Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A man filed suit in 2017 against three individuals and a club, alleging that he was sexually abused as a child between 1993 and 2000. He claimed that the abuse caused him numerous injuries but asserted that he did not learn of the connection between the abuse and his injuries until 2014, after receiving psychotherapy. The defendants argued that his claims were barred by the statute of limitations, contending that he was aware of the connection between the abuse and his injuries before reaching adulthood, based on deposition testimony and documents such as statements the plaintiff made to police.The Circuit Court of Sussex County considered deposition transcripts and documentary evidence submitted by the parties, with no live testimony presented at the hearing. The circuit court found that the plaintiff knew of the causal relationship between the abuse and his injuries before he reached the age of majority in 2002. Thus, the court determined that his claims accrued when he became an adult, and were barred by the two-year statute of limitations that expired in 2004. The court granted the defendants’ pleas in bar, dismissing the claims.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed this decision, holding that, since only documentary evidence had been presented, the circuit court’s factual findings were not entitled to deference. It reviewed the matter de novo, found disputed material facts, and concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of review. The Supreme Court clarified that factual findings based on deposition evidence are entitled to substantial deference unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the claims were time-barred. View "Stevens v. Jurnigan" on Justia Law

A man traveling with his family, including his thirteen-year-old daughter, on Delta Air Lines was reported by a flight attendant for suspected human trafficking or sexual abuse after comforting his distressed daughter during turbulence. The flight attendant relayed her suspicions to the flight captain, who then involved the airport station manager, resulting in a call to law enforcement. Upon landing, police detained and questioned the man and his daughter but found no probable cause for arrest. The incident caused the man significant emotional distress and exacerbated his pre-existing PTSD.He subsequently filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the City of Newport News against the flight attendant, Delta, and Endeavor Air, alleging negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with parental rights, and false imprisonment. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and moved to dismiss, claiming immunity under Virginia Code § 63.2-1512. The district court agreed, holding that the defendants were immune because the report, even if made only to law enforcement and not to social services, was made in good faith and without malicious intent. The man appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was uncertain whether the immunity statute applied in this context and certified the legal question to the Supreme Court of Virginia.The Supreme Court of Virginia, upon review of the certified question, held that Virginia Code § 63.2-1512 does not provide immunity to a nonmandatory reporter who, in good faith, reports suspected child abuse to law enforcement without also contacting a Department of Social Services employee or the designated hotline. The Court reasoned that the statutory language is clear and limits immunity to specific categories, which do not include complaints made solely to law enforcement by nonmandatory reporters. The answer to the certified question was “no.” View "Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Renee Jauregui brought a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Shannon J. Cothran, her OB/GYN, alleging that between May and October 2018 she repeatedly informed Dr. Cothran about a lump in her breast during pregnancy-related visits. Jauregui stated that Dr. Cothran dismissed her concerns, diagnosing a clogged milk duct and assuring her that the lump was normal and would resolve itself. At her postpartum visit in October 2018, Jauregui was told to monitor the lump and call if there were changes. When Jauregui noticed a change in July 2019, she returned for a follow-up in August, resulting in a diagnosis of metastatic breast cancer.The Circuit Court of Fairfax County granted Dr. Cothran’s plea in bar, finding that Jauregui’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The court determined there was neither a continuous nor substantially uninterrupted course of examination or treatment after October 2018, thus the continuing treatment rule did not apply. The court concluded that no ongoing physician-patient relationship existed regarding the breast lump after the October 2018 appointment.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the continuing treatment rule does not require specific treatment and that Jauregui’s return in August 2019, pursuant to Dr. Cothran’s prior instructions, established a continuous and substantially uninterrupted course of examination for the same condition.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court did not err in sustaining Dr. Cothran’s plea in bar. It clarified that the continuing treatment rule requires a mostly continuous physician-patient relationship regarding a specific malady, and found that the ten-month gap between appointments constituted a substantial interruption. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that Jauregui’s claim was time-barred. View "Cothran v. Jauregui" on Justia Law

The case involves a woman who, as a minor, engaged in a sexual relationship with an adult more than twice her age. After the relationship ended, she experienced significant psychological distress, including anxiety and difficulty with personal relationships, and was later diagnosed with PTSD by a psychologist. Years after the relationship, she reported the events to the police, resulting in criminal charges against the adult, who was ultimately acquitted. Over a decade after the relationship ended, she brought civil claims for negligence per se, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The Circuit Court of Fairfax County sustained the defendant’s plea in bar, finding that the statute of limitations had run. The court determined that the version of the Virginia accrual statute in effect when the plaintiff reached the age of majority governed the action. The court found no legislative intent to apply later, more favorable statutes retroactively and ruled that the limitations period began when the plaintiff turned 18. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, concluding that the relevant accrual statute did not apply retroactively and that the plaintiff’s own complaint demonstrated awareness of her injuries and their connection to the relationship before reaching adulthood.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed whether the lower courts erred in refusing to apply the more recent accrual statute retroactively and in finding that the plaintiff was aware of her injuries and their causal connection before the age of majority. The Supreme Court held that arguments for retroactive application of the statute were waived because they were not properly raised below, and that the record supported the finding that the plaintiff knew of her injury and its connection to the relationship as a minor. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the claims were time barred. View "Doe v. Green" on Justia Law

A former school administrator, who frequently attended and commented at public school board meetings, was removed from a meeting by police after refusing to leave. She later sued the school board and officials for violations of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) and prevailed. Subsequently, a school board member filed an internal disciplinary complaint against another board member, attaching a narrative that included statements accusing the former administrator of perjury in the prior VFOIA litigation. Another board member, then chairperson, circulated this narrative and a related notice to the school board and superintendent. The former administrator obtained these documents and filed a civil complaint for defamation and defamation per se against the two board members.The Circuit Court of the City of Suffolk overruled the board members’ demurrers, which argued that they were immune from the defamation claims based on legislative, sovereign, and statutory immunity. The court found that the allegations in the amended complaint did not establish immunity at this stage. The board members sought interlocutory review of this decision.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo. It held that while disciplining a fellow board member is a legislative act protected by common law legislative immunity, the immunity does not necessarily extend to allegedly defamatory statements about a third party, such as the plaintiff, when those statements may not be integral to the legislative process. The Court also held that the board members, sued in their individual capacities, were not entitled to sovereign immunity for intentional torts like defamation. Finally, the Court found that statutory immunity under Code § 8.01-223.2 did not apply because the complaint sufficiently alleged that the statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brooks-Buck v. Wahlstrom" on Justia Law

Z.M., a non-verbal autistic child, attends the Center for Autism at Kiln Creek Elementary School. Through his father, he filed a lawsuit alleging that while being transported on a school bus, Newport News Public Schools employees struck him with a wet sock, verbally abused him, and allowed him to leave the bus partially unclothed. The complaint also mentioned previous verbal insults by school employees. Z.M. sought $15 million in compensatory and punitive damages, alleging negligence and gross negligence by the School Board and its employees.The Newport News School Board filed a plea in bar, claiming sovereign immunity. The Circuit Court of Newport News denied the plea regarding claims of simple and gross negligence but granted it concerning punitive damages, citing sovereign immunity. The School Board then filed an interlocutory appeal under Code §§ 8.01-626 and 8.01-670.2, which allow appeals from decisions on sovereign immunity pleas.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that Code § 22.1-194, which waives sovereign immunity when a vehicle is "involved in an accident," did not apply because the bus was not involved in an accident. The court held that the alleged acts did not relate to the operation of the bus as a vehicle. Consequently, the court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also noted that while the School Board is protected by sovereign immunity, the employees accused of gross negligence are not, allowing the lawsuit to proceed against them. View "Newport News School Board v. Z.M." on Justia Law

Dennis Christopher Howard sued Spotsylvania County Sheriff Roger L. Harris and Deputy David Setlock for injuries from a self-inflicted gunshot wound while detained in a law enforcement vehicle. Howard claimed Harris was responsible for Setlock’s actions, which he argued constituted gross negligence. The incident began when Howard, a convicted felon, was found with a suicide note and missing shotgun. After being detained and searched, Howard maneuvered his handcuffs, accessed a handgun left in the vehicle, and shot himself.The Circuit Court of Spotsylvania County granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that Howard’s gross negligence claim failed as a matter of law and that the defense of illegality barred his claims. The court found that Setlock’s actions did not amount to gross negligence and that Howard’s injuries resulted from his illegal act of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court’s decision, holding that Howard had stated a viable gross negligence claim and that his claim was not barred by the illegality defense. The appellate court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Howard’s mental state and whether it negated the mens rea required for the illegal possession of a firearm.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and concluded that Howard’s claim was barred by the defense of illegality. The court held that Howard’s violation of Code § 18.2-308.2, which prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms, was a proximate cause of his injuries. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment for the defendants, finding that Howard’s allegation of an “unsound mind” did not negate the strict liability offense of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. View "Harris v. Howard" on Justia Law

Fatima Shaw-McDonald filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Eye Consultants of Northern Virginia, P.C. after suffering vision loss following cataract surgery. While the lawsuit was pending, she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy but did not initially disclose the lawsuit in her bankruptcy filings. Eye Consultants moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that Shaw-McDonald no longer had standing to pursue it because her interest in the lawsuit had transferred to the bankruptcy trustee. Shaw-McDonald later amended her bankruptcy filings to include the lawsuit and obtained a discharge from the bankruptcy court.The circuit court dismissed the medical malpractice case, concluding that Shaw-McDonald lost standing when she filed for bankruptcy. The court relied on the precedent set by Kocher v. Campbell, which held that a plaintiff loses standing when a cause of action becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. Shaw-McDonald appealed the decision.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that Shaw-McDonald had standing to maintain her medical malpractice action. The court reasoned that once the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the claim, it reverted to Shaw-McDonald as if no bankruptcy petition had been filed.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Shaw-McDonald did not lose standing permanently when she filed for bankruptcy; rather, her standing was temporarily suspended. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy was to hold the medical malpractice case in abeyance until the bankruptcy proceedings were resolved, rather than dismissing it. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Eye Consultants of Northern Virginia P.C. v. Shaw-McDonald" on Justia Law

On November 10, 2014, a traffic accident occurred at the intersection of Wellington Road and Market Place Avenue involving vehicles driven by Sharon Elizabeth Furr and Janaia Spurlock. Tamara Al-Saray, a passenger in Spurlock's vehicle, suffered significant injuries, including a traumatic brain injury. Spurlock attempted a left turn with a solid green light, requiring her to yield to oncoming traffic. Furr, traveling westbound at the speed limit, collided with Spurlock's vehicle. Al-Saray filed claims against both drivers for negligence but later nonsuited her claims against Spurlock. The trial court excluded evidence of Spurlock's guilty plea for failure to yield.The Prince William County Circuit Court denied Furr's motions to strike the evidence and for reconsideration, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the claim that Furr failed to maintain a proper lookout. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Al-Saray, awarding her $7,000,000 in damages. Furr appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the evidence was insufficient to establish Furr's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident. The Court of Appeals majority found that the evidence was purely circumstantial and did not exclude other possible causes of the accident.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Al-Saray, was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The Court emphasized that proximate cause can be established by circumstantial evidence and that the jury's inference of Furr's negligence was reasonable. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address Furr's remaining assignments of cross-error. View "Al-Saray v. Furr" on Justia Law

Father Constantine P. Rogakos, an 86-year-old retired Greek-Orthodox priest, visited Bon Secours-DePaul Medical Center for an outpatient abdominal ultrasound. He used a cane due to a shuffled gait and had a history of falls. At the hospital, he was provided a wheelchair to reach the waiting room. In the ultrasound room, he was instructed to change into a medical gown. While changing, he leaned on a wheeled hospital stretcher, which moved, causing him to fall and sustain severe injuries. He later died from these injuries.The Administrator of his estate filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against the hospital, alleging negligence by the sonographer, Joanna Regan, for failing to assist and ensure the stretcher's wheels were locked. The circuit court denied the hospital's motion to strike and refused to allow a hospital stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $2,000,000. The hospital's post-trial motions were denied.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the circuit court's decisions, including the admissibility of Father Rogakos' statements under the Dead Man’s Statute, the refusal to grant a multiple causes jury instruction, and the exclusion of the stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit. The hospital appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment. It held that the Dead Man’s Statute did not preclude the introduction of Father Rogakos' statements as they were conveyed by non-interested witnesses. The court also found no error in the circuit court's refusal to grant the multiple causes jury instruction, exclusion of the stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit, and denial of the hospital's motion to strike, as the evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "Bon Secours-DePaul Medical Center v. Rogakos-Russell" on Justia Law