Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute between H. Cliff Page and the Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority (PRHA). Page owned a building in Portsmouth that shared a common wall with a building owned by PRHA. In 2014, PRHA demolished its building after the City of Portsmouth declared it an unlawful nuisance. Page claimed that the demolition was negligently performed and damaged his building. PRHA responded with a plea in bar, raising the defense of sovereign immunity.The circuit court held a hearing on the plea in bar and ruled in favor of PRHA, holding that sovereign immunity barred Page’s claim. The court found that the demolition of the property was implemented under the City of Portsmouth’s plan to address blight in the Downtown Portsmouth Historic District. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s ruling, stating that PRHA’s immunity should be the same as that of the City of Portsmouth.However, the Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that sovereign immunity does not shield PRHA from tort liability under the circumstances of this case. The court found that PRHA was acting in its proprietary capacity, similar to a private landowner, when it demolished the building. The court concluded that PRHA's obedience to the City’s Notice of Emergency Demolition was not an exercise of governmental discretion but a ministerial legal duty to perform a proprietary function. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Page v. Portsmouth Redevelopment & Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County and Rita M. Leach-Lewis, trustee of the Rita M. Leach-Lewis Trust, which owns several homes in Fairfax County. These homes are used by members of the New World Church of the Christ, including Leach-Lewis, for activities such as handling correspondence, preparing spiritual teachings, and storing files and boxes. The homes are located in a residential-conservation zone, which prohibits office uses. After a zoning official conducted a search of the residences, a notice of violation of the zoning ordinance was issued, stating that the homes were being used as an "office."The notice of violation was appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), which upheld the zoning administrator's decision. Leach-Lewis then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the BZA's decision, arguing that the residences were not being used as an "office" and that the notice of violation was based on an improper search under the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court upheld the BZA's decision, and Leach-Lewis appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the BZA had a duty to interpret and apply a provision of the zoning ordinance that states that no part of the ordinance may be construed to authorize an unconstitutional inspection or search. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the BZA to determine whether the zoning ordinance was violated by the search of the church's property.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the BZA was not required to examine the constitutionality of the search underlying the notice of violation. The court also concluded that the residences were being used as an "office" as defined in the zoning ordinance. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment in favor of the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County. View "Board of Supervisors v. Leach-Lewis" on Justia Law

In Virginia, Bryant McCants arranged for his 1970 Ford Mustang Mach 1 to be repaired at a shop operated by CD & PB Enterprises, LLC, doing business as Maaco Collision Repair & Auto Painting. The repair shop was managed by Hanson Butler, a part owner and employee of CD & PB Maaco. After the work was completed, McCants inspected the vehicle and was unsatisfied with the work, prompting Butler to agree to repaint it. However, due to various personal circumstances, McCants was unable to pick up the vehicle for several months. In the meantime, Butler initiated the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles' abandoned-vehicle process, which resulted in him acquiring title to the vehicle, which he later sold.McCants sued Butler for conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act. The jury found in favor of McCants on the conversion claim only and awarded him $78,500. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding that Butler had properly followed the abandoned-vehicle process and had obtained legal title to the vehicle.The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that a rational jury could have found that Butler wrongfully used the DMV's abandoned-vehicle process as a pretext for severing McCants's ownership rights in the vehicle and thereafter claiming it for himself. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstated the jury’s verdict, and affirmed the trial court’s confirmation order. View "McCants v. CD & PB Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the State Corporation Commission dismissing Verizon Virginia LLC's petition for a declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition pursuant to Va. Code 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821.Verizon, a telecommunications company, filed a petition for a declaratory judgment with the Commission requesting a declaration that either Capital Beltway Express LLC (CBE) or The Lane Construction Corporation was responsible for costs pursuant to section 33.2-1815(B) to relocate some of Verizon's utility facilities, as required by the Virginia Department of Transportation in the underlying project to extend portions of the I-495 express lanes. The Commission dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Verizon appealed, arguing that sections 33.2-1815(B) and 33.2-1821 granted the Commission jurisdiction to resolve which party was responsible for the costs of the utility relocations necessitated by the project. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Verizon's petition. View "Verizon Virginia LLC v. SCC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in this real property dispute, holding that the escheat provision of Va. Code 58.1-3967, as applied to the factual circumstances of this case, violated Va. Const. art. I, 11.The City of Richmond obtained a judicial sale of a parcel of property that was subject to a statutory lien for delinquent taxes. The circuit court confirmed the sale and directed that the City's lien for delinquent taxes, along with its costs and legal fees, be fully paid by the purchase proceeds. Although the sale proceeds satisfied the tax lien, the circuit court concluded that section 58.1-3967 required it to award a portion of the surplus sale proceeds to the City instead of an unsatisfied junior lienor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as applied to this particular case, section 58.1-3967 unconstitutionally authorized the City to take the proceeds and keep them for itself. View "McKeithen v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court entering summary judgment favor of Eastern Shore Community Services Board (ESCSB) and holding that Oreze Healthcare LLC's conveyance of real property to a third party prohibited Oreze from pursuing its breach of contract claim against ESCSB, holding that ESCSB was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.ESCSB and Oreze entered into a commercial lease agreement under which ESCSB agreed to lease the four buildings comprising an assisted living facility whose license had been suspended and to provide interim care to its residents until a permanent solution was reached. When water damaged the buildings and no remedy was reached before ESCSB terminated the lease Oreze brought this complaint for breach of contract. While the lawsuit was pending, Oreze conveyed the property to a third party by general warranty deed. The circuit court granted summary judgment for ESCSB, ruling that Oreze failed to reserve its claims in the deed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deed did not extinguish or transfer Oreze's right to sue ESCSB for property damage arising from an alleged breach of the lease. View "Oreze Healthcare v. Eastern Shore Community Services Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court in this property dispute, holding that the evidence did not support the judgment in connection with Kevin and Meredith Horn's claim of a prescriptive easement to dock a boat on James and Hong Webbs' property.The Horns claimed a prescriptive easement to store small watercraft on the Webbs' land and further claimed a prescriptive easement to lock a boat on the Webbs' property. The Webbs brought this complaint alleging trespass and nuisance and seeking a declaratory judgment of their rights. The Horns counterclaimed that they had a prescriptive easement to both dock the boat and to store the watercraft. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Webbs and awarded them compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in rejecting the Horns' claim of a prescriptive easement to store smaller watercraft; (2) the Horns established the existence of a prescriptive easement to dock a boat; and (3) nothing in the record established malice on the part of the Horns in filing their lawsuit, and therefore, the award of punitive damages was improper. View "Horn v. Webb" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court determining that an auctioneer had verbally modified its advertised terms prior to the start of the auction and ordering the conveyance of a fee simple interest in a parcel of real property by special warranty deed to Plaintiff, holding that the circuit court erred.Plaintiff attended an auction advertised by Plaintiff for the sale of the property at issue. Plaintiff's bid was the high bid, but Defendants refused to sell the property for that amount. Plaintiff brought this complaint seeking specific performance, alleging that, in the pre-auction announcement, Defendants used language stating that the auction was going to be an absolute auction. The trial court ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance and ordered the conveyance of the property by special warranty deed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that the auction was an absolute auction rather than an auction with reserve; and (2) therefore, no contract was formed between the parties. View "Williams v. Janson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court holding that no justiciable dispute existed between the parties following the court's holding that the plaintiff qualified as a third-party beneficiary of a 1973 ground lease, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in sua sponte dismissing this declaratory-judgment action as nonjusticiable.A developer filed a declaratory judgment action against the lessee of an adjoining property seeking to resolve conflicting interpretations of a lease provision. The circuit court concluded that the developer was a third-party beneficiary of the long-term ground lease in this case and dismissed the case on the grounds that there were no further justiciable controversies to resolve. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that dismissal was premature because the parties continued categorically to disagree on what specific rights, if any, the developer had under the lease and when those rights could be asserted. View "Ames Center, L.C. v. Soho Arlington, LLC" on Justia Law

Southwest Virginia Wildlife Center of Roanoke (SVWC) provides medical and rehabilitative care to 2,000 animals each year. SVWC is located at the end of a shared private easement that is approximately 476 feet long; the other properties that can only be accessed by the easement’s unpaved, single-lane dirt driveway, across their lawns. The easement is not maintained by any governmental entity. SVWC sought a special use permit to build a large “raptor building.” The Zoning Administrator determined that existing “accessory structures” on SVWC's property were either improperly granted zoning permits or had not been granted permits. The Board of Supervisors granted the special use permit, which retroactively authorized the accessory structures and the construction of the raptor building, subject to conditions requiring buffering and materials. Neighboring owners challenged the approval, arguing that traffic on the easement has increased “20- to 50-fold” since, SVWC began operating in 2014, causing “congestion, noise, dust, and light pollution” and posing a danger to their children.The trial court dismissed their complaint, citing lack of standing. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed. The dust, noise, and light pollution allegedly caused by the traffic on the easement constitute particularized harm to the plaintiffs. The complaint sufficiently alleged that the construction of the raptor building and the corresponding expansion of SVWC’s services would cause more traffic and supports a reasonable inference that the decision to retroactively approve the accessory structures would lead to traffic on the easement. View "Seymour v. Roanoke County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law