Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, owners of garaged lots in a subdivision, filed a complaint against the homeowners' association (HOA) alleging that the unequal treatment resulting from the HOA's assignment of parking spaces only to ungaraged lots in an amendment violated the subdivision's declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (the Declaration). The circuit court determined that the amendment was invalid and ruled that the reservation of parking spaces in the common area for use solely by owners of ungaraged lots violated the Declaration. The court also found Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling the Declaration requires that parking spaces in the common area be assigned equally among all lot owners; (2) did not err in ruling that the amendment was invalid; (3) erred in its award of certain compensatory damages but did not err in awarding other compensatory damages; and (4) did not err in ruling that Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees and in determining the amount of that award. Remanded for a determination of attorneys' fees incurred by Plaintiffs subsequent to the court's entry of the judgment appealed from. View "Manchester Oaks Homeowners Ass'n v. Batt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging common law trespass. Plaintiffs argued that by not developing their land in a reasonable manner, Defendants directed and caused storm water to flow upon Plaintiffs' property so as to cause damage to the property. The trial court sustained Defendants' demurrer with prejudice, finding that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action for trespass. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in sustaining Defendants' demurrer, as Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action for common law trespass based upon a violation of the modified common law rule applicable to surface water. Remanded. View "Kurpiel v. Hicks" on Justia Law

In these appeals the Supreme Court considered whether the Virginia Constitution provides for a cause of action by a landowner for inverse condemnation when the allegation of the complaint is that the landowner's property has been damaged by a diminution in value resulting from a public utility's construction and operation of an electrical transmission line for public use on nearby property. The trial court sustained the public utility's demurrers with prejudice, finding that because the complaints did not allege that the entire property had been rendered useless, and because the property had not lost all economic value, a damaging under the Constitution had not occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court applied the wrong standard in reviewing the pleadings; but (2) under the proper standard, the complainants could not state a cause of action for declaratory relief for inverse condemnation when the sole damage alleged was a diminution in value arising from the public use of proximately located property, and therefore, the circuit court's judgment sustaining the demurrers was correct under the proper standard. View "Byler v. Va. Elec. & Power Co." on Justia Law

In this case, Long Lane Associates Limited Partnership challenged ordinances adopted by the town council of the Town of Lessburg concerning property owned by an adjoining landowner. The challenged ordinances rezoned property owned by Cornerstone Chapel, amended the Town Plan to remove a portion of a public road, and approved a special exception to permit Cornerstone to operate a day care center on its property. The circuit court concluded that the amendment to the Town Plan was null and void, ruling that the Town lacked authority to approve Cornerstone's request to rezone its property or amend its zoning conditions without Long Lane's consent because Long Lane had a vested right in the completion of the road and the development set forth in the proffered conditions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Long Lane did not have vested rights in the zoning classification or land uses of its neighbor, even where the property was subdivided from a parcel which was rezoned subject to proffered conditions; and (2) Long Lane did not have a vested right in the construction of a road shown on the Town Plan, and the Town did not need Long Lane's consent to amend its plan. View "Town of Leesburg v. Long Lane Assocs." on Justia Law

Rosa Steward leased a home from Holland Family Properties. Rosa's son Dontral suffered lead poisoning as a result of his exposure to high levels of lead paint, which caused severe physical and mental impairments. Dontral, through his mother (Steward), filed a complaint against Holland and Jean Cross, the owner of property Dontral often visited. Both properties contained lead-based paint. Steward claimed that Defendants were liable for his injuries based on theories of negligence per se and common law negligence. The circuit court dismissed both counts on demurrer. At issue on appeal was whether Defendants, landlords subject to the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (VRLTA), had a duty in tort to the tenants of leased properties to comply with building and housing codes concerning public health and safety. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a tort duty was not imposed on these landlords by the common law, the leases executed in this case, or the VRLTA. View "Steward v. Holland Family Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Fred and Mary Ann Hart filed a complaint against Piney Meeting House Investments (PMH), alleging that PMH placed various obstructions in the Harts' easement area on PMH's property that interfered with the Harts' full use and enjoyment of the easement. A commissioner in chancery enjoined PMH from maintaining several encroachments but found that a well and a propane tank could remain underground. The Harts filed exceptions to the commissioner's report and argued that they were entitled to their attorney's fees. The circuit court sustained the Harts' exceptions and found that the Harts were entitled to recover their attorney's fees and costs from PMH. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court insofar as it sustained the Harts' exceptions regarding the buried propane tank and well; (2) affirmed the circuit court in its award of costs to the Harts; and (3) reversed the circuit court in its award of attorney's fees to the Harts. Remanded. View "Piney Meeting House Invs., Inc. v. Hart" on Justia Law

Jackson Ward Partners (JWP) owned real property in the City of Richmond. JWP filed an amended complaint in the circuit court for correction of erroneous tax assessments on the property for the tax years 2005-2008, claiming that the assessments were clearly erroneous and in excess of the fair market value. The circuit court held that JWP satisfied its burden of proving the City's assessments were erroneous and ordered the City to correct its assessments and issue refunds to JWP for taxes it overpaid based on the erroneous assessment, plus interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that JWP failed to prove the fair market value of the real property at issue. Remanded for entry of an order reinstating the City's tax assessments on the real property for the tax years in question. View "City of Richmond v. Jackson Ward Partners, L.P." on Justia Law

Nina and her brother Eddie Russell were co-trustees of several family trusts. The trust estate consisted of the interests held by Nina and Eddie as co-trustees in Russell Realty Associates (RRA), which was created by the siblings' father. Nina and Russell disagreed about several matters and conflicts escalated. Eventually, Eddie, individually and as co-trustee, filed a complaint seeking judicial dissolution and winding up of RRA. The circuit court granted Eddie's complaint for dissolution, finding that the economic purpose of RRA was likely to be reasonably frustrated and that the business could no longer practicably operate in conformity with the partnership agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court's findings. View "Russell Realty Assocs. v. Russell" on Justia Law

The Mathewses conveyed a parcel of land by deed of trust to a credit union to secure a promissory note. PHH Mortgage Corporation subsequently became the holder of the note and the beneficiary of the deed of trust. After the Mathewses failed to make payments, PHH commenced foreclosure proceedings on the parcel. The Mathewses filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the foreclosure sale would be void because PHH had not satisfied conditions precedent to foreclosure set forth in the deed of trust. Specifically, they alleged that 24 C.F.R. 203.604 (the Regulation) required PHH to have a meeting with them thirty days before the commencement of foreclosure proceedings. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the Regulation was incorporated into the deed of trust as a condition precedent to foreclosure but that, under Virginia common law, the party who breaches a contract first cannot sue to enforce it. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) borrowers may sue to enforce conditions precedent to foreclosure even if they were the first party to breach the note secured by a deed of trust through non-payment; and (2) the Mathewses pled sufficient facts for the Regulation to apply. Remanded. View "Mathews v. PHH Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

Gerald T. Dixon, Jr., LLC retained Hassell & Folkes to survey and mark the boundary lines of a parcel Dixon owned. After completion of the survey, Dixon conveyed the parcel to Brat Development, which began construction of an office building. Thereafter, A&G Partnership filed for injunctive relief alleging that the building encroached upon its adjoining parcel. The circuit court found in favor of A&G and ordered the building's removal. Brat subsequently sued Dixon. Dixon then sued Hassell alleging breach of contract due to Harrell's erroneous determination of the parcel's boundary lines. The circuit court dismissed Dixon's complaint with prejudice, concluding that Dixon's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Dixon's cause of action was subject to a three-year statute of limitations and was time-barred when Dixon filed its complaint. View "Gerald T. Dixon, Jr., L.L.C. v. Hassell & Folkes" on Justia Law