Articles Posted in Trusts & Estates

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At issue in this case was the validity of instruments executed by Beverly Gelber two months before she died. The documents purported to convey Beverly’s home and personal property to her daughter, Meryl Glock. Lawrence Gelber and Darlene Fleischmann, Beverly’s children and the executors of her estate, filed this lawsuit asserting that Meryl wrongfully induced Beverly to execute a deed of gift and bill of sale through undue influence and fraud and that the bill of sale, which Beverly executed in her individual capacity, was of no effect because Beverly’s personal property was held in trust. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court and remanded this case for a new trial, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying the executors’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of title and possession of Beverly’s personal property, in excluding records of real estate tax assessments on Beverly’s home, and in granting the motion to strike the executors’ evidence on the civil conspiracy claims; and (2) erred in excluding from evidence declarations made by Beverly disavowing the property transfers and in granting the motion to strike the executors’ evidence on their claims for undue influence and promissory fraud. View "Gelber v. Glock" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates

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Frank Still and Jane Still, who were married, created trusts in 1991 and amended those trusts in 1999. Also in 1999, Frank executed a durable power of attorney. Frank designated Jane as his attorney-in-fact should he become incapacitated and LaVerne Lemen, his daughter, as his successor attorney-in-fact. Frank’s other child was Jeffrey Still. Frank’s power of attorney vested his agent with broad powers. In 2011, Jane died, and Lemen and Still received nothing from Jane’s estate. Upon Jane’s death, Lemen became Frank’s attorney-in-fact, and she and Still became co-trustees of Frank’s trust and the executors of his will. Lemen and Still relied on the broad power of attorney to create an inter vivos trust that disinherited Jane’s heirs and provided for Lemen and Still to receive Frank’s entire estate at his death. William Reineck, Jane’s heir, filed suit against Lemen and Still, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted summary judgment for Lemen and Still. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment with the exception of the award of attorney’s fees against Reineck personally, holding (1) Lemen’s actions were authorized by the power of attorney; and (2) the court erred in awarding attorney’s fees. View "Reineck v. Lemen" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates

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The two decedents in these consolidated cases were residents at two different nursing homes operating by Virginia Health Services, Inc. After their deaths, the executors asked the nursing homes to provide copies of the written policies and procedures in effect during the decedents’ stays. The nursing homes refused, and the decedents’ estates filed declaratory judgment complaints seeking to assert a private right of action for the production of documents under 12 VAC 5-371-140(G). Specifically, the estates sought an order of “specific performance” compelling the nursing homes to provide the requested documents. The circuit court dismissed both complaints, holding that the regulation did not require the production of documents requested by the estates. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) the governing statute does not imply a private right of action for the enforcement of this regulation; and (2) therefore, the estates’ claims cannot be enforced in a declaratory judgment action. View "Cherrie v. Virginia Health Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2003, Dumville met with attorney Thorsen to prepare her will. Thorsen understood that Dumville wanted a will that would, upon her death, convey all of her property to her mother if her mother survived her, and, if her mother predeceased her, to the Richmond Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). Dumville was 43 and lived with three cats, which she desired to go to the RSPCA upon her death. Thorsen prepared, and Dumville executed, the will. She died in 2008, her mother having predeceased her. Thorsen, as co-executor of the estate, notified the RSPCA that it was the sole beneficiary of Dumville’s estate. Thorsen was informed that, in the opinion of the title insurance company, the will left only the tangible estate, not real estate, to the RSPCA. Thorsen brought suit in a collateral proceeding to correct this “scrivener’s error” based on Dumville’s clear original intent. The court found the language unambiguously limited the RSPCA bequest to tangible personal property, while the intangible estate passed intestate to Dumville’s heirs at law. The RSPCA received $72,015.60, but the bequest, less expenses, would have totaled $675,425.50 absent the error. RSPCA sued Thorsen for negligence, as a third-party beneficiary of his contract with Dumville. The court found for the RSPCA. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed: RSPCA was a clearly and definitely identified third-party beneficiary. View "Thorsen v. Richmond Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals" on Justia Law

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Settlor established a revocable trust that designated his new wife and his only children, two sons from a previous marriage (the Sons), as beneficiaries. After Settlor died, the Trustee informed the Sons that she had decided that the Sons’ act of writing certain letters to an attorney and a beneficiary violated the Trust’s no contest clause. The Sons filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that their conduct did not trigger the no contest clause. The Trustee demurred. The court overruled the demurrer and ruled that the Sons and their descendants were the rightful remainder beneficiaries of the Trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the Trustee’s demurrer and in concluding that the Sons and their respective descendants were rightful beneficiaries of the Trust. View "Rafalko v. Georgiadis" on Justia Law

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Four-year-old Jameer Woodley was killed in a school bus accident. The decedent’s parents, who qualified as co-administrators of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit against the Southampton County School Board and three bus drivers. A jury awarded damages to the statutory beneficiaries, including the decedent’s three older brothers. Plaintiffs presented to the trial court two proposed irrevocable trusts to receive the funds awarded to their minor sons. The trial court rejected the proposed trusts and directed payment of the awards to the clerk of court. The clerk later advised Plaintiffs that the funds would be deposited in a savings account at a bank with a rate-of-return of .10 percent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred when it refused to direct payment of the minor beneficiaries’ awards to the personal representatives and instead ordered that the awards be placed in a bank account maintained by the clerk of court. View "In re Woodley" on Justia Law

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In 2002, James Edmonds executed a will that left all of his personal property to his wife, Elizabeth, and the remainder of his property to a revocable living trust. After James died, his original will could not be located. Elizabeth filed a complaint seeking to have a copy of the will and trust to be probated. The trial court ordered that a photocopy of the 2002 will be probated, concluding that Elizabeth had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the will was not revoked. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts were sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that James did not destroy the original 2002 will with the intention of revoking it. View "Edmonds v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

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This case concerned a dispute over the disposition of shares of stock in a family held business after the death of the business’s founding generation. Plaintiff, one of the founder’s children and a stockholder, filed suit after the death of her mother, Norma, to whom shares in the business were transferred upon the founder’s death. Plaintiff alleged that a shareholders’ agreement controlled disposition of Norma’s shares and that the business was required to purchase those shares. Defendants argued that Norma’s estate planning documents controlled the disposition of Norma’s stock, and accordingly, those shares were to go into an inter vivos trust. The circuit court concluded that the shares were to pass to the inter vivos trust established by Norma’s estate planning documents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the shareholders’ agreement governed disposition of Norma’s shares of the business’s stock. View "Jimenez v. Corr" on Justia Law

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After Tonia Begley died, Robert Bartee and Wiley Begley qualified as co-administrators of Begley’s estate. Wiley Begley subsequently died. Thereafter, Bartee filed a wrongful death lawsuit against an emergency department physician. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that Bartee lacked standing to sue alone. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bartee had standing to file the action under the doctrine of survivorship because the power of appointment given to Bartee and Wiley Begley as co-administrators of the estate to prosecute a wrongful death action could be exercised by Bartee as the sole remaining survivor. Remanded. View "Bartee v. Vitocruz" on Justia Law

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John Warren Shepperd, who never married and had no children, died without having executed a will. Fourteen second cousins from John’s maternal side and Jason Shepperd, John’s half-uncle from John’s paternal side, survived John’s death. The administrator of John’s estate sought judicial assistance to determine the proper distribution proportions of John’s estate where all the heirs were collaterals and the estate must be separated into paternal and maternal parts. The circuit court held that, because of Jason’s half-blood status, Jason could only take a one-half share of John’s estate that was to pass to John’s paternal side, and the remainder of John’s estate was to go to the fourteen maternal second cousins. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Va. Code Ann. 64.2-200(A)(5) requires John’s estate to be separated into two moieties, each valued at one-half of John’s estate, with one moiety half passing to John’s maternal kindred and the other moiety passing to John’s paternal kindred; (2) the maternal side moiety passes to John’s fourteen second cousins, and the other moiety passes to John’s paternal kindred; and (3) Va. Code Ann. 64.2-202(A) requires John’s paternal side moiety to be distributed entirely to Jason. View "Sheppard v. Junes" on Justia Law

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