Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Plaintiff bought a parcel of property from Fauber Enterprises, Inc., the basement of the house flooded when it rained. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Fauber, Fauber’s real estate agent, and others, alleging violations of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing that the instructions given on the standard of proof were incorrect. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a plaintiff must prove a violation of the VCPA by a preponderance of the evidence; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred by concluding that Plaintiff was required to prove her VCPA claims by clear and convincing evidence. Remanded. View "Ballagh v. Fauber Enters." on Justia Law

Bank filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that its deed of trust on certain property was a valid first priority lien on the property. Defendant filed an answer requesting a declaration that its deed of trust was a valid first priority lien on the property. The circuit court ruled that Defendant’s deed of trust had priority over Bank’s deed of trust and that Va. Code 55-52, which codifies the doctrine of after-acquired title, could not elevate Bank’s deed of trust over Defendant’s deed of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 55-52 only applies between the parties to a deed and does not affect the rights of third parties or influence the relative priority of their interests; (2) a party who acquires a deed of trust pursuant to a court order is a lien creditor for purposes of section 55-96(A); and (3) a prior deed of trust recorded outside a party’s chain of title is not “duly admitted to record” for purposes of 55-96(A). View "Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Arrington" on Justia Law

In 1936, the the Grand View Development Corporation distributed a large tract of real estate in a beach area to its shareholders via a deed. A referenced map included two parallel lines depicting an easement. Between the parallel lines was written “Along Present Mean High Water.” Due to changes in the sand and water levels since 1936, the easement is now under water. Plaintiffs, landowners of some of the properties conveyed by the 1936 deed, sought a declaratory judgment claiming that the location of the express easement moved with the mean high water line as the beach eroded. Defendants asserted that the easement had been extinguished. The circuit court ruled that Plaintiffs had a variable express easement that moved with the mean high water line. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that that the express easement created by the 1936 deed had been extinguished because the easement never moved from the mean high water line as it existed in 1936. View "Marble Techs., Inc. v. Mallon" on Justia Law

The Commissioner of Highways sought to acquire a 387-acre portion of Landowners’ property to facilitate road improvements. Before making an offer, Thomas Savage completed an appraisal ordered by the Commonwealth and valued the entire property at $500,000 and just compensation for the to-be acquired portion at $246,292. The Commissioner deposited $248,707 with the clerk of court, and Landowners withdrew the money. The Commissioner then filed a petition in condemnation requesting that a jury ascertain the value of the property. A second appraisal of the property assessed just compensation for the acquired portion of property at $92,127. During trial, Landowners sought, unsuccessfully, to admit into evidence Savage’s appraisal. A jury found just compensation for Landowners’ property to be $234,032. The trial court held that title in relevant portion of Landowners’ property vested in the Commonwealth and ordered Landowners to repay the Commissioner $14,675. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in finding that oral and written evidence of the property value as determined in the Savage appraisal was an offer to settle and, as such, was inadmissible at trial. Remanded. View "Ramsey v. Comm’r of Highways" on Justia Law

A county code compliance investigator issued Appellant a notice of violation regarding her property. The county zoning administrator then determined that Appellant had committed a violation. The Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) upheld that violation determination. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari to seek judicial review of the BZA’s final decision. Appellant, however, did not name the Board of Supervisors or any other party. The circuit court granted the zoning administrator’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Appellant failed to add the Board of Supervisors as a party to the proceeding within the thirty-day statutory period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that compliance with the styling requirement in Va. Code 15.2-2314 is required to trigger the circuit court’s active jurisdiction, and no waiver to the thirty-day filing requirement occurred in this case. View "Frace v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The City of Fredericksburg brought suit against CVAS 2, LLC, which owns real estate within the City’s geographic area, seeking to have CVAS 2’s real estate sold in order to collect the LLC’s outstanding payments for delinquent real estate taxes and special assessments. The circuit court entered a decree of sale ordering that CVAS 2’s real estate be sold in gross to pay the delinquent taxes, penalties and special assessments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City did not strictly comply with Va. Code 15.2-5158 and 58.1-3965(A) allowing for it to bring suit under the circumstances, and therefore, the circuit court lacked authority to order the sale of CVAS 2’s real estate. View "CVAS 2, LLC v. City of Fredericksburg" on Justia Law

In 2005, Donald Devine and his wife Nancy Devine acquired ownership of Rock Hall, a 200-year-old house. In 2007, Charles Buki and Kimberly Marsho signed a contract agreeing to purchase Rock Hall. Later that year, Buki and Marsho (together, Plaintiffs) brought suit against Donald and Nancy (together Defendants), alleging that Defendants fraudulently induced them to enter into the real estate contract and to close on Rock Hall by misrepresenting and concealing the true condition of the house. The trial court concluded that Nancy had committed no wrong but nonetheless granted rescission of the real estate contract against both Donald and Nancy, concluding that Nancy should be “responsible jointly and severally with her husband for the payment of the purchase price” of Rock Hall. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because there was no evidence of any wrongdoing on the part of Nancy, the trial court had no basis for awarding any remedy, including rescission, against Nancy. View "Devine v. Buki" on Justia Law

In 2005, Donald Devine and his wife Nancy Devine acquired ownership of Rock Hall, a 200-year-old house. In 2007, Charles Buki and Kimberly Marsho signed a contract agreeing to purchase Rock Hall. Later that year, Buki and Marsho (together, Plaintiffs) brought suit against Donald and Nancy (together Defendants), alleging that Defendants fraudulently induced them to enter into the real estate contract and to close on Rock Hall by misrepresenting and concealing the true condition of the house. The trial court concluded that Plaintiffs were entitled to rescission of the contract where David, but not Nancy, committed fraud. The court awarded consequential damages and attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in granting rescission of the real estate contract based on Donald’s fraudulent concealment of the true state of the house and did not err in awarding attorney’s fees; (2) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award punitive damages; and (3) erred in awarding consequential damages and prejudgment interest. View "Devine v. Buki" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth filed a complaint alleging that Windsor Plaza Condominium violated Va. Code 36-96.3(B)(ii) by failing to make reasonable accommodations in rules or services that were necessary to afford Michael Fishel equal opportunity to enjoy his dwelling. Fishel and his wife moved to intervene in the lawsuit, alleging additional causes of action. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Windsor Plaza. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling that the evidence relating to conversion of a bicycle storage space into an accessible parking space supported a claim for reasonable modification rather than a claim for reasonable accommodation; (2) did not err in ruling granting Windsor Plaza’s motion to strike; (3) erred in ruling that Windsor Plaza’s request for attorney’s fees against the Commonwealth was not barred by sovereign immunity, but the error was harmless; (4) did not err in concluding that the statute of limitations barred the Fishels’ additional claims; and (5) did not err by refusing to award Windsor Plaza attorney’s fees against the Fischels. View "Commonwealth v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

DHRI, Inc. entered into a contract to purchase a parcel of land from William Hanback. DHRI later sued Defendant for specific performance of the land purchase contract. On June 9, 2004, the trial court entered a decree providing that Hanback should sell the property to DHRI and DHRI should pay to Hancock certain sums. On November 21, 2012, Hancock filed a petition for rule to show cause, asserting that after closing on the property, DHRI refused to pay funds owed him under the June 9, 2004 order. After a hearing, the circuit court issued a rule to show cause to DHRI. The court then determined that DHRI had not paid Hancock the required amount of $350,000, found DHRI in contempt of the June 9, 2004 order, and entered judgment for Defendant against Plaintiff in the amount of $350,000. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the rule to show cause, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion because the June 9, 2004 order did not contain definite terms as to the total amount DRHI was required to pay and when such payment was due. View "DRHI, Inc. v. Hanback" on Justia Law