Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court admitting the will at issue in this case to probate and appointing an administrator for the estate of James A. Townsey but otherwise reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting relief on counts two and three of the complaint.The circuit court admitted Townsey's will to probate, appointed an administrator for the estate, and awarded the proceeds of a brokerage account to a German charity. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court properly admitted the will to probate and appointed an administrator for Townsey's estate; and (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellant on counts two and three of the complaint. View "Taylor v. Aids-Hilfe Koln e.V." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Virginia Uniform Arbitration Act, Va. Code 8.01-581.01 to -.016 (VUAA), and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1-16 (FAA), do not compel enforcement of an arbitration clause in a trust.The decedent created an inter vivos irrevocable trust that was divided into three shares for his children and grandchildren. The trust contained an unambiguous arbitration clause. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, the trust's trustee, alleging breach of duty. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a trust is neither a contract nor an agreement that can be enforced against a beneficiary; and (2) therefore, neither the VUAA nor the FAA compel arbitration. View "Boyle v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in this interlocutory appeal of a decision of the circuit court overruling Appellants' demurrer and allowing Appellees to proceed with their claims, holding that the circuit court erred.Appellees brought this action against Margaret's Future Trust, the Estate of Walter, Jr. and another trust seeking an accounting of each party's assets, restitution, and the imposition of a constructive construct on the trusts' assets based on Walter, Jr.'s alleged fraudulent conduct and breach of fiduciary duty as trustee of Walter, Sr.'s and Margaret's estates. The circuit court subsequently allowed Appellees to amend their complaint to add claims relating to the arms-length sale by their mother, Margaret, of her minority interest in Hurley, LLC, in 2006 and to joint the relevant members of Hurley, LLC as defendants. In this interlocutory appeal, Appellants argued that the circuit court improperly conferred standing on Appellees to pursue claims challenging and seeking to "unwind" the 2006 Hurley Transaction. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision on these issues, dismissed Appellees' claims relating to the Hurley Transaction, and remanded for further proceedings, holding that Appellees lacked standing to bring the claims regarding the Hurley Transaction. View "Kittrell v. Fowler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting demurrers as to all claims filed by John Mark Rohrbaugh Sr.'s daughter seeking both an equitable and a statutory accounting from her brother in his former capacity as an agent managing their father's financial affairs pursuant to a power of attorney (POA) and in his current capacity as co-executor of their father's estate, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff brought this complaint against John Mark Rohrbaugh Jr. in both his individual capacity and in his capacity as a co-executor of the Rohrbaugh Sr. estate requesting a statutory accounting from Rohrbaugh Jr. concerning his actions pursuant to his father's POA and requesting an equitable accounting. The circuit court granted the demurrers to the complaint and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err when it dismissed on demurrer Plaintiff's equitable and statutory accounting claims. View "Phillips v. Rohrbaugh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in these appeals regarding two brothers' disputes concerning the administration of their deceased mother's estate, holding that the circuit court did not err in removing both brother from their fiduciary roles and replacing them with a disinterested third party.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in removing the brothers as co-executors on the basis that the brothers were, to the detriment of the estate, deadlocked concerning the administration of the estate; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the brothers compensation, legal fees, and costs; and (3) there was no reversible error regarding the presence of a third brother in the courtroom during the trial. View "Galiotos v. Galiotos" on Justia Law

In this appeal arising out of a suit to impeach a will the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying a plea in bar, holding that if the circuit court erred in denying the plea in bar, any error was harmless.Ten days before the decedent's death, Robert Machen, a lawyer who had befriended the decedent, presented the decedent with copies of a will he had drafted for her signature. The decedent signed the will, which contained a no-contest clause providing that the decedent's family members would get nothing from the estate if they contested the will. All family members except David Williams signed a release form. Williams then brought this suit to impeach the will. Machen filed a plea in bar asserting that Williams lacked standing to sue. The circuit court denied the plea in bar and held that the will and been procured by undue influence and fraud. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that any error in denying the plea in bar as to Williams was harmless. View "Machen v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Defendant's plea in bar and dismissing Plaintiffs' action, holding that Plaintiffs had standing and were not collaterally estopped from pursuing the claims asserted in their complaint.Defendant, the matriarch of the Plofchan family, created a trust and named two of her children, Plaintiffs, as co-trustees. Defendant then petitioned the Supreme Court to appoint her daughter as her property guardian. The guardianship court denied relief, finding Defendant was not an incapacitated person. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint against Defendant seeking injunctive relief to prohibit Defendant from dissipating trust assets and interfering with the trust's administration. The circuit court sustained Defendant's plea in bar and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court abused its discretion in sustaining the plea in bar for collateral estoppel and lack of standing, and the errors were not harmless. View "Plofchan v. Plofchan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the trial court that James Charles St. John must pay attorney fees to the person he defrauded, holding that the circuit court did not err.St. John befriended his neighbor, Ernest Stuart Elsea, II. St. John subsequently persuaded Elsea to transfer his extensive firearm collection to a firearm trust that St. John established and controlled and had Elsea sign a durable power of attorney. St. John then induced Elsea to sign a codicil to his will naming St. John and St. John's partner as beneficiaries. Elsea filed a complaint seeking an accounting and a recovery of the firearms, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, and alleging fraud an undue influence. The circuit court rejected counts one and two but ordered St. John to either return the firearms to Elsea or pay Elsea the value of the firearms. The circuit court then ordered St. John to pay attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly awarded fees under Prospect Development Co. v. Bershader, 258 Va. 75 (1999). View "St. John v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint regarding the distribution of Dr. Lloyd Griffith's estate, holding that Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the claims asserted.Dr. Griffith was survived by his three adult children - two daughters (collectively, Plaintiffs) and a son, Charles - and his second wife, Mary Cate. Charles, acting as the personal representative of Dr. Griffith's estate, requested to probate his father's 2010 will after initially probating a 2008 will. The circuit court ordered that the 2010 be entered into probate. In 2018, Plaintiffs filed a complaint listing Mary Cate and Charles as defendants, alleging, among other claims, breach of fiduciary duty, waste of the estate, constructive fraud, and conversion. The circuit court dismissed the claims with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' factual allegations were insufficient to establish standing. View "Platt v. Griffith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Defendant's demurrer to Plaintiffs' suit, holding that "fair market value" on a specified date, without more specificity, was not a sufficiently certain price term to allow a court to compel specific performance of a contract regarding the purchase of real estate.The decedent executed a will wherein she devised property to Plaintiffs, her three daughters. In the same will, the decedent granted her son, Defendant, an option to purchase the property from his sisters. The decedent then executed a codicil to her will revising the purchase price for the option to "an amount equal to the fair market value at the time of my death." In their complaint, Plaintiffs sought specific performance of a contract for the purchase of real estate. The circuit court dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that there was no enforceable contract because the will and codicil did not determine the purchase price and did not provide a method of determining the purchase price. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term "fair market value," as set forth in the codicil, did not provide a price for the property, nor did it provide a mode for ascertaining the price with sufficient certainty. View "Wilburn v. Mangano" on Justia Law