Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose from two civil investigative demands (CIDs) issued to the University of Virginia and the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (collectively, UVA) by the attorney general, pursuant to the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act (FATA). The CIDs sought information relating to the research of a climate scientist that had taught at UVA, received a series of grants to fund his research, and, with other climate scientists, had allegedly falsified data to indicate an upturn in the earth's surface temperatures due to the use of fossil fuels. UVA petitioned the circuit court to set aside the CIDs, arguing that the attorney general had no statutory authority to serve CIDs upon agencies of the Commonwealth and that the CIDs were defective because they failed to state the nature of the conduct alleged. The circuit court granted the petition and set aside the CIDs, without prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, but, unlike the circuit court, set aside the CIDs with prejudice, holding that the University of Virginia, as an agency of the Commonwealth, did not constitute a "person" under the FATA and therefore could not be the proper subject of a CID. View "Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va." on Justia Law

James Blaxton was convicted in 1989 of rape, forcible sodomy and attempted sodomy. In 2008, the Commonwealth filed a petition seeking Blaxton's civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. The trial court found that Blaxton was a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). The circuit court subsequently entered an order granting Blaxton conditional release and transferred supervision of Blaxton to the state of Illinois after finding that the SVPA does not prohibit interstate transfers of sexually violent predators. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court's judgment was error pursuant to Commonwealth v. Amerson, in which the Court held that the SVPA does not authorize the conditional release of a sexually violent predator outside the Commonwealth. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Blaxton" on Justia Law

SunTrust Bank and Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA) owned two properties in the City of Richmond as tenants in common. The RRHA was exempt from taxation but SunTrust was not. In 2009, the City determined that SunTrust was liable not only for the taxes on its ownership interests, but also for the taxes on the RRHA's interests. The City accordingly corrected the assessments against SunTrust for 2006 through 2009 to reflect that it was liable for taxes on both its ownership interests and the RRHA's. SunTrust challenged the City's actions, and the circuit court ruled that the City had no authority to tax SunTrust for the RRHA's ownership interests in the properties. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City had no authority pursuant to the parties' operating agreements, the state Constitution, or state law to tax SunTrust for the RRHA's ownership interests in the properties. View "City of Richmond v. SunTrust Bank" on Justia Law

During the course of his employment as a police officer for the Town of Abingdon, Kevin Christy suffered injuries from an automobile accident. Christy was insured under an automobile liability insurance policy issued by Mercury Casualty Company (Mercury). Christy submitted a claim to Mercury for payment of the portion of his medical expenses not paid by the Town's workers' compensation carrier. Mercury denied the claim, asserting that an exclusion in the policy barred Christy from receiving any payment for medical expenses because a portion of those expenses had been paid by workers' compensation benefits. Christy filed a warrant in debt against Mercury seeking contract damages. The district court entered judgment in favor of Christy. The circuit court reversed, concluding that, based on the unambiguous language of the exclusion, payment of workers' compensation triggered the exclusion and precluded payment by Mercury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of the exclusion was clear and that the exclusion permitted Mercury to deny coverage for any expenses that would have been subject to workers' compensation coverage without regard to whether all of those expenses were actually paid by the workers' compensation carrier. View "Christy v. Mercury Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to attempted rape, a felony. Defendant's sentencing order contained a provision stating that the sentencing court would reduce the conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor following Defendant's incarceration and successful completion of probation. After Defendant violated his probation, he filed a motion to vacate the sentencing order as void ab initio and to dismiss his charge of the probation violation, arguing that the circuit court did not have the power to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor under the circumstances. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in this case, the circuit court did not have the power to render a judgment reducing Defendant's conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor more than five years after its entry of the sentencing order; and (2) the ultra vires provision in the sentencing order resulted in the entire sentencing order being void ab initio. View "Burrell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

On February 5, 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant doctor, alleging that he committed medical malpractice during his treatment of her. On February 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion asking the circuit court to find that she had shown good cause for lack of service of process on Defendant within the statutory twelve month period. The court granted the extension. On March 30, 2010, Bowman obtained service of process of the complaint on Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The circuit court held that the February 5, 2010 order was void because Plaintiff's failure to obtain service on Defendant within twelve months resulted from a lack of due diligence on her part. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in ruling that the February 5, 2010 order was void, but it did not err in setting aside the order and requiring Plaintiff to demonstrate that she exercised due diligence in attempting to obtain service of process on Defendant; and (2) did not err in finding that Bowman had not shown that she exercised due diligence in seeking to obtain service of process upon Defendant within twelve months of filing her complaint. View "Bowman v. Concepcion" on Justia Law

After Jennifer Bing was arrested on suspicion of drug possession and distribution, a lieutenant conducted a full cavity search on Bing. Almost two years later, Bing filed a complaint against several law enforcement officers, alleging assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that the search was illegal. The trial court found that the statute of limitations barred Bing's claim and dismissed with prejudice the cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err when it granted Defendants' plea of the statute of limitations because Bing was "confined" within the meaning of Va. Code Ann. 8.01-243.2, and the body cavity search related to the conditions of her confinement. Therefore, a one-year statute of limitations applied. View "Bing v. Haywood" on Justia Law

Brenda Collins filed a motion for judgment against Verbena Askew, a former circuit court judge, among others, alleging defamation, conspiracy and breach of contract. Collins settled with the other defendants, and the case proceeded to trial against Askew. The jury returned a verdict in Collins' favor on the defamation claim. Askew subsequently moved the trial court to set aside the verdict or to reduce it by the sums Collins had already received from the other defendants, arguing that a reduction was required by Va. Code Ann. 8.01-35.1.The trial court denied the motions, and Askew appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to set aside the jury's verdict or in refusing to apply section 8.01-35.1 to reduce the amount of the judgment. View "Askew v. Collins" on Justia Law

After the decedent's death, the decedent's daughter probated her 2008 will and qualified as executor for the will. The decedent's remaining children sued the daughter to challenge the will. The trial court ruled that the 2008 will had been impeached and Decedent's 2007 will should proceed to probate, holding (1) Decedent lacked testamentary capacity when she executed her contested will, and (2) the contested will was the result of undue influence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred where (1) the trial court's decision that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity was based on an incorrect view of the law and an improper weighing of the evidence; and (2) the evidence in this case rebutted the presumption of undue influence. Remanded. View "Weedon v. Weedon" on Justia Law

Defendant Roger Stevens was found guilty of, among other crimes, two counts of murder, two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, and malicious bodily injury. The court of appeals affirmed Stevens' conviction. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statement to police during a custodial interrogation because, in light of the circumstances, Defendant's request for a lawyer was ambiguous and, therefore, the officers were entitled to ask further clarifying questions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the officers could have reasonably viewed Stevens' statement as ambiguous, and thus they were permitted to ask Stevens clarifying questions. View "Stevens v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law