Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Settlor established a revocable trust that designated his new wife and his only children, two sons from a previous marriage (the Sons), as beneficiaries. After Settlor died, the Trustee informed the Sons that she had decided that the Sons’ act of writing certain letters to an attorney and a beneficiary violated the Trust’s no contest clause. The Sons filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that their conduct did not trigger the no contest clause. The Trustee demurred. The court overruled the demurrer and ruled that the Sons and their descendants were the rightful remainder beneficiaries of the Trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the Trustee’s demurrer and in concluding that the Sons and their respective descendants were rightful beneficiaries of the Trust. View "Rafalko v. Georgiadis" on Justia Law

Four-year-old Jameer Woodley was killed in a school bus accident. The decedent’s parents, who qualified as co-administrators of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit against the Southampton County School Board and three bus drivers. A jury awarded damages to the statutory beneficiaries, including the decedent’s three older brothers. Plaintiffs presented to the trial court two proposed irrevocable trusts to receive the funds awarded to their minor sons. The trial court rejected the proposed trusts and directed payment of the awards to the clerk of court. The clerk later advised Plaintiffs that the funds would be deposited in a savings account at a bank with a rate-of-return of .10 percent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred when it refused to direct payment of the minor beneficiaries’ awards to the personal representatives and instead ordered that the awards be placed in a bank account maintained by the clerk of court. View "In re Woodley" on Justia Law

In 2002, James Edmonds executed a will that left all of his personal property to his wife, Elizabeth, and the remainder of his property to a revocable living trust. After James died, his original will could not be located. Elizabeth filed a complaint seeking to have a copy of the will and trust to be probated. The trial court ordered that a photocopy of the 2002 will be probated, concluding that Elizabeth had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the will was not revoked. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts were sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that James did not destroy the original 2002 will with the intention of revoking it. View "Edmonds v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute over the disposition of shares of stock in a family held business after the death of the business’s founding generation. Plaintiff, one of the founder’s children and a stockholder, filed suit after the death of her mother, Norma, to whom shares in the business were transferred upon the founder’s death. Plaintiff alleged that a shareholders’ agreement controlled disposition of Norma’s shares and that the business was required to purchase those shares. Defendants argued that Norma’s estate planning documents controlled the disposition of Norma’s stock, and accordingly, those shares were to go into an inter vivos trust. The circuit court concluded that the shares were to pass to the inter vivos trust established by Norma’s estate planning documents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the shareholders’ agreement governed disposition of Norma’s shares of the business’s stock. View "Jimenez v. Corr" on Justia Law

After Tonia Begley died, Robert Bartee and Wiley Begley qualified as co-administrators of Begley’s estate. Wiley Begley subsequently died. Thereafter, Bartee filed a wrongful death lawsuit against an emergency department physician. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that Bartee lacked standing to sue alone. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bartee had standing to file the action under the doctrine of survivorship because the power of appointment given to Bartee and Wiley Begley as co-administrators of the estate to prosecute a wrongful death action could be exercised by Bartee as the sole remaining survivor. Remanded. View "Bartee v. Vitocruz" on Justia Law

John Warren Shepperd, who never married and had no children, died without having executed a will. Fourteen second cousins from John’s maternal side and Jason Shepperd, John’s half-uncle from John’s paternal side, survived John’s death. The administrator of John’s estate sought judicial assistance to determine the proper distribution proportions of John’s estate where all the heirs were collaterals and the estate must be separated into paternal and maternal parts. The circuit court held that, because of Jason’s half-blood status, Jason could only take a one-half share of John’s estate that was to pass to John’s paternal side, and the remainder of John’s estate was to go to the fourteen maternal second cousins. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Va. Code Ann. 64.2-200(A)(5) requires John’s estate to be separated into two moieties, each valued at one-half of John’s estate, with one moiety half passing to John’s maternal kindred and the other moiety passing to John’s paternal kindred; (2) the maternal side moiety passes to John’s fourteen second cousins, and the other moiety passes to John’s paternal kindred; and (3) Va. Code Ann. 64.2-202(A) requires John’s paternal side moiety to be distributed entirely to Jason. View "Sheppard v. Junes" on Justia Law

Shirley Gregg Dean (Shirley) and Marion Casey Dean (Casey) married in 1978. Shirley died in 1999. At the time, Shirley’s daughters (the sisters) decided not to probate their mother’s estate, basing their decision on their belief that Shirley had an oral contract with Casey for him to provide for them in his will. After Casey died in 2010, the sisters sued Casey’s estate for breach of an oral contract between Casey and Shirley. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the sisters, concluding that they carried their burden of proving that there was an oral agreement between Casey and Shirley to leave one-third of Casey’s estate to Shirley’s children if Shirley predeceased Casey. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court ruling that a contract existed between Shirley and Casey, holding that the record lacked clear and convincing evidence as to the terms of the agreement between Casey and Shirley. View "Dean v. Morris" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are the estranged great grandchildren of Elsie and legatees to one half of her residuary estate under a will dated 2004 and admitted to probate following Elsie's death in 2010. The defendants are Audrey, Elsie's sister and legatee to the remaining half of her residuary estate, and Elsie’s former neighbors, Toni, Bruce, and Mike. Elsie's will nominated Toni as executrix; Toni and Audrey took possession of significant assets from Elsie during Elsie’s life. Toni and Bruce began providing assistance to Elsie and her husband in 2004 under a contract providing that Toni and Bruce would be paid $500 per week and would receive $8000 for assistance given in the past. The agreement provided that Toni and Bruce would be paid from her estate, rather than during her lifetime. The trial court found that that Toni, while acting as an agent under the power of attorney, did not arrange for Elsie’s assets to pass at death to the defendant, that the assets in question were retitled by Elsie personally. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Toni was in a confidential relationship with Elsie and the burden was on the defendants to rebut the presumption that the transactions were the result of undue influence. View "Ayers v. Shaffer" on Justia Law

At issue in this will contest was whether the circuit court erred in instructing the jury as to the existence of the presumption of testamentary capacity. In this case, the decedent bequeathed her dog and a cash gift for the dog's care to Appellant and bequeathed the remainder of her residuary estate to charity. Appellant contended that, under the facts of this case, the presumption disappeared, and it was error to instruct the jury regarding the presumption. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding (1) the presumption of testamentary capacity does not necessary disappear in the face of evidence to the contrary, and moreover, the circuit court did not rule at the motion to strike that the presumption had been rebutted; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not err in instructing the jury about the presumption. View "Kiddell v. Labowitz" on Justia Law

Lloyd Tuttle Jr. appealed the circuit court's judgment holding that execution of a check payable to his wife, Grace Tuttle, excluded the funds from Grace's augmented estate and that therefore Lloyd's written consent or joinder was not required when Grace, before her death, gifted the funds to her son. Lloyd also appealed the circuit court's judgment holding him liable for more than one-half of an indebtedness evidenced by a note executed by him and Grace as co-makers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Lloyd's check to Grace did not exclude those funds from Grace's augmented estate, and therefore, the circuit court erred by failing to include the funds in Grace's augmented estate; and (2) the circuit court erred by requiring Lloyd to pay more than one-half of the total joint indebtedness, as Lloyd was liable for only one-half of the indebtedness. View "Tuttle v. Webb" on Justia Law