited her claims against Spurlock. The trial court excluded evidence of Spurlock's guilty plea for failure to yield.The Prince William County Circuit Court denied Furr's motions to strike the evidence and for reconsideration, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the claim that Furr failed to maintain a proper lookout. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Al-Saray, awarding her $7,000,000 in damages. Furr appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the evidence was insufficient to establish Furr's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident. The Court of Appeals majority found that the evidence was purely circumstantial and did not exclude other possible causes of the accident.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Al-Saray, was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The Court emphasized that proximate cause can be established by circumstantial evidence and that the jury's inference of Furr's negligence was reasonable. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address Furr's remaining assignments of cross-error. View "Al-Saray v. Furr" on Justia Law

Father Constantine P. Rogakos, an 86-year-old retired Greek-Orthodox priest, visited Bon Secours-DePaul Medical Center for an outpatient abdominal ultrasound. He used a cane due to a shuffled gait and had a history of falls. At the hospital, he was provided a wheelchair to reach the waiting room. In the ultrasound room, he was instructed to change into a medical gown. While changing, he leaned on a wheeled hospital stretcher, which moved, causing him to fall and sustain severe injuries. He later died from these injuries.The Administrator of his estate filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against the hospital, alleging negligence by the sonographer, Joanna Regan, for failing to assist and ensure the stretcher's wheels were locked. The circuit court denied the hospital's motion to strike and refused to allow a hospital stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $2,000,000. The hospital's post-trial motions were denied.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the circuit court's decisions, including the admissibility of Father Rogakos' statements under the Dead Man’s Statute, the refusal to grant a multiple causes jury instruction, and the exclusion of the stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit. The hospital appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment. It held that the Dead Man’s Statute did not preclude the introduction of Father Rogakos' statements as they were conveyed by non-interested witnesses. The court also found no error in the circuit court's refusal to grant the multiple causes jury instruction, exclusion of the stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit, and denial of the hospital's motion to strike, as the evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "Bon Secours-DePaul Medical Center v. Rogakos-Russell" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over personal jurisdiction. Worth Harris Carter Jr., a Virginia resident, sought treatment for a rash from Wake Forest University Baptist Medical Center and Wake Forest University Health Sciences in North Carolina. Despite numerous in-person visits and follow-up communications via phone calls, text messages, and an online patient portal, Mr. Carter's condition worsened, and he was eventually diagnosed with skin cancer. After his death, Katherine Louise Carter, executor of Mr. Carter's estate, filed a lawsuit against Wake Forest in Virginia, alleging medical malpractice.The Circuit Court for the City of Martinsville dismissed the case, ruling that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Wake Forest. The court found that Wake Forest's communications with the Carters in Virginia were responses to inquiries initiated by the Carters and did not constitute purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities within Virginia. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed this decision, emphasizing that the actual treatment occurred in North Carolina and that Wake Forest did not maintain a presence or solicit business in Virginia.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that Wake Forest's contacts with Virginia were incidental to in-person treatment and were directed to the patient in need, rather than the forum state itself. The court found that Wake Forest's responses to the Carters' communications did not constitute purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in Virginia. The court also noted that the communications between Ms. Carter and Wake Forest were more aptly characterized as isolated or attenuated and were insufficient to give rise to jurisdiction. View "Carter v. Wake Forest" on Justia Law

Patricia Hanger filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Allison L. Raines and Emergency Physicians of Tidewater, PLC, alleging that they negligently failed to treat her low blood sodium, leading to a seizure and a subsequent fall that resulted in a traumatic brain injury. The defendants argued that the fall could have been caused by other means. A jury sided with Hanger and awarded her $1.6 million, a decision that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals had to decide whether the trial court erred in refusing a jury instruction supporting the defendants' theory of the case. The Court of Appeals held that this question was waived. The defendants argued that they did not waive their right to appeal this question and that they were entitled to the issuance of their proffered jury instruction.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals, concluding that the defendants did not waive their argument. The Supreme Court found that the defendants had preserved their objection to the trial court's refusal to issue the jury instruction and had adequately briefed the matter before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court's failure to issue the jury instruction was reversible error and that the Court of Appeals also erred in declining to rule on the matter. The case was reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals to enter a mandate to the trial court consistent with the opinion. View "Emergency Physicians of Tidewater v. Hanger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Liosha Miles on the issue of whether each of the two insurance policies in this case provided separate tranches of insurance of uninsured motorist (UM) coverage and underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage, holding that the circuit court erred.Given her disagreement with GEICO Advantage Insurance Company and GEICO Choice Insurance Company (collectively, GEICO), Miles filed this action seeking a declaration that each policy at issue contained separate $50,000 limits for UM and UIM coverage and that GEICO owed her addition amounts for her UIM claims related to a single automobile accident caused by the negligence of two different drivers other than herself. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Miles. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) UIM coverage is a constituent part of UM coverage; and (2) consequently, the circuit court erred in concluding that Va. Code 38.2-2206(A) required each policy to provide Miles with separate UM and UIM coverage limits for injuries arising from a single accident. View "GEICO Advantage Insurance Co. v. Miles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's claims against the Rappahannock Area Community Services Board (RACSB) based on its determination that RACSB was a municipal corporation entitled to sovereign immunity, holding that RACSB is not a municipal corporation.Appellant received psychological therapy through RACSB at its facilities when he was between six to eight years old. Appellant brought this action against the estate of Scott Henry and RACSB, alleging that Henry, a therapist employed by RACSB, molested him during his counseling sessions. RACSB filed a plea in bar, claiming that it was entitled to sovereign immunity as either an "arm" of the Commonwealth or as a municipal corporation performing a governmental function. The circuit court granted the plea in bar, concluding that RACSB was a municipal corporation that was performing a governmental function by providing mental health treatment to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that RACSB was not a municipal corporation because it lacked the fundamental characteristics of such an entity. View "Fines v. Rappahannock Area Community Services Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendant's plea in bar to Plaintiff's negligence claim on the ground that he was protected by derivative sovereign immunity and granting Defendant's demurrer to Plaintiff's gross negligence claim because it was insufficiently pleaded, holding that there was no legal error in either of these decisions.Langston Patterson was an inmate in the Danville Adult Detention Center (DADC) when he suffered cardiac arrest and later died. The personal representative of his estate sued Defendant, the DADC physician, claiming that Defendant committed medical malpractice by failing to provide the necessary and appropriate care to Patterson. The circuit court granted Defendant's plea in bar to Plaintiff's negligence claim and Defendant's demurrer to Plaintiff's gross negligence claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error of law or any irrationality in the fact-finding of the circuit court; and (2) Defendant's claim for gross negligence failed as a matter of law. View "Patterson v. City of Danville" on Justia Law

In this personal injury case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Defendant's plea in bar and dismissing this case with prejudice, holding that the date of Plaintiff's second filing did not relate back to the date of her first filing and was therefore barred by the statute of limitations.After Plaintiff learned that she had erred in naming Defendant in her initial pleading Plaintiff non-suited the case. One month later, Plaintiff filed the present action, correctly naming Defendant. Defendant filed a plea in bar, arguing that the present action was filed over two years after the cause of action accrued and was thus time-barred. Plaintiff objected, arguing that the error in naming Defendant was a misnomer subject to correction. The court sustained the plea in bar, concluding that Plaintiff's original filing did not relate back to the date of the original filing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's second filing was barred by the statute of limitations. View "Edwards v. Omni International Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) was covered under a homeowner's insurance policy as a "farm type vehicle," holding that the circuit court erred.Diamond Jones was injured while riding as a passenger on the back of an ATV driven by the daughter of Jennifer and Richard Rekowski. Jones filed a negligence action against the Rekowskis, who were insured by a homeowner's policy issued by Erie Insurance Exchange, and then filed this action seeking a judgment that Erie was obligated to pay the insurance claim. The circuit court concluded that the policy covered the accident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the ATV involved in the accident was not a "farm type" vehicle; and (2) therefore, the ATV was excluded from coverage by the homeowner's insurance policy. View "Erie Insurance Exchange v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court determining what portion of a settlement was subject to the Commonwealth's Medicaid lien, holding that there was no error.Appellant was seriously injured in a car accident. Because the Commonwealth's Medicaid program paid for a portion of Appellant's medical care the Commonwealth was entitled to a lien on the proceeds of an ensuing settlement between Appellant and the driver who caused the accident. At issue was what portion of the settlement was subject to the Medicaid lien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's judgment was proper under the deferential standard. View "Farah v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law