Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

First American Title Insurance Company (FATIC) provided title insurance for a mortgage refinancing to SunTrust Mortgage through FATIC's title agent, First Alliance. First Alliance subsequently obtained a $100,000 surety bond pursuant to the Virginia Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act (CRESPA) from Western Surety (Western). After the property owner defaulted under the original mortgages, SunTrust lost $734,296. FATIC paid the full amount of this loss then made a formal demand upon Western for $100,000. Western refused to pay FATIC the amount of the surety bond. FATIC sued Western and First Alliance for breach of contract. The district court entered judgment in FATIC's favor for $100,000. The Supreme Court held (1) CRESPA does not recognize a private cause of action that may be asserted against a surety and the surety bond issued pursuant to former Va. Code Ann. 6.1-2.21(D)(3); (2) Virginia law nonetheless permits a cause of action against a surety and the surety bond executed pursuant to CRESPA by the assertion of a common law claim; and (3) a title insurance company may have standing, not in its own right, but as a subrogee of its insured, to maintain a cause of action against a surety and the surety bond. View "First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. W. Surety Co." on Justia Law

An unincorporated association purporting to represent the general public filed a complaint for injunctive relief against several property owners, alleging that the property owners blocked access to a public road by the general public by erecting pole gates. In their answer, the property owners denied that the road was a public road. The circuit court granted injunctive relief to the association after finding that the association had proven that the general public was entitled to unrestricted use of the road. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding there had been no dedication and acceptance of the road as a public road; (2) the circuit court erred in finding that the association had established that the road was public solely by virtue of its long and continuous use by the general public and recognition of that use by the county; and (3) the circuit court erred in its ruling insofar as it would allow a traditional prescriptive easement could be created in favor of the general public, but the court's ruling that prescription had not been proven was nonetheless a correct result in light of its finding that there had been no acceptance. View "Dykes v. Friends of the C.C.C. Road" on Justia Law

McCarthy Holdings filed a complaint against Vincent Burgher, seeking a declaratory judgment concerning an easement agreement. McCarthy, the owner of the dominant estate, sought a declaration that it had the right, as a matter of law, to bar Burgher, the owner of the servient estate, from any use of the easement. The circuit court found that the easement agreement was unambiguous and that it did not bar Burgher from reasonable use of the easement area. McCarthy appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in construing the easement agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying McCarthy's request to bar Burgher, as a matter of law, from any use of the easement area based upon the easement agreement; and (2) the circuit court did not improperly consider parol evidence in interpreting the easement agreement. View "McCarthy Holdings L.L.C. v. Burgher" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Fox Rest Associates (Fox Rest) was formed to purchase Fox Rest Apartments. Defendants in this case were George Little, Fox Rest's legal counsel through his law firm, George B. Little and Associates (GBL&A), George Little's wife, and GBL&A. This action took place after Mr. Little sold the Apartments without knowledge of Fox Rest and transferred a portion of the proceeds from the sale in an account he held with Mrs. Little. Unable to satisfy a previous judgment finding Mr. Little and GLB&A liable to Fox Rest for, inter alia, malpractice and double billing, Fox Rest filed this action against Defendants, seeking to void various transactions by Mr. Little as fraudulent conveyances and voluntary conveyances. The court granted Defendants' motion to strike, finding that Fox Rest did not present sufficient evidence in its case in chief to establish a prima facie case for its claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that, except for a portion of the claims relating to the sale of certain equipment, the circuit court erred in striking Fox Rest's fraudulent conveyance and voluntary conveyance claims. Remanded. View "Fox Rest Assocs., L.P. v. Little" on Justia Law

The City of Richmond provides a partial exemption from real estate taxes for qualifying rehabilitated property if a property increases in value by at least forty percent because of rehabilitation. According to the city code, the amount of the partial exemption is the difference between the property's assessed value before rehabilitation and its initial rehabilitated assessed value. At issue in this case was whether the City Assessor's policy of determining a property's initial rehabilitated assessed value not as of the date its rehabilitation is completed but as of the date its owner's application for the program is submitted was consistent with the requirements of the city code. The circuit court held the policy departed from the requirements of the code because the ordinance requires that a property's first assessed value after rehabilitation be used to determine the amount of a partial exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "initial rehabilitated assessed value" means the first assessed value after rehabilitation and not, as the city argued, value attributable to rehabilitation. View "Riverside Owner v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

In 2008 the Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner of Virginia condemned the Taco Bell restaurant building located near a federal highway. Taco Bell argued that approximately 42 pieces of equipment used in the restaurant as part of Taco Bell's business were fixtures and therefore should be included in determining the just compensation for the property taken. The trial court held that the items in question were personal property and there was no factual determination to be made by the jury because the evidence showed that the items could have been removed from the property. Taco Bell appealed, arguing that the trial court did not properly apply the Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement test for determining whether sufficient evidence was presented to submit the issue to the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while the items in question were moveable, there was evidence the items were of the type needed for the purpose to which the property was devoted, and therefore the evidence on the issue whether the items were fixtures or personalty for condemnation purposes was sufficient to submit to the jury. View "Taco Bell of America, Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Gardiner Mulford purchased a tract of land after being advised by the seller that it might be landlocked and reviewing an appraisal that concluded an access easement would need to be acquired. Mulford began to use an old plank road on Walnut Hill Farm Group's land to access his property. Mulford was arrested for trespassing. Mulford then filed a four-count complaint against Walnut Hill, alleging the roadbed was a lawful, recorded easement. The trial court held for Walnut Hill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court did not err in finding (1) a public body did not accept an offer to dedicate the roadway, and therefore the roadbed was not public; (2) the elements of proof for a prescriptive easement, including use of an easement by prior occupants, were not established, and therefore Mulford was not entitled to a prescriptive easement; and (3) because Mulford did not allege that Walnut Hill made any representation regarding an easement upon which he relied, Walnut Hill was not equitably estopped from denying the easement. View "Mulford v. Walnut Hill Farm Group, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Appellee John Jennings operates a commercial marina/boatyard. He challenged the local zoning board's authority to regulate the construction of additional mooring slips that would lie beyond the mean low-water mark of a navigable body of water on his property. Appellant also challenged the authority's "special exception permit" ordinance, claiming that the ordinance lacks adequate standards to guide the governing body's decision to grant or deny a permit. On review, the Supreme Court found no errors from the lower court's record on either ground: "the County's zoning authority 'embrace[s] the entirety of [Appellee's] proposed construction, even the portion that 'extends into the Chesapeake Bay's tidal tributaries.'" The Court affirmed the lower court's denial of Appellee's request for declaratory relief.

In 2008, the Board of County Supervisors filed a petition for condemnation in trial court against Appellee's Charles and Anna Dean, seeking to obtain the Deans' property to expand a bus maintenance facility and parking structure. The Deans' property consisted of approximately one acre, and had been used previously as a gas station and transmission repair shop. The County had tried to purchase the property, but had been unable to reach an agreement regarding compensation for the property. Before trial, the County filed a motion in limine requesting the court exclude evidence of a purported comparable sale that the Deans relied on to arrive at a price for their property. At trial, the County's expert appraiser testified that the Deans' property was worth $475,000; the Deans' expert valued the property at $900,000. Ultimately the jury fixed the property's value at $488,750. The Deans filed exceptions to the jury's report that the court overruled and denied. On review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the County's motion in limine and excluding evidence regarding the "comparable sale," and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

In 1925, the owner of a parcel of land adjacent to the James River obtained the right to construct a wharf and pier extending into the river and adjacent to public land, then owned by the Isle of Wight County. Over time, the wharf was extended to include a pavilion and attached piers resting on pilings placed in the subsurface lands of the river, within the area between the mean low-water mark and the line of navigation. Through a chain of successive recorded transfers, the pavilion and piers were acquired by members of the Bracey family, including Appellee R. Forrest Scott. The family performed extensive renovations and began using the pavilions as a family retreat. The pavilion and connecting piers were destroyed by hurricane in 2003, and although a number of pilings that supported the original structures remain in place, there has been no reconstruction. In 2006, Appellant Burwell's Bay Improvement Association received approval to construct a pier from its property into the riparian area formerly containing the pavilion and piers that were destroyed in 2003. In March, 2007, Scott and other members of the Bracey sought a declaratory judgment from the circuit court that they own the riparian and other rights on and adjacent to the public area, to determine the extent of those rights, and to enjoin construction by Appellant that would interfere with the family's rights. The circuit court found that the family failed to establish ownership of the riparian rights by adverse possession or a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to review whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the use of the riparian rights was exclusive and continuous for the required period of time. The Court found because the family chose not to reconstruct after the 2003 hurricane, the piers that remained was not enough to use tacking to establish exclusive and continuous use of the area and riparian rights. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.