Justia Virginia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Virginia Supreme Court
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Jeffrey Ruhlin filed a complaint against Mariam Samaan, seeking damages for injuries he suffered in an automobile accident with Samaan. The jury found in favor of Ruhlin and awarded him $5,000 in damages. Ruhlin appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in ruling on two evidentiary issues during the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the circuit court did not err in (1) permitting the use of a transcript of a recorded statement to refresh a witness's recollection and finding that the admission did not implicate the rule prohibiting the use of a written statement to directly impeach a witness; and (2) ruling that a witness's testimony concerning Ruhlin's prior consistent statements was not admissible into evidence. View "Ruhlin v. Samaan" on Justia Law

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Dewey Monroe, a member of a limited liability company, died. Through his will, Dewey bequeathed his entire estate to his daughter, Janet. Janet asserted that Dewey transferred his membership in the company to her. Lou Ann Monroe, the company's managing member, responded that Janet had inherited only Dewey's right to share in profits and losses of the company and to receive distributions to which he would be entitled. Janet filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking declaratory judgment that she had inherited her father's full membership in the company and that Lou Ann and Joseph Monroe, who was named in the company's operating agreement as a successor managing member, had been validly removed from their positions. The circuit court ruled that Janet was not a member of the company and thus lacked the authority to remove Lou Ann and Joseph from their positions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the company's operating agreement lacked specific language that would constitute an exception to the rule of dissociation set forth in Va. Code Ann. 13.1-1040.1; and (2) therefore, Dewey was dissociated from the company upon his death and Janet became a mere assignee, entitled only to Dewey's financial interest. View "Ott v. Monroe" on Justia Law

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The Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation (DRPT) entered into an agreement, pursuant to the Rail Enhancement Fund created by Va. Code Ann. 33.1-221.1:1.1, to grant funds to Norfolk Southern Railway Company (Norfolk Southern) for the development of an intermodal terminal in Montgomery County. Appellant, Montgomery County, instituted on action against DRPT, DRPT's director, and the Commonwealth Transportation Board, claiming that section 33.1-221.1:1.1 and the agreement were unconstitutional pursuant to the state Constitution's internal improvements clause and credit clause, and sought to enjoin their administration. Norfolk Southern subsequently intervened as a defendant. The circuit court ruled in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 33.1-221.1:1.1, as applied in this case, did not violate either the internal improvements clause or the credit clause of the Constitution of Virginia. View "Montgomery County v. Va. Dep't of Rail & Pub. Transp." on Justia Law

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Kasey Landrum sued Defendants, Chippenham and Johnson-Willis Hospitals and Dr. John Deitrick, for medical malpractice. Because Landrum did not identify her expert witnesses in accordance with the circuit court's scheduling order, Defendants moved to exclude the expert witnesses and for summary judgment. The circuit court denied Defendants' motions and gave Landrum's out-of-state counsel extra time to supplement the designation so as to comport with Va. R. Civ. P. 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). Landrum's out-of-state counsel then filed a supplemental designation without local counsel's signature in violation of Va. R. Civ. P. 1A:4(2). The circuit court then granted Defendants' motions to exclude the expert witnesses and for summary judgment after finding that Landrum could not meet her burden of proof on her medical-malpractice claims without an expert witness to establish the standard of care. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Landrum's expert's witnesses because of her failure to obey its pretrial orders. View "Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps." on Justia Law

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Employee of a pest control company signed an employment agreement containing a provision stating that he would not engage in similar business within two years after he ceased employment. After resigning and within the two-year period set forth in the provision, Employee became employed by another pest control company. Employer filed a complaint asserting that Employee's subsequent employment violated the provision. Employee filed a plea in bar, asserting that the provision was overbroad and therefore unenforceable. The circuit court granted the plea in bar and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in ruling the provision was unenforceable. View "Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer" on Justia Law

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George Christian filed petitions for temporary injunction and declaratory relief, alleging that the clerk of the State Corporation Commission (SCC) failed to provide requested public records relating to all overpayments or unused payments that the Commission's authority to order a refund had lapsed, and any complaints or grievances arising therefrom. The SCC dismissed the petition, finding (1) no controversy existed given the clerk's timely response to Christian's request for records; and (2) because no controversy existed, it was not necessary to address Christian's other arguments, including whether the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) was applicable to the SCC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a live controversy persisted because Christian would be entitled to recover his costs and fees if he prevailed; (2) however, the VFOIA was inapplicable to the SCC; and (3) therefore, Christian's assignments of error were resolved or rendered moot. View "Christian v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Calvin Bowman was found guilty of robbery, abduction, and two counts of use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The court of appeals and Supreme Court affirmed. Bowman subsequently filed petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Bowman's claim that the Commonwealth failed to correct false testimony of its witness was barred because this non-jurisdictional issue could have been raised at trial and on appeal; (2) evidence of the lack of Bowman's DNA on a piece of evidence did not prejudice him under the Strickland v. Washington standard; (3) the lack of evidence on a particular piece of clothing recovered from Bowman when he was arrested did not prejudice him under the Strickland standard; and (4) the introduction of evidence by Bowman's expert that confirmed the existence of his fingerprints at the scene of the crime but provided the opportunity for a different explanation did not prejudice him under the Strickland standard. View "Bowman v. Johnson" on Justia Law

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Defendant James Bevel was convicted in a jury trial for having sexual relations with his daughter. Bevel's counsel filed a notice of appeal, after which Bevel died. Counsel filed a motion to abate conviction ab initio, which the circuit court denied after finding that the Commonwealth had established good cause for not abating Bevel's conviction. The court of appeals affirmed. Later, the court of appeals entered an order in the merits appeal dismissing the appeal as moot. At issue was whether to abate a conviction ab initio when the defendant has died while his appeal was pending or to dismiss the appeal and leave the conviction intact. The Supreme Court (1) held that the question of whether a criminal conviction necessarily will abate upon the death of the defendant while an appeal is pending or whether there should be a good cause exception in that policy is appropriately decided by the legislature, not the courts; (2) vacated the judgment of the court of appeals applying the abatement doctrine; and (3) affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in the merits appeal, under the specific facts of this case, holding that Bevel's death rendered the appeal of his conviction moot. View "Bevel v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Defendant Jerry Anderson was found guilty of fellatio by force and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. The court of appeals denied his appeal. At issue was whether prior consistent statements made by the complaining witness were properly admitted in evidence to rehabilitate the witness after her impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in admitting the victim's prior consistent statements and any error by the circuit court in admitting parts of the prior consistent statements that were overly repetitious was harmless under the circumstances; and (2) Defendant had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice was reached. View "Anderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Wife sought to collect installments of child support that were due between the years 1967 and 1982. The circuit court determined the total amount of support arrearages due Wife was $73,629. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the parties' 1966 child support order created a judgment or judgments that triggered the running of the twenty-year statute of limitations set forth in Va. Code Ann. 8.01-251(A), therefore barring Wife's enforcement of the child support order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) each installment payment ordered by the court in its 1966 decree became a judgment on the date such payment was due if it was not paid; (2) all support obligations ordered by the divorce decree became due and owing in 1982, when the youngest child for whom Husband owed support reached the age of eighteen, and thus created judgments on or before that date; and (3) this action to collect past due child support obligations, based on the 1966 decree, was filed more than twenty years after any payments ordered by the decree became judgments by operation of law, and was barred pursuant to section 8.01-251(A). Final judgment entered for Husband. View "Adcock v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law